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ABSTRACT 
 
Does Truth Promote Peace? Toward a Greater Understanding of Truth Commissions as 
Transitional Justice Mechanisms.  
This study explores the societal effects of transitional justice mechanisms in post-
conflict countries. In particular, an emphasis is placed on exploring whether truth 
commissions, which are suggested in virtually all post-conflict situations today, have a 
positive or negative effect on key indicators, such as democracy, human rights, economic 
development, and the durability of peace. Three central research questions are examined. 
First, do truth and reconciliation commissions “work”? In other words, are they 
associated with a reduction in communal violence and improvements in democratic 
institutions, human rights protections, and economic development? Second, must truth 
commissions be coupled with transitional justice mechanisms that are retributive in 
nature in order to exhibit a positive societal effect? For example, if policymakers couple a 
truth commission with a human rights criminal tribunal, will this increase its efficiency 
and societal effect? Third, and finally, are top-down approaches to transitional justice, 
such as truth commissions, becoming increasingly obsolete in the 21
st
 century in 
comparison to more localized, traditional dispute resolution mechanisms? 
A mixed-method approach is used to explore these three central research puzzles. 
The quantitative section of this study uses a dataset on more than 1,100 transitional 
justice mechanisms between 1970 and 2010 to examine the first two research questions. 
The qualitative aspect of this study uses Rwanda’s gacaca courts as a case study to 
explore the effectiveness of bottom-up versus top-down approaches to transitional justice. 
These community-based courts were the face of Rwanda’s ambitious transitional justice 
project and charged with investigating all crimes committed during the genocide. To 
assess their effect, survey and interview data are used to draw connections and an overall 
picture of public perceptions toward gacaca and other forms of transitional justice in 
post-genocide Rwanda.  
This study finds evidence to suggest that truth commissions are unlikely to 
produce positive societal outcomes if used in isolation from other transitional justice 
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mechanisms. Further, this study finds some, albeit limited, evidence to suggest that truth 
commissions, when paired with reparations, do appear to be associated with positive 
societal effects in the forms of increased levels of democratization, reduced levels of 
communal violence, and increased levels of wealth in post-conflict countries. The 
Rwandan case study, moreover, indicates that top-down approaches will likely fail to 
accomplish their goals if they do not provide tangible results at the local-level. The key 
theme in the survey and interview data is that gacaca, while imperfect, was a country-
specific solution to a country-specific problem using a country-specific transitional 
justice mechanism. More importantly, this case study suggests that we must continue to 
rethink how transitional justice is being implemented in situations marked by past periods 
of violence and instability at the local level. A mixture of bottom-up and top-down 
approaches appear to be better situated to meet the specific needs and desires of various 
stakeholders that are influential in shaping peace, justice, and reconciliation.  
Key words: Transitional Justice, Truth Commissions, Restorative Justice, Retributive 
Justice, Gacaca Courts 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 A Tale of Two Post-Conflict Societies  
Colombia has the unfortunate distinction of hosting the longest running 
insurgency in the post-World War II international system. Decades-old violence between 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army 
(ELN), drug traffickers, criminal organizations, and the national government has killed an 
estimated 220,000 civilians and displaced six million (Patterson 2016, 4). As a 
consequence of this fighting, generations of Colombians have been haunted by 
kidnappings, forced displacement, summary executions, and retaliatory attacks from both 
government and rebel forces alike. In September 2016, FARC leaders and government 
officials agreed to a sweeping peace framework intended to formally bring an end to 
violence. This framework was predicated on four main themes: (1) FARC would be 
transformed into a political party in Colombia’s multi-party political system; (2) criminal 
trials would be held for egregious offenders of human rights abuses; (3) amnesty would 
be provided for rebels who turned in their arms; and (4) a truth commission would 
investigate allegations of misconduct and abuses perpetrated by both government and 
rebel forces. In a surprising turn of events, Colombian voters narrowly rejected the terms 
of this peace framework in a national referendum expressing their discontent with the 
parameters of the agreement and their fear that the peace process would not end a cycle 
of impunity. A revised peace framework, which was subsequently signed in November 
17 
 
2016, has since been plagued by problems associated with disarming, demobilizing, and 
reintegrating (DDR) roughly 7,000 former rebels. These complications, coupled with a 
failure to receive a popular mandate for the revised peace framework, have created 
obstacles toward societal reconciliation and the establishment and consolidation of an 
enduring and durable peace. 
Tunisia, like Colombia, is also a post-conflict country
1
 in a precarious state. 
Although popular uprisings led to the ousting of an entrenched autocrat, the subsequent 
transition to democracy has opened a Pandora’s Box of past crimes, abuses, and atrocities 
perpetrated against regime opponents and political opposition by state security forces and 
former government officials. A central component of the Tunisian political transition is 
the Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC), which, as a constitutionally-mandated truth 
commission, has the power and authority to investigate human rights abuses suffered by 
ordinary Tunisians and opposition figures under repressive governments since 1966. This 
commission, which formally began its operations in November 2016, has collected 
testimony from thousands of individuals who were victims of abuses and, upon 
completion, will recommend institutional reforms to ward off future troubles. The choice 
of a truth commission to become the bedrock of government efforts to address past 
human rights abuses, however, has been controversial since it has limited the ability of 
the transitional government to try, sentence, and punish thousands of former regime 
                                                          
1
 A post-conflict country is a country that is emerging from a period of political turmoil, 
state repression, or civil war. The term “post-conflict” only implies that physically 
hostilities and armed violence have ceased; it does not necessarily imply that the 
underlying, or root causes, of a conflict have been addressed. The term post-conflict does 
suggest a “window of opportunity” for peace as Fischer (2004, 2-3) and Hamre and 
Sullivan (2002, 90) suggest.  
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officials guilty of committing sweeping, widespread human rights abuses. Further, 
political and business elites that benefited from corrupt ties with the former government 
mostly remain in positions of power. Both of these facets have hindered Tunisia’s 
tenuous political transition and fomented underlying grievances among ordinary 
Tunisians who desire justice for crimes committed against loved ones, friends, and 
acquaintances.   
The post-conflict trajectories of Colombia and Tunisia, at first glance, share very 
little in common. Colombia is in the process of ending a decades old civil war and 
protracted insurgency, whereas Tunisia is emerging from decades of autocratic, 
strongman rule. Colombia and Tunisia, moreover, have adopted different paths to 
addressing mass human rights abuses. Colombia has adopted an amnesty program, 
implemented provisions to promote DDR, and created an ad hoc human rights criminal 
tribunal and truth commission to address insecurity and bring justice to victims and their 
families. Tunisia, on the other hand, has largely framed its political transition around a 
truth commission modeled after the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(SATRC).
2
 The goal of this commission is to establish an official, impartial history and 
restore a lost balance between victims and perpetrators, many of which remain in office 
or hold positions in Tunisia’s state security apparatus. The success of Tunisia’s peace 
process, as a result, largely hinges on whether the TDC can effectively dispense 
                                                          
2
 This commission was established to investigate widespread human rights abuses that 
occurred during South Africa’s apartheid regime between 1960 and 1994. Over the 
duration of its operations, it collected testimony from more than 20,000 witnesses, 2,000 
of which appeared publicly (Quinn and Freeman 2003, 1121). More than 30 TRCs have 
been created since, mainly as a key component of modern day peacebuilding operations, 
as illustrated by the Colombian and Tunisian peace process and democratic transition, 
respectively.  
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restorative justice
3
 in such a way that is acceptable to all stakeholders involved in its 
political transition. More importantly, its transition hinges on whether victims accept the 
outcomes of the TDC and view its operations as satisfactory toward their individual 
needs. Colombia’s peace process, on the other hand, hinges on the success of several 
mechanisms that blend restorative and retributive justice
4
 with the intended goal of 
delivering a sense of closure to victims and their families and punishing those who were 
culpable for abuses committed often decades ago.  
Although their post-conflict trajectories appear to have little overlap, efforts by 
key stakeholders, government officials, third-party donors, and intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) in both 
Columbia and Tunisia are similar in many respects. First, key stakeholders in both 
countries realize the importance of addressing past human rights abuses in some form or 
another as a clear building block for moving forward politically, socially, and 
economically. In his 2016 Nobel Peace Lecture, Colombian President Juan Manuel 
Santos stressed that even though the peace process did not address all societal concerns or 
problems associated with the insurgency completely, it provided a path forward for 
victims to learn the truth and begin the process of healing.
5
 In November 2016, 
Chairwoman of the TDC, Sihem Ben Sedrine, commented, moreover, that “we need to 
                                                          
3
 Restorative justice (i.e., reparative justice) places an emphasis on restoring a lost 
balance between victim and perpetrator and rehabilitating and reintegrating perpetrators 
back into society (Braithwaite 1999; Olson and Dzur 2004).  
4
 Retributive justice (i.e., punitive or corrective justice) entails punishing perpetrators of 
human rights abuses, often holding them criminally liable for their wrongdoings (Minow 
1998, 12).     
5
 Santos’s Nobel Lecture is available at: 
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2016/santos-lecture_en.html 
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expose these testimonies [of key perpetrators of human rights abuses] for history. The 
Tunisian people are tolerant, but they are tolerant after knowing the truth … Tunisia will 
no longer accept human rights violations.”6  
A second thread that unites the post-conflict trajectories of Colombia and Tunisia 
is how both have struggled immensely with the delicate question of how to best address 
past abuses in such a way that promotes social reconciliation instead of creating 
underlying grievances and animosities that have the potential to reignite conflict. Any 
effort to address past abuses holds the potential to rekindle the negative emotions of hate, 
anger, and revenge. Although key stakeholders agree that addressing the past is crucial 
for moving forward, respective efforts in each country have been a harbinger for painful 
memories. These efforts, moreover, have conjured different views toward the competing 
values of vengeance and forgiveness.
7
 
A third key thread that unites both of these post-conflict societies is the potential 
for the overall peace process to be derailed by factions unwilling to agree to the terms of 
their respective transition, the ability of political, economic, and social elites to mobilize 
against or try to frame the peace process in their favor, and lingering power dynamics and 
entrenched institutions, which make it difficult to completely move forward. These three 
                                                          
6
 Quote was obtained from a Reuters news story covering the beginning of testimony at 
the TDC. The full story is available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-rights-
idUSKBN13C2IF. 
7
 Martha Minow (1998) coined the term “vengeance and forgiveness” to describe the 
dilemma post-conflict countries face when dealing with past (and increasingly 
contemporary) human rights abuses. Minow uses the statement to describe how a violent, 
reaction to past abuses in the form of “vengeance” will not heal the trauma of mass 
violence. She also notes that the “saintliness” of forgiveness is not sufficient on its own 
when dealing with injustice and a past legacy of abuse.  
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factors, together, illustrate not only the complications associated with the post-conflict 
transitions of Colombia and Tunisia, but the long and tumultuous road any country 
emerging from a period of civil war, state repression, or political instability in the 
contemporary world faces when attempting to deal or cope with a violent past.   
1.2 Purpose Statement  
Post-conflict countries are confronted with a host of institutional challenges that 
hold the potential to derail peace and reignite renewed violence. Although physical 
hostilities may cease and belligerents may agree to basic provisions contained in a peace 
agreement or negotiated settlement, they often use the threat of violence to seek better 
terms and “spoilers” hold the potential to hijack the peace process for private gain 
(Stedman 1997; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Spoilers, as defined by Stephen John 
Stedman (1997, 5), are individuals, groups, or segments of society that “believe that 
peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and 
use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.”  
Further complicating matters, post-conflict societies are plagued by weak 
institutions, poverty, insecurity, the absence of the rule of law, low levels of social 
capital, crumbling infrastructure, and weak transitional governments that lack legitimacy 
and the ability to exercise authority through nonviolent means (de Greiff and Duthie 
2009). In most cases, these societies lack basic judiciaries that can mediate disputes, 
proper education and health systems, and economic opportunities for former combatants. 
As Donald Horowitz (2008, 1214-1215) comments, these societies are marked by the 
22 
 
absence of basic mechanisms to prevent intergroup tensions and disparities, which 
inevitably rise between groups in the aftermath of multipolar conflicts.   
Contributing to these institutional failures, post-conflict countries are also 
confronted with the difficult task of addressing past human rights abuses that often stand 
in the way of political and social reconciliation. These abuses can range from forcible 
displacement to torture, sexual violence, and extrajudicial killings. A failure to address 
these past abuses not only may prevent the establishment of a just or inclusive peace as a 
growing chorus of jus post bellum theorists suggest (Orend 2002; Walzer 2002; Williams 
and Caldwell 2006; Philpott 2012), but also possibly explain why one-fifth to one-third of 
all post-conflict societies relapse into armed violence within five years and about half of 
all post-conflict countries revert back to armed violence within a decade (Collier et al. 
2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 572-581).
8
  
The purpose of this study, then, is to examine how we can devise and implement 
durable, effective, and robust transitional justice processes that can allow post-conflict 
countries to address their dark pasts. In particular, I wish to shed light on how these 
countries can attempt to mitigate past human rights abuses in order to move forward 
politically, socially, and economically through the use of a methodologically rigorous 
research design. Transitional justice, as a conception of justice associated with the post-
conflict period, refers to any legal or non-legal mechanism that is adopted in the post-
conflict stage to address systematic and widespread human rights violations that occurred 
                                                          
8
 Walter (2004, 371) estimates that 36 percent of civil wars between 1945 and 1996 
experienced renewed warfare, which is slightly higher than the estimate from Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004).  
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during past, and sometimes contemporary, periods of violence, instability, or armed 
hostilities (de Greiff 2009; Teitel 2000; Hayner 2001; Olsen et al. 2010; Wiebelhaus-
Brahm 2010; Stewart and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2017).The goal of transitional justice is to 
shed light on past abuses but also repair a torn social or societal fabric in order to move 
forward. The mechanisms in which to do so vary dramatically in the world today and can 
range from criminal tribunals
9
 and truth commissions
10
 to amnesty programs,
11
 lustration 
policies (i.e., vetting, exile, or purging processes),
12
 and reparations.
13
 In virtually any 
post-conflict situation, one or more of these mechanisms is adopted by a transitional 
government, a neutral third-party mediator, or an IGO as a means of signifying a 
                                                          
9
 Criminal tribunals formally charge perpetrators with human rights violations (e.g., 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, acts of genocide) with the goal of holding them 
legally accountable or liable for their past actions. Posner and Vermeule (2004, 766) 
comment that “perpetrators are charged with crimes and then provided with lawyers, the 
chance to defend themselves, the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and other 
procedural protections.” Criminal tribunals are usually “ad hoc,” meaning that they exist 
for an abbreviated period of time. Criminal tribunals, moreover, are typically perceived 
as an extension of the Nuremburg trials and, thus, a Western form of justice.  
10
 Hayner (1994, 558) defines truth commissions as “bodies set up to investigate a past 
history of violations of human rights in a particular country - which can include 
violations by the military or other government forces or armed opposition forces.” These 
bodies are usually ad-hoc and focus on a specific period of human rights abuses. For 
example, Chile’s National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in 1990 (Rettig 
Commission) documented more than 3,400 cases of torture, kidnapping, assassinations, 
and targeted killings by security forces under the government of Augusto Pinochet as part 
of political purges between 1974 and 1977 (Weissbrodt and Fraser 1992).  
11
 Porter (2015, 82-83) defines amnesty programs as those that grant immunity from 
criminal prosecution to former combatants in exchange for disclosing their role in 
orchestrating human rights abuses.  
12
 Lustration policies (i.e., political purges) are intended to formally prevent perpetrators 
of state repression or human rights abuses from holding public office or positions in a 
country’s security apparatus (Mayer-Rieckh and de Greiff 2007). See David (2003) for a 
discussion on the implementation and effects of lustration policies in the Czech Republic 
and Poland, which had the intended goal of prohibiting former communist regime 
members and their sympathizers from holding public office or positions in government.   
13
 Olsen et al. (2010, 806) define reparations as a “state’s official grant of monetary 
payments, property, or other forms of restitution of monetary value to victims, or to 
relatives of victims, or past human rights violations.”  
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departure, or break, from a past period of state repression or widespread impunity. More 
importantly, these transitional justice mechanisms are usually devised in such a way to 
provide a sense of closure to victims or their families.  
Despite a burgeoning literature on the topic in recent decades, our understanding 
of transitional justice as well as the outcomes associated with different transitional justice 
mechanisms remains an incomplete enterprise. Some scholars place an emphasis on 
utilizing mechanisms that promote accountability for past crimes, such as criminal 
tribunals or lustration policies (e.g., Huyse 2003; Sikkink and Walling 2007; 
Wigglesworth 2008). Other scholars place an emphasis on adopting mechanisms that are 
more victim-centered and “buy off” perpetrators in exchange for immunity from post-war 
prosecution, such as reparations, exiles, or amnesties (e.g., Aron 1981; Fearon 2005). 
Still others place an emphasis on adopting mechanisms that allow victims to know the 
truth about what transpired to their loved ones in the form of truth commissions (Hayner 
2001; Kerr and Mobekk 2008; Kashyap 2009; Porter 2015). Further complicating matters 
is the fact that these mechanisms vary considerably in their application and 
implementation, with some criminal tribunals and truth commissions, for example, being 
ad hoc in nature (e.g., the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) and others 
existing alongside an established criminal justice system for an extended period (e.g., 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia) or implemented as a permanent 
organ of a newly established government (e.g., National Unity and Reconciliation 
Committee for Rwanda). 
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This study attempts to build on our understanding of what conditions the success 
of transitional justice by focusing primarily on the application and effectiveness of truth 
commissions both spatially and across time. In Colombia and Tunisia, truth commissions 
are a vital component of the overall peace process and a mechanism to establish an 
official, authoritative record of what transpired. These two cases, moreover, highlight a 
growing norm in favor of establishing the “truth” in the post-conflict stage. To increase 
our understanding of these mechanisms, this research is structured around two key 
puzzles. First, do truth commissions exhibit a positive or negative effect on post-conflict 
indicators? In particular, do these bodies increase the durability of peace and the 
prospects for economic development in post-conflict countries? Do they lead to 
improvements in democratization, end a cycle of impunity, and help improve the track 
record of human rights protections in the post-conflict countries they operate in? More 
importantly, should we expect variation between post-conflict countries that adopted 
truth commissions versus those that did not? Second, must truth commissions be coupled 
with other transitional justice mechanisms to be effective? In particular, should truth 
commissions, as a tool of restorative justice, be coupled with other mechanisms that are 
more retributive or punitive in nature to exhibit a positive social effect?  In the cases 
above, Colombia adopted a truth commission in conjunction with ad hoc criminal 
proceedings and amnesty program. Tunisia, on the other hand, has relied exclusively on a 
truth commission to promote transitional justice in the post-conflict stage. Will this 
variation in design and application lead to different societal outcomes in one post-conflict 
situation in comparison to the other?  
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1.3 Why Study Truth Commissions?    
Since the 1970s, approximately 50 truth commissions and commissions of inquiry 
have been established worldwide in countries as disparate as South Africa, El Salvador, 
South Korea, East Timor, Haiti, and Liberia.
14
 Today, truth commissions have been 
popularized as an attractive mechanism for transitional justice, one that is capable of 
bringing disparate parties together through the establishment of an official, impartial 
history of events. Figure 1 illustrates the proliferation of truth commissions in today’s 
post-Cold War international system, from a low of four truth commissions between 1970 
and 1979 to a high of 25 between 2000 and 2009. A critical juncture in the application of 
truth commissions is the South Africa TRC, which was created in 1995 and garnered 
mass international attention for its use in uncovering crimes and abuses committed during 
South Africa’s apartheid regime. In total, this commission collected testimony from 
20,000 individuals, named individual perpetrators, and recommended reparations to 
victims of state repression (Gibson 2006). The SATRC is widely viewed as being an 
important stepping stone for racial reconciliation and, more importantly, a catalyst for the 
consolidation of democracy, improvements in human rights, and impressive domestic 
economic growth rates since the mid-1990s (Gibson 2006; Bickford 2007; Gibson 2009).  
                                                          
14
 A list of all truth commissions between 1974 and 2010 can be found in Appendix A. 
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This proliferation of truth commissions has also been aided by a growing 
international norm that families should be guaranteed the basic right of knowing what 
transpired, or happened, to their loved ones as part of any peace or politically-motivated 
transitional process. This right to know the truth about abuses suffered, the identity of 
individual perpetrators, or the fate and whereabouts of loved ones is enshrined in the 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, the International Convention for the 
Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances (ICCPED), and the United 
Nations Convention against Torture (UNCAT). These treaties, however, lack compliance 
mechanisms and no specific international convention has been reached on the topic. 
Based on cumulative figures in Table 1, the frequency of truth commissions pales 
in comparison to the frequency of criminal trials and amnesties in today’s post-Cold War 
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Figure 1: Frequency of Truth Commissions, 1970-2009
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international system; however, the percentage increase in the adoption of truth 
commissions (as well as reparations and lustrations) has increased dramatically over both 
trials and amnesties over this period (see Table 2). Despite only comprising 7 percent of 
all transitional justice mechanisms since 1989, there has been a 400 percent increase in 
the number of truth commissions between 1989 and 2010 compared to 1970 and 1988. 
The frequency of trials has increased marginally (28 percent), while there has been a 0.6 
percent decrease in the usage of amnesties over this period. Reparations and lustration 
policies have also increased dramatically in today’s post-Cold War international system 
(1850 percent and 115 percent respectively), yet their usage is largely isolated to Eastern 
European or Latin American countries transitioning away from authoritarian regimes as 
part of the Third Wave of Democratization (see Table 3). Truth commissions, on the 
other hand, have proliferated in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and are recommended in 
virtually every post-conflict country today, making them truly an international tool for 
transitional justice rather than a Western or Latin American solution to addressing a 
legacy of human rights abuses.  
 
Table 1. Frequency of Trials, Amnesties, Truth Commissions, Reparations, & 
Lustration Policies, 1989 - 2010         
Type         Number  Percentage 
Criminal Tribunals       147       24   
Amnesties        355   58       
Truth commissions       45   7         
Reparations        39   6                 
Lustration Policies       28   5                   
Total         614   100      
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Table 2. Percent Change in Frequency of Trials, Amnesties, Truth Commissions, 
Reparations, & Lustration Policies, 1970 - 2010       
Type     1970-1988       After 1989             Percent 
                     Change 
Trials         115   147    +28  
Amnesties        357   355        -0.6 
Truth commissions       9   45   +400      
Reparations        2   39   +1850    
Lustration Policies       13   28   +115 
              
 
 
Table 3. Frequency of Trials, Amnesties, Truth Commissions, Reparations, & 
Lustration Policies by Region, 1989 - 2010        
Type   Asia Africa    Latin       North   W. Europe    E. Europe  Oceania 
       America  America      
Trials   26 34   23            11             11                    41                   1 
Amnesties  130 134   43             0  5                     41                   2     
Truth commissions 12 15   14        0               2                      2                    0        
Reparations  4           6           10             0               7                      11                  1 
Lustration Policies 2 4    7              0               1                      14                  0
             
What’s troubling about this proliferation of truth commissions is the absence of 
empirical data to determine whether they actually make a societal difference or not. In 
particular, we lack spatial and temporary data needed to determine whether truth 
commissions exhibit a positive or negative effect on democracy, human rights, economic 
development, and the durability of peace. Even more problematic, truth commissions 
vary dramatically in terms of costs and the time that is needed to complete their 
investigations. El Salvador’s truth commission in 1993, for example, cost upwards of $2 
million and took eight months to wrap up its proceedings (USIP 2017). South Africa’s 
TRC, on the other hand, cost upwards of $29 million and required more than two years to 
complete investigations into apartheid-related abuses and crimes (Economist 1997). 
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The majority of research we do have is largely case-study driven.
15
 Extant studies, 
moreover, tend to choose commissions that represent the opposite sides of the spectrum 
when arguing the benefits or pitfalls associated with adopting these bodies. Eric 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010, 129) states “one obvious problem within the literature is that, 
in general, it is dominated by a few high-profile truth commission cases such as South 
Africa.” This means that proponents of truth commissions largely point to the success of 
South Africa’s TRC when making generalizations about the positive effects of truth 
commissions. Opponents, on the other hand, only focus on failures, such as Uganda’s 
truth commissions in 1974 and 1986 respectively,
16
 when noting the inherent limitations 
and weaknesses associated with these bodies. This reliance on case studies on both sides 
creates concerns related to selection bias and selecting on the dependent variable, both of 
which increase the potential for erroneous inferences being made in extant studies.  
Studies that have attempted to examine their effect geographically or as part of 
large-N studies have helped alleviate this small-N nature of the literature; however, these 
quantitative-based studies use different and often competing methods, datasets, and 
                                                          
15
 A majority of transitional justice research, in general, is qualitative and case-study 
driven. This is especially true for research on truth commissions. As a consequence, the 
study of truth commissions and transitional justice, overall, continues to lag behind other 
key topics in the study of international conflict, such as the causes of interstate and 
intrastate wars, territorial disputes, or alliance formation.  
16
 Idi Amin (i.e., The Butcher) is credited with creating the first truth commission to 
investigate crimes committed by his own security and police forces upon taking power. 
Yoweri Museveni, leader of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) also created a 
truth commission upon taking power in 1986 to illustrate his government’s break with the 
Amin and Obote governments, which were associated with notoriously cruel and 
inhumane human rights abuses. Both truth commissions are widely argued to be tools 
used by successive governments to shore up legitimacy and to pay lip service to calls to 
end a cycle of impunity. In both cases, the work of both commissions was hampered by 
financial problems and their recommendations largely fell on deaf ears.  
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indicators, which further contributes to contradictory results and findings. Further, few 
studies have attempted to parse out the societal effects or consequences of truth 
commissions in combination with other mechanisms in a rigorous, systematic way. Those 
that do so only focus on democracy or human rights protections as critical dependent 
variables, or focus on the conditions in which a certain combination of mechanisms is 
likely to be adopted over others (e.g., Olsen et al. 2010). Separating cause from effect, on 
the other hand, has remained notably elusive in extant studies.  
These limitations in existing studies causes conceptual and theoretical debates to 
linger without definitive evidence to suggest that these bodies matter or not. In practical 
terms, it seems entirely plausible that uncovering the past can promote healing and 
societal reconciliation. It also seems entirely plausible that uncovering the truth about 
past atrocities can foment debilitating feelings of hate, anger, and revenge. If there is 
evidence to conclude that truth commissions “work,” meaning that they have positive 
effects on post-conflict indicators then they should be adopted more vigorously in 
societies coming to terms with social strife. If they actually exhibit negative outcomes, a 
more vibrant and critical discussion must emerge when post-conflict societies plan on 
adopting a truth-seeking mechanism as part of their transitional process.  
How to promote peace and address a legacy of human rights abuses in war’s last 
phase is hardly a new topic or question in the fields of international peacebuilding and 
transitional justice. Several influential studies in recent years have yielded important, 
empirical insight into what conditions peace and the strategies in which post-conflict 
countries can use to promote transitional justice through the use of statistical analyses, 
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case study analyses, or historical analyses (e.g., Hayner 2001; Elster 2004; Sikkink and 
Walling 2007; Fletcher et al. 2009; Kim and Sikkink 2010; Meernik et al. 2010; Olsen et 
al. 2010; Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010). To contribute to an already impressive body of 
literature, the objective of this study is to examine the effectiveness of truth commissions 
in combination or in conjunction with other transitional justice mechanisms to build on a 
small subset of this literature (e.g., Olsen et al. 2010). In particular, this study isolates the 
effects of truth commissions in different combinations and examines the societal 
outcomes of these combinations on common societal outcomes, such as democracy and 
human rights, as well as additional outcomes in the form of economic development and 
the durability of peace. By doing so, the goal is to unite studies that have sought to 
explore the effectiveness of truth commissions alone (e.g., Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010) with 
those that have examined the effect of transitional justice mechanisms in a broader sense 
(e.g., Sikkink and Walling 2007; Kim and Sikkink 2010; Olsen et al. 2010).  
In undertaking this project and topic, the intent is to produce a better 
understanding of the ways in which we can promote an enduring and durable peace that 
is built on the foundations of ending a cycle of impunity, improving human rights, and 
promoting societal reconciliation. We desperately need to further our understanding of 
transitional justice and, in particular, the role that truth commissions play in this process 
as a consequence of the changing nature of contemporary global violence itself. In 
contrast to wars fought between countries on accepted battlefields using conventional 
weaponry, conflicts today are localized in so-called “zones of war” and involve 
extremely personalized violence that is often perpetrated along ethnic or religious lines 
(Singer and Wildavsky 1996; Kaldor 2006). Civilian populations are now caught in the 
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cross-hairs of this violence and directly targeted as a means to sow fear and exert control 
over an increasingly evolved battlefield (Kaldor 2006; de Nevers 2006; Banks 2011; 
Kaldor 2013).  
This changing nature of global violence means that civilian populations are 
increasingly subjected to widespread and repeated human rights abuses. The United 
Nations (UN), for example, estimates that 60,000 women were raped at some points, if 
not repeatedly, during Sierra Leone’s civil war (1991-2002), that 60,000 women were 
raped in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, and that anywhere between 100,000 to 250,000 
women were raped over a three-month period during the Rwandan genocide in 1994 (UN 
2014, 1). Coupled with this sexual violence, millions were displaced either internally or 
externally during these conflicts, creating mass humanitarian crises that are still being felt 
today in places such as the DR Congo. Not only does this changing nature of global 
violence complicate international peacebuilding strategies and laws of warfare governing 
interstate conflict, or conflicts between nation-states, it also creates complications for 
transitional justice mechanisms that are ill-prepared to deal with human rights abuses 
committed on a mass scale (Banks 2011; Richemond-Barak 2011; Zoli 2011).  
1.4 Central Research Questions  
A burgeoning literature in recent decades has provided important insight into the 
effect of transitional justice and other conflict resolution mechanisms in post-conflict 
countries. Our understanding of transitional justice, for example, has been strengthened 
by those that have identified historical and regional variation in the usage of certain 
mechanisms (e.g., Elster 2004, Sikkink and Walling 2007) or even collect information on 
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transitional justice on a global scale (e.g., Binningsbø et al. 2005). We have also 
benefited immensely from studies examining variation in outcomes across regime-type, 
conflict-type, and victory-type (e.g., Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010; Olsen et al. 2010). To 
build on an already impressive body of literature, this study is framed around the three 
central research questions identified in the purpose statement above:  
1. First, are truth commissions independently associated with positive societal 
outcomes (e.g., democracy, human rights, economic development, and peace) 
in countries emerging from periods of instability, state repression, or armed 
violence?  
2. Second, must truth commissions be coupled with transitional justice 
mechanisms that are retributive in nature (e.g., criminal tribunals, reparations, 
lustration policies) in order to exhibit a positive societal effect?  
3. Third, and finally, are top-down approaches to transitional justice, such as 
truth commissions, increasingly becoming obsolete as a consequence of 
shifting conflict trends (e.g., increased frequency of intrastate conflicts over 
interstate conflicts, the rise of low-intensity conflicts, etc.) and the changing 
nature of global violence?  
The first question is hardly new; however, adopting this research question enables 
this study to contribute to and build upon extant studies that have sought out the difficult 
task of isolating the effect and outcomes of truth commissions either through quantitative, 
historical, or case-study research designs. Not surprising, consensus on whether truth 
commissions actually “work” is far from homogenous. As described in greater detail in 
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Chapter 2, different camps have formed around the utility of truth commissions and truth-
seeking processes, with a number of scholars (e.g., Scharf 1997; Boraine 2000; Hayner 
2001; Abrams and Hayner 2002) advocating on behalf of establishing the truth in any 
post-conflict situation and a growing number of scholars (e.g., Popkin and Roht-Arriaza 
1995; Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003; Mendeloff 2004; Ingelaere 2009) advocating against 
the use of truth commissions and similar ad hoc bodies. Several quantitative studies, 
moreover, have found contradictory results when testing the effect of truth commissions 
on levels of democracy or human rights protections (e.g., Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010; Olsen 
et al. 2010).  
The second question is framed for a broader audience -- scholars and practitioners 
who are concerned with the effect of transitional justice as a whole. This question builds 
on extant studies that have begun the tedious and complicated task of exploring the 
individual effects and outcomes of various transitional justice mechanisms and, more 
importantly, parsing out the effect that certain mechanisms have in concert with others 
(e.g., Olsen et al. 2010; Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010). By framing the second question 
around the theme of retributive versus restorative effects, this study seeks to build on 
extant studies by empirically testing whether this relationship must hold true in post-
conflict societies today.   
The third question is framed for scholars who have questioned the discourse 
surrounding the top-down nature, or the “cookie-cutter” approach, of transitional justice. 
The conventional wisdom in the transitional justice literature is that there is not a one-
size-fits-all solution or approach that can be applied uniformly across continents (e.g., 
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UN 2010) and even within countries (e.g., Taylor 2015). Borrowing from scholars that 
have questioned the dominant discourse of “liberal” peacebuilding in the field of 
international peacebuilding (e.g., Paris 1997; Barnet 2006; Newman et al. 2009; Paris 
2009; Richmond 2011), there is now a growing view that top-down approaches may be 
flawed since they are easily manipulated by elites for personal gain or susceptible to the 
detrimental effect of spoilers (Austesserre 2006; Waldorf 2006; Lundy and McGovern 
2008; Fletcher 2009; Baines 2010; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; MacDonald 2015; 
Baker and Obradovic-Wochnik 2016).  
Top-down approaches to transitional justice can be thought of as those that place 
an emphasis on social reconciliation, the pursuit of justice, and the establishment of an 
official, authoritative record at the national-level. Bottom-up approaches, on the other 
hand, can be thought of as being less institutionalized and instead focused on repairing 
social relationships and promoting psychological healing among victims at the grassroots 
level. The purpose of this last question, then, is to critically assess whether top-down 
approaches to transitional justice are increasingly becoming obsolete in the 21
st
 century 
due to the changing nature of global violence itself, which has become increasingly 
localized. Since a robust debate has emerged between scholars of international 
peacebuilding over the utility and effectiveness of top-down peacebuilding strategies in 
comparison to bottom-up approaches, this third research question represents an attempt to 
bridge parallel critiques in two sets of closely linked literatures.  
A mixed-method research design is used to explore and provide empirical 
evidence for each of these three research questions (see Chapter 3). The quantitative 
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section of this study utilizes a dataset on approximately 1,100 transitional justice 
mechanisms between 1970 and 2010 to test the effects of truth commissions, reparations, 
amnesties, criminal tribunals, and lustration policies on post-conflict indicators, such as 
democracy, human rights, per capita gross domestic product (GDP), and the duration of 
peace. These data are used to provide important insight into the first two research 
questions. The qualitative section of this study uses Rwanda as a critical case study to 
provide insight into the third question.  Rwanda, which has engaged in extensive “social 
reengineering” projects since the Rwandan genocide, is used since it adopted a hybrid 
approach to transitional justice in the form of local, grassroots courts called gacaca and 
an internationally-backed, top-down criminal tribunal. Rwanda, as a result, is an excellent 
case study for providing insight into how contemporary post-conflict countries have 
grappled with the thorny question of how to address past abuses, at what level this should 
be done (especially when violence is perpetrated on a mass scale), and what the best 
strategy for moving forward after traumatic violence might be.  
1.5 Theoretical Framework & Hypotheses  
This study begins with the conventional wisdom that adopting more than one 
transitional justice mechanism improves the net effect of transitional justice as a whole in 
post-conflict countries (UN 2010). This study theorizes that truth commissions, alone, are 
unlikely to produce positive societal outcomes despite their growing popularity and 
application in virtually every contemporary, post-conflict situation (e.g., Tunisia). This 
study bases this view on the belief that the proceedings of truth commissions may not 
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deliver a sense of justice or closure to victims or their families. This lack of victim-
centered justice, as a result, is not likely to exhibit lasting societal effects.  
Truth commissions, without a doubt, offer an invaluable forum to collect the 
testimony of thousands of individuals. Further, these bodies hold the potential to promote 
psychological and societal healing by uncovering the truth about past abuses and being a 
catalyst for repairing intergroup relations, which can lead to improvements in levels of 
democracy, human rights, economic development, and the durability of peace. Finally, 
truth commissions can play an essential role in the post-conflict stage by dispelling myths 
and identifying perpetrators, thus administering a form of “shock therapy” by forcing 
transitional societies to confront structural and institutional weaknesses that made past 
injustices and violence possible, as was the case with the South African TRC.   
With that said, this study argues that truth commissions are unlikely to promote 
positive societal transformation by themselves due to their restorative nature. We should 
not expect post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions in isolation from other 
transitional justice mechanisms to experience measurable increases in levels of 
democratization, economic development, human rights protections, or the durability of 
peace since their effects are likely time-sensitive and can be muted after their 
proceedings, outcomes, and recommendations come to a close. This study advances the 
view that these bodies must be coupled with other transitional justice mechanisms to have 
a positive effect as a consequence of their lack of a punitive element or ability to punish 
perpetrators for past transgressions. If this view is correct, we should not expect the 
Tunisian TDC to impose positive societal outcomes since it lacks retributive elements.  
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Five hypotheses are framed from this theoretical argument in response to each of 
the three research questions above:  
H1: In a comparison of post-conflict countries, countries that adopt only a truth 
commission are less likely to experience advancements, or improvements, in levels of 
democratization in comparison to those that adopt a truth commission in combination 
with one or more retributive mechanisms.  
 The first hypothesis suggests that truth commissions alone are unlikely to become 
a catalyst for improvements in democratic institutions or processes. If coupled with 
retributive mechanisms, on the other hand, then we should expect truth commissions to 
exhibit a positive effect on levels of democracy in post-conflict countries. Democratic 
institutions are those that allow for multiple groups to participate in governance, while 
democratic processes are those that allow for elected officials to be held accountable by 
ordinary citizens at regular intervals and protect basic, individual civil liberties (Dahl 
1974; Zakaria 1997; Dahl 1998; Przeworski 2000).   
H2: In a comparison of post-conflict countries, those that only adopt a truth 
commission are less likely to experience improvements in human rights protections in 
comparison to those that adopt a truth commission in combination with one or more 
retributive mechanisms. 
 Similar to H1, this second hypothesis suggests that the effect of truth commissions 
on human rights will be negated unless they are coupled with retributive mechanisms. In 
other words, we should not expect truth commissions to end a cycle of impunity or lead 
to the institutionalization of greater human rights protections over time unless they are 
used in conjunction with retributive mechanisms. These latter can range from criminal 
trials, reparations, or lustration policies.  
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H3: In a comparison of post-conflict countries, those that only adopt a truth 
commission are less likely to experience improvements in economic development in 
comparison to those that adopt a truth commission in combination with one or more 
retributive mechanisms.   
 The third hypothesis suggests that a positive relationship may exist between truth 
commissions and levels of economic development in post-conflict societies as long as 
they are coupled with retributive elements. The logic behind this hypothesis is that 
restorative and retributive mechanisms are an important harbingers for improving a 
climate of economic investment or creating incentives for the transfer of capital and 
services into post-conflict countries. More importantly, this study advances the view that 
both types of mechanisms are needed to address, mitigate, and ultimately alleviate 
patterns of inequality, economic discrimination, and marginalization that largely 
contributed to the onset of violence to begin with. 
H4: In a comparison of post-conflict countries, those that only adopt a truth 
commissions are less likely to remain at peace than those that adopt truth commissions 
in combination with one or more retributive mechanisms. 
 The fourth hypothesis suggests that the durability of peace in post-conflict 
countries is tied to a combination of restorative and retributive mechanisms. In this case, 
we should not expect truth commissions alone to affect the durability of peace in post-
conflict countries unless they are coupled with mechanisms that can punish perpetrators 
for their past transgressions. Post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions in 
conjunction with punitive mechanisms, such as trials or lustrations, should be expected to 
experience reduced levels of societal violence in comparison to those that do not. 
H5: Post-conflict countries that only adopt top-down approaches are less likely to 
experience improvements in levels of societal peace, democratization, economic 
41 
 
development, and human rights in comparison to those that combine top-down 
approaches with grassroots level mechanisms. 
 The sixth, and final, hypothesis addressed in this study suggests that we should 
expect countries that adopt both traditional, top-down approaches with hybrid, bottom-up 
approaches to experience more positive societal outcomes versus those that only adopt 
top-down or bottom-up approaches. This hypothesis is based on the belief that top-down 
approaches are necessary, yet increasingly incapable of dispensing justice on a mass scale 
and, more importantly, a form of justice that is easily accessible to individuals. The key 
component of this hypothesis is that a combination of these mechanisms is required 
versus one being a “better” approach than the other.  
1.6 Conceptual Definitions 
To operationally and conceptually define key variables at the onset to avoid 
confusion, several key terms and descriptor variables are defined in this section. Peace, 
which is associated as a “post-conflict peace” in this study, is narrowly defined as a 
situation in where there is an absence of armed violence between two or more 
belligerents, often termed a minimalist or negative conception of peace.
17
 This conceptual 
definition of peace excludes more substantive, or “positive” definitions of peace, which 
are associated with social justice marked by the absence of structural violence in the form 
of poverty, inequality, or discrimination (Galtung 1965). A negative peace, as a result, 
may not necessarily address the underlying sources of conflict, such as social, political, or 
cultural injustice. Justice is framed exclusively in a legalistic manner and is defined as a 
                                                          
17
 Galtung (1965) terms a “negative peace” as one in where there is merely the absence of 
war or physical violence. 
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situation in where fairness and equity are administered to victims and perpetrators alike 
the post-conflict stage (Elster 2004, 135-139). Reconciliation is defined in interpersonal, 
sociopolitical, and institutional terms, with interpersonal reconciliation defined as a 
situation in where victims and perpetrators have taken the steps necessary to peacefully 
coexist and to move forward with their lives (Philpott 2012: 5-6). Socio-political 
reconciliation refers to a situation in where disparate groups in society, which have often 
been at odds with one another, are willing to put aside their grievances in favor of 
working together as part of a pact. Institutional reconciliation, moreover, occurs when 
post-conflict countries creates institutional frameworks, both formal and informal, that 
protect the individual rights of citizens and try to rebuild trust and popular acceptance 
with the ultimate goal of citizens taking part in the decision-making process by formally 
participating in new institutions or by holding government officials accountable. Finally, 
a post-conflict society describes any country that is emerging from a period of political 
instability, armed conflict, civil war, or state repression and is positioned somewhere 
along a continuum between the extremes of war, defined in this study as a conflict that 
exceeds 1,000 annual battle-related deaths, and peace. Despite the potential for post-
conflict societies to be situated anywhere along this continuum, they usually exhibit one 
of the following conditions: (1) a cease-fire between two or more parties; (2) a peace 
agreement or negotiated settlement usually with third-party monitoring; (3) the absence 
of physical hostilities measured by less than 1,000 annual battle-related deaths; or (4) a 
disarmament agreement that calls for opposition forces to lay down their weaponry. As 
Elisabeth Porter (2015: 3) comments, the term post-conflict is extremely difficult to 
conceptualize due to the fact that even when physical hostilities have ended, often a 
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culture of violence and impunity persists and underlying tensions between belligerents 
endure, which have the potential to become the proximate cause for future conflict.  
1.7 Plan of Study 
 This study is composed of six chapters, with this chapter serving as the 
introduction. Chapter 2 is a detailed literature review that is structured around four key 
themes. The first part surveys the changing nature of global conflict trends, with a 
particular emphasis placed on examining the “new war” thesis. New wars scholars, 
notably Mary Kaldor (2006), posit that this changing nature of global violence requires 
fundamental shifts in how we view and approach the post-conflict stage. The second part 
surveys scholarly debate over the nature and conduct of international peacebuilding 
efforts in the 20
th
 century, and whether peacebuilding strategies developed for state-
centric conflicts will be effective when dealing with contemporary, modern conflicts best 
characterized as internationalized civil wars or mixed conflicts. The third part surveys a 
burgeoning literature on transitional justice and studies that have attempted to isolate the 
effects of different mechanisms on post-conflict societal indicators, such as democracy or 
human rights. The fourth, and final, section surveys critical discussions concerning the 
effectiveness of truth commissions and truth-finding processes in post-conflict countries.    
The mixed-method research design used to explore and provide empirical answers 
to the research questions identified in this chapter is detailed in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 
itself is split into five sections. The first section provides the rationale for using a mixed-
method approach. The second describes the original dataset developed for this study, the 
quantitative models developed, and the variables employed in these models to test the 
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effect of truth commissions and other forms of transitional justice. The third section 
describes the case-study design and the fourth section offers a brief synthesis, or 
synopsis, of the mixed-method research design.  
Chapter 4 presents the statistical tests and their results. The chapter begins by 
presenting the results from four models that test the effect of truth commissions on: (1) 
levels of democratization; (2) human rights protections; (3) levels of economic growth; 
and (4) the durability of peace when holding other transitional justice mechanisms 
constant. The second section then presents the results from the four models that test the 
effect of truth commissions on these indicators when combined with other mechanisms. 
The third section provides a brief, yet clear synthesis of these key findings.    
Chapter 5 presents the Rwandan case study. In particular, this chapter critically 
assesses survey and interview data collected from gacaca participants to shed insight into 
the third research question and fifth hypothesis. These data provide a complicated tale of 
post-conflict building in the aftermath of extremely personal and localized violence. 
Chapter 6 acts as the concluding chapter in this study by summarizing the key results 
found, discussing the implications of these results independently of and in relation to 
extant studies on transitional justice, and directing attention to future areas of research 
and discovery. This chapter also discusses and acknowledges the limitations associated 
with this project as well as the practical applications of the findings. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
 The chapter provides an exhaustive review of the scholarly literature as it relates 
to truth commissions and the topic of transitional justice in a broader sense. To do so, key 
puzzles and findings raised in extant studies on international conflict, international 
peacebuilding, and transitional justice are discussed and dissected. The purpose of 
structuring this review in this way is to provide an important foundation for key debates 
that linger in the literature and also show how fragmented and decentralized the literature 
actually is, which at times creates obstacles toward our understanding of what conditions 
peace in war’s last phase and the role that different transitional justice mechanisms, 
including truth commissions, play in this complicated and often messy process. A review 
of this literature also shows how divided extant studies are in terms of research designs, 
research questions, and methodological approaches, which makes comparisons difficult 
and creates complications for the establishment of a basic foundation that can provide a 
path forward when trying to understand the effect of truth commissions and transitional 
justice in the 21
st
 century. 
There are four parts to this literature review. The first section surveys the 
changing nature of global violence and the “new wars” thesis. The second section 
examines the international peacebuilding literature and, in particular, hones in on critical 
debates over the goals, effectiveness, and direction of peacebuilding efforts in the 21
st
 
century. In this section, special attention is placed on critiques of “liberal peacebuilding.” 
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The third section surveys extant studies on transitional justice and focuses on several key 
debates that linger. For example, scholars remain divided on the question of whether it is 
better to seek retributive justice, or whether it is better to structure transitional justice 
around restorative means. The fourth section specifically focuses on extant studies that 
examine the utility and effectiveness of truth commissions as a form of transitional 
justice in the 21
st
 century. This chapter concludes with a brief synthesis of these various 
discussions. The literature review itself is structured in such a way to “peel” away 
different layers to identify gaps and limitations in our knowledge.   
2.2  The Changing Nature of Global Violence 
Contemporary violence and warfare
18
 is fundamentally different from the 
violence that marked much of the 20
th
 century. Time-series data in Figure 2 illustrate that 
interstate wars have virtually ceased to exist in today’s post-Cold War international 
system. Andrew Mack (2005, 22-23) was one of the first conflict scholars to estimate that 
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 Wars can be categorized based on the nature of the actors and type of violence 
involved. Interstate wars involve organized violence between two or more state actors, 
whereas intrastate conflicts (i.e., civil wars) involve militarized violence between one or 
more state actors and one or more non-state actors within the geographic confines of a 
single state (Wallensteen and Sollenburg 2001, 643). As a consequence of most intrastate 
conflicts no longer being confined to the territory of one state, Jel Odermatt (2013, 29) 
uses the term mixed or internationalized civil wars to describe armed conflicts between 
governments and non-state actors such as rebel groups, separatist movements, or 
paramilitary groups that take place predominantly within the territory of one state but 
spill over into another, with the latter often receiving financial, logistical, or military 
assistance from external state actors or donors. The various Islamic groups fighting in 
Syria, which are receiving financial support from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, are 
an example. Finally, J. Martin Rochester (2012, 146) uses the term extra-state wars to 
describe those that involve “unconventional security threats posed by non-state actors, 
including transnational terrorist and criminal organizations, which can potentially disrupt 
national order and world order through skyjackings, drug trafficking, cyberspace 
interference, and other means.” 
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intrastate and internationalized intrastate armed conflicts, or civil wars, now comprise 
more than 95 percent of contemporary conflicts and wars. Of the 52 conflicts in 2015, for 
example, only one was classified as an interstate conflict by the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program. Civil wars, or conflicts within the geographic boundaries of a nation-state 
between a government and a non-government actor, have become the primary form of 
global violence (Mack 2005; UCDP 2017). Pure civil wars, moreover, are increasingly 
being replaced by internationalized, or hybrid civil wars that combine multiple actors and 
are fought along the polarizing lines of religion, race, and ethnicity in conjunction with 
economic exploitation in the form of natural resource extraction (Collier and Hoeffler 
2004). Still further, regional variations now exist in conflict and peace trends, with most 
conflicts now located in “zones of war” in parts of Asia, the Middle East, and Sub-
Saharan Africa, and “zones of peace” being in parts of Western Europe, North America, 
and Latin America (Singer and Wildavsky 1993; Pinker 2011).  
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These evolving conflict trends mean that most wars today are fought within, not 
between, states and are localized in the poorest and underdeveloped parts of the world. 
Although decline of violence theorists (e.g., Pinker 2011; Goldstein 2011) provide 
evidence to suggest that all forms of violence are declining worldwide, contemporary 
warfare differs dramatically from wars between nation-states or traditional civil wars 
decades ago, which were marked by conventional weapons on well-defined battlefields 
(Mack 2005; Banks 2011; Pinker 2011; Goldstein 2011). Today’s conflicts are low-
intensity in nature, which means that irregular tactics are utilized and formal battles are 
rare, which can cause these conflicts to fester for long periods of time. Despite being 
labeled as low-intensity, however, the relapse rate for these types of conflicts, if they do 
end, has increased dramatically in comparison to conflicts in the first half of the 20
th
 
century (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Walter 2004). 
This changing nature of global violence can also be seen by the fact that 
contemporary conflicts are increasingly asymmetrical in nature, with non-state actors as 
the dominant agents as illustrated by Figure 3. To offset their military disadvantage vis-
à-vis state actors in asymmetric warfare, these actors often utilize guerrilla tactics, 
employ irregular, nonconventional weaponry, and deliberately target civilian populations 
through unlawful means to create fear.
19
 Civilian populations, as a consequence, are 
                                                          
19
 According to de Nevers (2006, 369), “wars today range from wildly unbalanced 
conflicts pitting highly trained and technologically sophisticated armies like that of the 
United States against irregular combatants on horseback, to conflicts in which 
paramilitaries and criminals intermingle and terrorize local populations to achieve their 
own goals.” Under international humanitarian law, belligerents are expected to respect 
the principles of military necessity, proportionality, distinction, and the avoidance of 
undue suffering. In particular, they are required to clearly distinguish themselves from 
civilian populations, avoid using weaponry that inflicts disproportionate suffering, and 
49 
 
disproportionately affected by modern violence both directly and indirectly. In terms of 
the former, Joshua Goldstein (2011, 26) states that “killing and causing the suffering of 
civilians can serve military goals such as displacing a hostile population from coveted 
land, or punishing a population for supporting insurgents.” In terms of the latter, civilians 
often face hardship long afterward in the form of being widowed or losing loves ones, 
being forced from their homes, towns, or cities as refugees, or psychological trauma. In a 
reversal of civilian to military battle-related deaths in World War I, Charles Kegley and 
Shannon Blanton (2010, 509) note that civilian casualities now outnumber military 
casualities by a ratio of nine to one.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
avoid conducting military operations in heavily populated civilian areas. For a discussion 
on how new wars play havoc with laws of armed conflict, see Banks (2011) and 
Rochester (2016).  
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To describe these evolving conflict trends, “new wars” theorists (e.g., Kaldor 
2004; Hammes 2005; de Nevers 2006; Duffield 2014) argue that modern warfare is 
distinct in several ways from conventional warfare between nation-states that shaped the 
nature of global violence for much of international relations history, including the 20
th
 
century.
20
 Mary Kaldor (2006, 2), who coined the term “new wars” to describe the nature 
of conflict in today’s post-Cold War international system, posits that modern conflicts 
blur “distinctions between war (usually defined as violence between states or organized 
political groups for political motives), organized crime (violence undertaken by privately 
organized groups for private purposes, usually financial gain), and large-scale violations 
of human rights (violence undertaken by states or political organized groups against 
individuals).” Of particular importance to Kaldor (2013, 3) is the changing nature of the 
belligerents involved -- ranging from rebel groups and private security contractors to 
warlords, jihadists, and children -- their goals, the methods they employ, and how they 
finance their war efforts.
21
 Mark Duffield (2014, 14-15) builds on this terminology by 
stating that new wars are defined by local-global connections that work through and 
within states.
22
  
                                                          
20
 This “new wars” literature is extensive. We have especially benefited from Hammes 
(2005); de Nevers (2006); Kaldor (2006); Lind et al. (2008); Kaldor (2013). 
21
 “Weak states” can be defined as those that are rife with corruption, fragile government 
institutions, and limited rule of law. A key feature of “failed states” is their inability to 
provide security and public goods and exercise sovereignty over a territory with defined 
borders (Rotberg 2004, 2-21). Most intrastate conflicts are concentrated in states where 
transnational terrorist organizations operate freely, including Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, 
Syria, and Yemen. 
22
 Duffield (2014, 14) argues that “new wars can be understood as a form of non-
territorial network war that works through and around states.”  
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Coupled with the breakdown of key distinctions between combatants and 
noncombatants in today’s new battlegrounds that are fought in urban jungles, crowded 
markets, schools, and public transit systems, most ongoing and reoccurring wars are 
sustained through the contracting out of organized violence and financed through the 
establishment of war economies (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Banks 2011; Andreas 2014; 
Duffield 2014). The illicit trade of small arms, antiquities, precious resources, drugs, and 
human trafficking make contemporary warfare “good business.”23 In sum, Kaldor (2007, 
185) notes the factors that fuel violence, namely “fear and hatred, a criminalized 
economy that profits from violent methods of controlling assets, weak illegitimate states, 
or the existence of warlords and paramilitary groups,” persist and are often strengthened 
long after overt hostilities cease. Duffield (2014, 14) comments that new wars have 
“allowed warring parties to forge local-global networks and shadow economies as a 
means of asset realisation and self-provisioning.”  
For conceptual purposes, it is important to note that economic gain, quasi-private 
criminal combatants, plunder, ethnic cleansing, terrorism, and guerrilla tactics are hardly 
new developments in the history of warfare.
24
 Further, numerous scholars critique the 
                                                          
23
 See the “greed and grievance” thesis advanced by Collier and Hoeffler (2004). Also 
see Andreas (2014) for a discussion on how smuggling practices and quasi-private 
criminal combatants played a critical role in the outbreak, persistence, and termination of 
conflict in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995.  
24
 Stacey (1994, 27-39) provides an excellent discussion on how wars between Christian 
belligerents in Europe and between Christian and non-Christian belligerents elsewhere 
during the Middle Ages was marked by the indiscriminate killing of combatants and 
noncombatants alike (bellum romanum). In the 16
th
 century, large swaths of territory in 
Europe were subjected to conflicts marked by indiscriminate killing and plunder, 
moreover. Also see Boot (2013) and Kaplan (2015) for a detailed discussion on the 
historical evolution of asymmetric warfare as a tool of the “weak” as well as the use of 
terrorism as a weapon to create fear among civilian populations throughout human 
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very foundations of the news wars thesis by arguing that there is nothing “new” about 
contemporary violence (Kalvyas 2001; Berdal 2003; Newman 2004; Darabont 2010; De 
Waal 2012). What makes modern conflicts “new” is that they have replaced conventional 
warfare between regular armies of nation-states as the primary form of global violence in 
today’s post-Cold War international system that remains structured around state 
interactions. These conflicts blur distinctions between regular and irregular, internal and 
external, and public and private, causing contemporary global violence to represent a 
vivid departure from a traditional “Clausewitzian,” or state-centric, view of warfare. The 
latter has dominated thinking about the causes of war and how we can promote a durable 
and sustainable peace once overt violence and hostilities end.
25
 As Renée de Nevers 
(2006: 378) writes, the key point about new wars is not to debate whether terrorism, 
guerrilla warfare, criminality, and greed are new, rather how modern conflicts in a 
radically new global setting deviate from the “European model of war involving state 
armies of soldiers meeting on a battlefield” that engage in stylized conflict using 
acceptable weapons. Even more importantly, contemporary wars are often spawned by 
state-failing and denationalization
26
 processes, which may cause “winning” in a strategic 
military sense to no longer be a key objective for belligerents involved. 
 Although terminology and conceptual definitions are bitterly contested in extant 
studies, the former conflicts in the Balkans and Sierra Leone as well as the protracted 
                                                                                                                                                                             
history. Boot (2013, 100) goes as far as to argue that conventional warfare is a recent 
innovation and the exception rather than the norm when viewed historically. 
25
 Clausewitz’s conception of war is based on symmetric conflicts between state armies 
of roughly equal military strength and comparable organizational structures.  
26
 Denationalization refers to attempts to break apart a national identity, whether it is 
based on a shared heritage, culture, religion, race, or ethnicity.  
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conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, and 
Ukraine today mark the specific contours of new wars. Peter Andreas (2004) finds that 
ethnic and religious conflict between Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims was 
predominantly orchestrated by paramilitary groups who profited from plunder, hostage-
taking, and establishing black markets in weapons and human trafficking, thus adding a 
local-global profit-dimension to an already complicated ethnic and religious divide. 
Along with perpetrating violence to secure lucrative financial gains, Andreas finds that 
these groups purposely recruited criminals into their ranks and utilized ethnic cleansing, 
sexual violence, and forced deportation as tactical strategies. de Nevers (2006) finds that 
mercenaries figured prominently in Sierra Leone’s internationalized civil war, with 
private security contractors hired to train government forces, protect natural resources 
that could be utilized to sustain future hostilities, and conduct military operations.
27
 
Ongoing violence in the DRC today is characterized by both government and rebel forces 
relying on outside financial, military, and logistical assistance and the trade of precious 
resources to fuel war efforts. Not only are decisive battles rare, Séverine Austesserre 
(2006: 6-8) finds that civilian populations are purposively targeted through violence or 
servitude to create fear and exercise control over territory.  
In Afghanistan, de Nevers (2006) argues that even after a multinational coalition 
toppled the Taliban and aided in the establishment of a new national government, 
warlords remain the principal agents of political authority and violence festers as a 
consequence of these warlords having financial incentives to benefit from a lucrative, 
                                                          
27
 de Nevers (2006, 380-382) provides an excellent discussion on the role private security 
contractors, many of whom were former military personnel from South Africa and the 
United Kingdom, played in conducting asymmetric warfare in Sierra Leone’s civil war.  
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multibillion dollar opium economy.
28
 In Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) utilizes foreign mercenaries, funds itself through the sale of priceless 
antiquities and petroleum in black markets, and targets different ethnic and religious 
groups through illegal slavery, sexual violence, beheadings, and ethnic cleansing. As a 
consequence of incentives to continue fighting in order to protect lucrative markets, 
thousands of civilians have been displaced while ancient hatreds along religious and 
ethnic lines have become the focal point of violence. Finally, Russian-backed separatists 
and government-backed militia groups in Eastern Ukraine purposively violate laws of 
armed conflict (LOAC) to gain a strategic advantage. Doing so has caused civilian 
populations to be disproportionately affected by food-shortages and indiscriminate 
violence, while hostilities continue as these groups resist negotiated settlements out of 
concerns they may be charged with crimes against humanity once overt hostilities end.   
2.3 Why Are These Changing Conflict Trends Important?  
Efforts at resolving conflicts on the international stage are complicated by these 
changing conflict dynamics. In a UN (2014) report titled “Major Recent Trends in 
Violent Conflict,” it is estimated that 90 percent of UN peacekeeping forces are deployed 
in scenarios marked by low-intensity conflict, which has contributed to the evolution of 
international peacebuilding away from “peacekeeping” to third generation “peace 
enforcing” missions (Diehl et al. 1998; Doyle and Sambanis 2007; Sloan 2011). As 
Duffield (2014, 16) argues, “new wars have blurred distinctions between people, army, 
and government and, at the same time, forged new ways of projecting power through 
                                                          
28
 For a discussion on how Afghanistan fits the contours of the new wars thesis, see de 
Nevers (2006, 379).  
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non-territorial public-private networks and systems.” As a result, it is now increasingly 
difficult to address underlying causes of conflict or to create the conditions necessary for 
the establishment of orderly, peaceful societies in light of the fragmented nature of 
contemporary violence and the disparate actors involved.   
Of further importance, civilian populations are subject to extreme and 
disproportionate violence perpetrated along religious, ethnic, and racial lines through the 
use of irregular tactics, which makes the establishment of peaceful, orderly post-conflict 
societies an extremely daunting task. As John Paul Lederach (1996, 18) notes, “deep-
rooted and long-standing animosities that are reinforced by high levels of violence and 
direct experiences of atrocities” often derail peace efforts and those geared toward 
promoting reconciliation.
29
 Coupled with this disproportionate violence, war-shattered 
societies in the world today often remain embroiled in a “conflict trap” due to basic needs 
like food, water, shelter, and security being unmet and former warlords, paramilitary 
commanders, or sympathizers of an oppressive regime being granted positions of power 
in transitional governments. These realities on the ground challenge existing strategies to 
mitigate and prevent reoccurring violence.
30
 Similar to the obstacles created by these 
                                                          
29
 Lederach’s (1996, 7-10) work on peacebuilding in post-Cold War conflicts is one of 
the first to note how the changing nature of global violence complicates efforts at 
building peace, even though he does not use the term “new wars.”  
30
 The international community has traditionally relied on state-centric approaches such 
as peacekeeping and diplomacy to mitigate the adverse effects of interstate war. DeShaw 
Rae (2009) points out that the three foundational elements of peacekeeping include: (1) 
the minimum use of force; (2) consent and deployment based on full agreement of all 
parties; and (3) impartiality. Posing a critique to the ability of these traditional approaches 
to build peace in the aftermath of civil strife, Lederach (1996, 16) writes, “we persist in 
relying on traditional statist diplomacy, despite its inadequacies in responding to the 
nature of conflicts today.” Along with peacebuilding, new wars play havoc with 
international rules governing warfare that remain tailored to interstate conflicts. For a 
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changing conflict trends for LOAC (see Banks 2011; Corn 2011; Rose 2011; Jensen 
2011; Richemond-Barak 2011), these trends are also felt in the war’s last phase. As a 
result, devising ways of responding to these changing dynamics of global violence as 
well as determining how to build peace when hostilities have ended remain topics of 
considerable interest and debate.  
2.4 What is Peacebuilding? 
Peacebuilding
31
 represents a post-conflict enterprise that includes actions 
undertaken after the immediate termination of armed hostilities to mitigate, address, and 
ultimately remove underlying causes of conflict. Initially defined by former UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali (1992, 5) as “action to identify and support 
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict,” peacebuilding is a robust and holistic approach adopted by the international 
community to eliminate various social, economic, political, and security dilemmas that 
directly threaten the establishment of a sustainable and durable peace in the post-conflict 
stage. As Roland Paris (1997, 55) writes, peacebuilding operations involve a variety of 
actors -- ranging from IGOs and INGOs to third-party donors and individual states -- that 
are tasked with monitoring cease-fires, disarming belligerents, monitoring and 
conducting elections, providing humanitarian assistance, rebuilding and training security 
forces, repatriating refugees, rebuilding bridges and infrastructure, demining conflict 
zones, and overseeing interim government activities. Although an emphasis is placed on 
                                                                                                                                                                             
discussion on how these rules are becoming increasingly obsolete, see Banks (2011, 9-
15) and Rochester (2016).  
31
 Peacebuilding and post-conflict peacebuilding are used interchangeably in the 
literature.  
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improving security and humanitarian conditions initially, peacebuilding operations are 
structured in such a way to build effective and legitimate state institutions, broaden 
political participation, deepen civil society, and create pluralistic institutions that weave 
various ethnic and religious groups together into the fabric of society (Doyle and 
Sambanis 2000, 779).  
These various activities illustrate that peacebuilding is both an ongoing and 
sequential process that contains short-term and long-term goals (Lederach 1996; Jeong 
2005; Berdal 2009; Philpott 2012). The short-term goals of peacebuilding are to provide 
security guarantees and mitigate the detrimental effect of spoilers, whereas the long-term 
goals of peacebuilding are to build effective and legitimate state institutions, repair 
economic structures, broaden political participation, establish nonviolent dispute 
resolution mechanisms, and remove negative emotions of anger, fear, and humiliation 
(Stedman 1997). These activities also illustrate that peacebuilding is a preventive tool 
with the intended goal of healing deep-seated wounds that inevitably fester even after 
overt hostilities end (Cravo 2017, 48). Peacebuilders, in the form of international 
peacekeepers and personnel with INGOs, often are tasked then with the difficult goals of 
not only preventing renewed violence but also addressing the root causes of the violence 
itself. Picking up the pieces after the dust has settled, as a result, has become the chief 
source of growth and need for UN over the past two decades (Weiss 2013; de Soto and 
del Castillo 2016). As of September 2017, 71 peacebuilding operations have been 
authorized since 1948 with 58 of those operations occurring since 1988 (UN 2017).  
58 
 
Although the main goal of peacebuilding is to prevent future violence, 
considerable debate exists among scholars, practitioners, and policymakers over the 
goals, objectives, and strategies of peacebuilding. As Rob Jenkins (2013, 19) suggests, 
the key contentions refer to the “when, what, how, and who – that is, the period during 
which peacebuilding takes place, the type of peace sought, the methods employed to 
attain it, and the key actors in the peacebuilding enterprise.” Drawing upon the 
distinctions between “positive” and “negative” peace conceived by Johan Galtung 
(1965), securing an end to overt hostilities and violence can be considered an 
achievement in itself (negative peace). Unfortunately, the threat of violence does not end 
when arms are laid down, when belligerents are demobilized, or when peace agreements 
are signed. A growing consensus has emerged that building inclusive economic, legal, 
social, and political institutions as well as eliminating “structural violence” in the form of 
inequality, poverty, and discrimination is often necessary for preventing underlying 
sources of conflict from becoming the proximate causes for renewed violence (positive 
peace) (Lederach 1996; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Chandler 2004; Jeong 2005; 
Porter 2007; Porter 2015).  
In spite of this growing awareness that negative peace is fragile, consensus on 
how to cultivate positive peace in the aftermath of civil strife remains problematic. Some 
scholars contend that reengineering post-conflict societies requires deepening intergroup 
harmony, repairing social dynamics, and facilitating dialogue between former 
adversaries. Lederach (1996: 84), for example, argues that transforming a “war-system 
characterized by deeply divided, hostile, and violent relationships into a peace-system 
characterized by just and interdependent relationships with the capacity to find 
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nonviolent mechanisms for expressing and handling conflict” is critical for promoting 
peace. Elisabeth Porter (2007, 34) further argues that the goal of peacebuilding is to 
“build positive relationships, heal wounds, reconcile antagonistic differences, restore 
esteem, respect rights, meet basic needs, enhance equality, instill feelings of security, 
(and) empower moral agency.” Ho-Won Jeong (2005) suggests that long-term peace can 
only be cultivated by facilitating complex interdependencies and dialogue between 
opposing societal groups. 
Other scholars instead emphasize the need for peacebuilding operations to 
promote state-building
32
 through rebuilding physical infrastructure, facilitating 
socioeconomic reforms, and establishing democratic institutions (Doyle and Sambanis 
2000; Chandler 2004; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Skarlato et 
al. 2013). Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2006), for example, argue that 
peacebuilding operations can meet the needs of their every-changing missions by 
restructuring corrupt security forces, weak legal systems, and unresponsive political 
institutions. Peacebuilding operations, moreover, are also more likely to be successful 
when they are paired with peace agreements (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Seth Kaplan 
(2008) posits that state-building activities can generate legitimacy and accountability for 
a transitional government, both of which are critical for the nurturing of peace, stability, 
and resiliency over an extended period of time as well as bring an end to physical 
hostilities in the short-term. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2004) further argue that 
state-building can alleviate government deficiencies, which can reduce the high 
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 The terms state-building and nation-building are used interchangeably in the literature. 
State-building, in its simplest form, refers to actions undertaken to reform and strengthen 
state institutions that are either missing or severely eroded (Caplan 2005).  
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opportunity costs of war and increase incentives among warring parties to remain at 
peace. Finally, Charles Call and Vanessa Wyeth (2008) contend that stable, legitimate, 
and effective institutions that are responsive to citizen needs and capable of providing 
basic services increases the probability of a war-torn country remaining at peace. 
2.5 Are Current Approaches to Peacebuilding Flawed?  
Coupled with this disagreement over what peacebuilding operations should look 
like, the means of building peace in post-conflict societies are also contested.
33
 Critics 
and proponents hone in on the “liberal” discourse of peacebuilding operations. Based on 
a long history of Western thinking about what conditions peace both within and between 
states, the liberal peace thesis holds that liberal democracy,
34
 free-market economies,
35
 
and the institutionalization of the rule of law are critical for building peaceful societies 
(Russett and Oneal 2001).
36
 The logic behind implementing liberal reforms in post-
conflict societies, as Caroline Hartzell (2014, 378) comments, rests on the belief that 
“market democracies and related institutions are thought to help support a durable peace 
by fostering restraint, tolerance for others, predictability, justice, a sense of security, and 
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 Peacebuilding operations in Namibia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and East Timor are 
considered success stories. Peacebuilding operations in the DRC, Somalia, and Cyprus, 
on the other hand, are considered failures since they failed to prevent belligerents from 
resorting back to the use of armed violence to achieve better terms.  
34
 Zakaria (1997) defines liberal democracies as those promote free, fair, and competitive 
elections, protect basic civil liberties, and are marked by independent media and 
judiciaries.   
35
 Free market ideology, or “market fundamentalism,” is predicated on the belief that 
privatization, deregulation, and laissez-faire economics promote development, increased 
investment, and prosperity (Stiglitz 2003).  
36
 In Iraq and Afghanistan, neoliberal principles have been applied extensively with the 
hope that democratic and free-market reforms will promote a self-sustaining and 
enduring peace for generations to come.   
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prosperity, on the one hand, and minimizing the potential for governmental abuse and 
arbitrary action on the other hand.”  
Proponents defend incorporating liberal principles into peacebuilding operations 
in several ways (Rummel 1997; Paris 1997; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Paris 2009; Paris 
2010). R.J. Rummel (1997, 85), for example, argues that creating liberal institutions 
makes post-conflict countries less prone to civil unrest and other forms of domestic 
dysfunction, including “revolutions, bloody coup d’états, political assassinations 
antigovernment terrorist bombings, guerilla warfare, insurgencies, civil wars, mutinies, 
and rebellions.” Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2000, 779-780), moreover, 
comment that pluralistic state institutions, the rule of law, and higher levels of economic 
development can explain why some post-conflict countries remain at peace while others 
relapse back into armed hostilities. Roland Paris (1997, 2009, 2010) staunchly defends 
the liberal approach to international peacebuilding by arguing that there is no effective 
alternative. Electoral reforms and privatization efforts may fall short; however, Paris 
comments (2010, 362) that the “challenge today is not to replace or more “beyond” 
liberal peacebuilding but to reform existing approaches within a broadly liberal 
framework.” According to proponents, then, the post-conflict stage represents a critical 
window, or juncture, to implement key political, social, and economic reforms that can 
cure post-conflict countries by bringing disparate actors and former belligerents into the 
fold and creating incentives for warring parties to peaceful coexist through creating 
positive-sum institutions.  Echoing Francis Fukuyama (1992), who defiantly claimed the 
“end of history,” champions of this liberal discourse suggest that structuring 
peacebuilding operations around the implementation of elections, the building of state 
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institutions, and the opening of markets is the only way to repair war-torn societies.
37
 
This logic of the liberal approach to peacebuilding is depicted in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: The Liberal Peacebuilding Approach       
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Critics, on the other hand, posit that contemporary peacebuilding operations are 
ill-prepared to deal with their ever-expanding missions and liberal peacebuilding 
strategies, sometimes labeled liberal interventionism or liberal internationalism, are 
structured around incompatible and often conflicting goals (Barnet 2006; Cooper 2007; 
Chandler 2008; Pugh et al. 2008; Richmond 2011). Instant liberalization, or quickly 
promoting neoliberal principles in post-conflict societies through democratization as well 
as marketization, may actually may be doing more harm than good. This is largely a 
consequence of unintended socioeconomic and political disparities in the short-term, 
which raise the specter of renewed violence due to growing tensions between winners 
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 Fukuyama (1992) posited that the end of the Cold War represented a triumph for 
liberalism and constitutional democracy over its ideological counterparts – fascism and 
communism – in the 21st century. 
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and losers in markets and political processes.
38
 Michael Barnett (2006, 89), for example, 
suggests that liberal reforms are detrimental since they lack the “necessary institutional 
framework or civil culture to absorb the potential pressures associated with political and 
market competition.” Kirsten Howarth (2014) suggests that liberal democratic and 
economic reforms produce unequal outcomes, which creates a cycle of interpersonal 
violence and crime in post-conflict societies. In response to Paris’ critical defense of 
liberal peacebuilding, Neil Cooper, Mandy Turner, and Michael Pugh (2011) argue that 
promoting free markets and strengthening instruments of state coercion through “capacity 
building” leave little room for improvements in democracy and human rights.  
The claims of these critics are backed by recent empirical research, which shows a 
negative relationship between elections and the durability of peace or neoliberal 
economic reforms and peace. In a recent study on post-conflict elections, Thomas Flores 
and Infran Nooruddin (2012, 558) find that those held within the first year after armed 
hostilities end actually increase the probability of renewed violence when holding other 
predictor variables, such as type of victory or geographic region constant. Despite the 
normative appeal of replacing bullets with ballots, they posit that this is largely a 
consequence of former enemies using their newfound power to punish their opponents. 
Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Molly Bauer (2010) also find evidence to suggest that 
neoliberal reforms enacted immediately following the cessation of violence exacerbate 
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 Barnet (2006: 89) argues that liberal peacebuilding strategies are actually sowing the 
seeds for renewed violence since post-conflict societies “do not have the necessary 
institutional framework or civil culture to absorb the potential pressures associated with 
political and market competition.” Paris (1997: 56) notes that “paradoxically, the very 
process of political and economic liberalization has generated destabilizing side effects in 
war-shattered states, hindering the consolidation of peace and in some cases even 
sparking renewed violence.”  
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tensions between winners and losers in markets, which increases the likelihood of 
fighting reigniting. Roger Mac Ginty (2011, 7-8) in a provocative critique of 
reengineering societies through establishing electoral democracies finds that in four post-
conflict settings (Bosnia-Herzegovina, El Salvador, Kosovo, and Mozambique) turnout 
rates in parliamentary elections drop significantly after a peace accord is signed or as 
elections become more entrenched.
39
  
Other critics question the top-down nature of mediation in peacebuilding 
operations (Belloni 2001; Austesserre 2009; Pugh 2009; Labonte 2012; Mac Ginty and 
Richemond 2013). To these critics, top-down mediation tends to fortify the privileged 
status of predatory elites that largely contributed to the onset of violence. Michael Pugh 
(2009), for example, suggests that top-down peacebuilding strategies lock, or freeze, 
conflicts in place by ignoring local concerns, marginalizing local power-brokers, and 
making civilian populations more vulnerable to social divisions and intergroup tensions. 
Melissa Labonte (2012, 90) finds that top-down political reforms in Sierra Leone enabled 
political elites at the national-level to regain control over decision-making processes at 
the expense of local councils. Austesserre (2009, 249) also finds that peacebuilding 
operations in the DRC have failed as a consequence of political and economic reforms 
failing to resolve local grievances over land, resources, and administrative power that 
have traditionally been a source of violent conflict throughout modern Congolese history. 
Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond (2013) support more localized peacebuilding 
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 Mac Ginty finds that turnout rates decreased in Kosovo in 1998 from approximately 71 
percent to 37 percent in 2006, from 90 percent in El Salvador in 1997 to 54 percent in 
2009, from 50 percent in Kosovo in 2004 to 45 percent in 2007, and from 88 percent in 
Mozambique in 1994 to 36 percent in 2004.  
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strategies due to realities on the group, in where local actors are often the first source, and 
final, source of peacebuilding efforts and since infighting behind major players or actors 
in most international peacebuilding operations lead to a loss of confidence in a particular 
mission’s public image or legitimacy. 
To improve the track record of peacebuilding, even if it remains a liberal 
endeavor, Mac Ginty (2011) proposes “hybrid peacebuilding,” which entails the use of 
liberal peacebuilding mechanisms but in conjunction with input of local actors or agents 
that are capable of providing incentives to partake and participate in peacebuilding 
activities. Barnett (2006) proposes a “republican peacebuilding,” which places an 
emphasis on deliberation, constitutionalism, and representation to build legitimacy for the 
peacebuilding process and address the underlying concerns of all belligerents involved 
instead of relying on instant liberalization. Labonte (2012) and Austesserre (2009) 
propose yet another model, which is predicated on the utilization of INGOs and other 
third-party actors at the local level to increase the legitimacy of peacebuilding operations 
and incorporate local concerns that are often neglected at the national-level, yet become 
the proximate causes for future conflict. Finally, Jonathan Goodhand (2006)
40
 as well as 
Carrie Manning and Monica Malbrough (2010)
41
 are advocates for approaches that take 
into account regional differences and variations in peace processes worldwide, with a 
particular emphasis placed on incorporating regional donors or region-specific actors that 
have country-specific experience, knowledge of domestic political actors and institutions, 
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 Goodhand (2006) is a proponent of “regional peacebuilding,” largely through regional 
organizations, rather than the cookie-cutter approach that has been used to describe 
liberal peacebuilding. 
41
 Manning and Malbrough (2010, 143-169) cite the success of third-party, regional 
actors in Mozambique as evidence for the success of regional-specific approaches.  
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and a shared commitment to successful outcomes in comparison to UN-directed 
operations.  
2.6 Transitional Justice as Peacebuilding in the 21
st
 Century 
A subset of this peacebuilding literature stresses the importance of addressing past 
human rights abuses and demands of justice by victims against those they regard as 
perpetrators as a way of maintaining peace (Minow 1998; Tutu 1999; Teitel 2000; Teitel 
2003; Posner and Vermeule 2004; Philpott 2012; Porter 2015). As an academic topic, 
scholars are increasingly concerned how post-conflict societies come to terms with 
violence, oppression, and massive human rights abuses committed during periods of state 
repression, political instability, or armed conflict. A key area of analysis is how 
transitional societies employ different transitional justice
42
 mechanisms-- ranging from 
criminal tribunals and political purges to amnesty, reparations, and truth commissions -- 
to address past wrongs, hold those who are guilty of perpetrating atrocities accountable, 
and prevent the repetition of abuses in the future (Elster 2004). The roots of modern 
transitional justice can be traced to international efforts to develop international criminal 
law in response to the near extermination of European Jews at the hands of the Nazis as 
well as war crimes perpetrated by the Japanese during the Second World War in the 
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 Teitel (2000, 11) defines transitional justice as a conception of justice associated with 
periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront wrongdoings 
committed during periods of upheaval. Olson, Payne, and Reiter (2010, 805) expand this 
definition of transitional justice by noting how it encompasses an “array of processes 
designed to address systematic or widespread human rights violations committed during 
periods of state repression or armed conflict.”  
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Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals respectively.
43
 Although the roots of 
transitional justice can be traced to these two international criminal tribunals, transitional 
justice as a conception of post-conflict justice truly emerged during the 1980s as various 
political transitions in Latin America attempted to deal with past human rights abuses 
and, more importantly, thousands of “disappeared” under the oppressive reign of military 
governments in Chile, Argentina, and Brazil (Arthur 2009). This view of transitional 
justice as a critical component of international peacebuilding efforts was finally realized 
in the aftermath of the Cold War, which effectively gave a “green light” for the 
international community to pursue ambitious transitional justice projects in response to 
mass violence in places such as Bosnia and Rwanda. Once considered merely instruments 
to promote victor’s justice, transitional justice mechanisms began to be viewed as 
appropriate strategies for post-conflict countries to deal with legacies of past abuses 
(Subotic 2009, 166).  
Over time, scholars have shifted their focus to studying how and when different 
transitional justice mechanisms are employed and what factors impede or provide the 
foundations for the success of these mechanisms. For example, should a post-conflict 
society utilize trials to punish perpetrators, or should they offer amnesty to those who are 
willing to lay down their arms, confess their crimes, demobilize, and seek reconciliation 
in their former communities? Does offering amnesty, moreover, satisfy victims’ demands 
for justice, or does it create new grievances?  
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 For a discussion on how the field of transitional justice has evolved, see Posner and 
Vermeule (2004) and Fischer (2011).  
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The basic premise behind transitional justice is that peace can only be cultivated 
by addressing painful memories and past suffering. As Porter (2015, 10) writes, “the 
objectives of transitional justice are twofold: to deal with the past in confronting the 
legacies of human rights abuses and human suffering, ensuring accountability for past 
injustices while maintaining peace, the rule of law, and democratic processes; and also, to 
move into the future, including fostering reconciliation.” Although transitional justice can 
be viewed as retrospective due to an emphasis being placed on punishing wrongdoers or 
compensating victims, the prospective, or forward-looking dimension, of transitional 
justice offered by Porter is important since it promotes the idea that confronting the past 
is an essential ingredient for moving forward.
44
 Minow (1998, 2) similarly comments that 
post-conflict societies “have to struggle over how much to acknowledge, whether to 
punish, and how to recover.”  
In today’s post-Cold War landscape, transitional justice mechanisms have 
increasingly become embedded in peacebuilding operations. This proliferation is largely 
a consequence of shifting international attitudes that perpetrators must be held 
responsible for their actions in war and noncombatants must be afforded basic protections 
from the violence that is perpetrated. This proliferation has also been aided by a growing 
body of scholarship that stresses the need for a “just” peace to be established to prevent a 
cycle of renewed violence (Walzer 1992; Rawls 1999; Orend 2002; Bass 2004; Walzer 
2004; Williams and Caldwell 2006; Stahn 2007; Williams 2014). Despite being 
underdeveloped in the Just War tradition, a cornerstone of jus post bellum (“justice after 
                                                          
44
 For a discussion on how transitional justice is criticized as being backward thinking, 
see Posner and Vermeule (2004, 766) and Porter (2015, 10-12).  
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war”) is the assumption that restoring basic human rights protections and addressing a 
legacy of past human rights abuses is necessary and sufficient for an enduring and 
durable peace to take root. Similar to a revolution in ideas concerning international 
peacebuilding, scholars also began to view transitional justice along transformative lines, 
meaning that transitional justice, like peacebuilding, is both a short-term and long-term 
process that links the past to the future (Lambourne 2009). 
As Michael Walzer (1992) notes, considerations about ending a war justly are of 
equal importance to considerations as to whether a war was started for just reasons (jus 
ad bellum) or whether that war was fought justly (jus in bello). John Rawls (1999, 98) 
also discusses postwar obligations and contends that “the enemy’s people are not to be 
held as slaves or serfs after surrender, or denied in due time their full liberties.” Building 
on the work of Walzer and Rawls, which remain the most influential on the topic, Robert 
Williams and Dan Caldwell (2006, 309) argue a “just peace exists when the human rights 
of those involved in the war, on both sides, are more secure than they were before the 
war.” Brian Orend (2002, 55) further comments that a just peace is one in where “human 
rights to life and liberty and community entitlements to territory and sovereignty” are 
established. Finally, Carsten Stahn (2007, 936) argues that “a fair and just peace 
settlement will ideally endeavor to achieve a higher level of human rights protection, 
accountability, and good governance than in the period before the resort to armed force.”  
2.7 Vengeance or Forgiveness?  
Transitional justice mechanisms in post-conflict societies assume two broad 
forms: retributive justice and restorative justice. When pursuing retributive justice, 
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perpetrators of human rights abuses are held accountable through criminal prosecution 
and punishment through courts of law and ad hoc war crimes tribunals (trials), through 
ineligibility for public office (lustration), or through being forced to repay victims, 
usually through monetary compensation.
45
 The rationale behind retributive justice is that 
some abuses are so heinous that perpetrators must be punished due to the extent of the 
harm inflicted by their actions. If not, past injustices will remain unaddressed and a cycle 
of impunity will continue, increasing the prospects for armed violence reigniting. As 
Minow (1998, 12) writes, retributive justice “reflects a belief that wrongdoers deserve 
blame and punishment in direct proportion to the harm inflicted,” in the hope that doing 
so will deter abuses in the future and establish a society that upholds the virtue of human 
rights and the rule of law. A central assumption of retributive justice, then, is the idea that 
those responsible for organizing, orchestrating, or actually carrying out acts of mass 
violence should not “get away with” their crimes and only a legal response -- one that is 
capable of handing down punishments for these crimes -- is capable of creating the 
conditions necessary for peace, societal stability, and reconciliation (Stover and 
Weinstein 2004; Fletcher 2005).   
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 As a form of retributive justice, Posner and Vermeule (2004, 766) note that in criminal 
trials “perpetrators (are) charged with crimes and then provided with lawyers, the chance 
to defend themselves, the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and other procedural 
protections.” In their most basic form, lustration policies (i.e., political purges) are 
intended to formally prevent perpetrators of state oppression or human rights abuses from 
holding public office or positions in a country’s security apparatus. For a discussion on 
the role of lustration policies in transitional justice literature, see Mayer-Rieckh and De 
Greiff (2007). Also see David (2003) for a discussion on the role of lustration policies in 
the Czech Republic and Poland to impose legal disabilities on former communist regime 
members and their sympathizers. Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010, 806) define reparations 
as a “state’s official grant of monetary payments, property, or other forms of restitution of 
monetary value to victims, or to relatives of victims, of past human rights violations.” 
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Restorative justice, on the other hand, takes the form of amnesties, pardons, 
public memory projects, and truth commissions.
46
 In contrast to retributive justice, the 
goal of restorative justice is to heal and reintegrate victims and perpetrators into society. 
As John Braithwaite (1999) notes, “restorative justice is about restoring victims, restoring 
offenders, and restoring communities.” Susan Olson and Albert Dzur (2004, 139) further 
offer that restorative justice is victim-centric and decenters the focus on offenders to 
broader institutional weaknesses and social disparities that made violence possible. The 
underlying goal is to right a balance between groups bitterly divided along the polarizing 
lines of ethnicity, class, religion, or race to advance reconciliation and, more importantly, 
to allow individuals an opportunity to recover from past trauma.   
In the transitional justice literature, widespread debate exists between the values 
of “vengeance” and “forgiveness” and which is more compatible with the lofty goals of 
peace, justice, and reconciliation in post-conflict societies (Minow 1998). These 
competing visions of what justice entails, as a result, has created a healthy debate 
concerning what type of mechanism should be used and under what contexts. To some 
scholars, retributive justice contributes to reconciliation more so than restorative justice 
mechanisms (Huyse 2003; Sikkink and Walling 2007; Wigglesworth 2008). Luc Huyse 
(2003: 98), for example, posits that retributive justice can help post-conflict societies 
move forward by preventing perpetrators of abuses from returning to power and ending a 
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 Porter (2015, 82-83) notes that amnesties, as a form of restorative justice, often grant 
immunity from criminal prosecution to former combatants in exchange for disclosing 
their role in orchestrating human rights abuses or human suffering. Already defined 
above, Hayner’s (1994, 558) definition of truth commissions is widely accepted: truth 
commissions are “bodies set up to investigate a past history of violations of human rights 
in a particular country – which can include violations by the military or other government 
forces or armed opposition forces.”  
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cycle of impunity. Kathryn Sikkink and Carrie Booth Walling (2007) broadly assess the 
impact of retributive justice mechanisms in Latin America and conclude that these 
mechanisms have contributed to democratic consolidation and increased human rights 
protections. Gillian Wigglesworth (2008) further argues that retributive justice 
mechanisms foster reconciliation by making it difficult for heads of state and other 
important political and military leaders to avoid facing legal consequences for their 
actions, which allows post-conflict societies to prevent a repetition of abuses. Hunjoon 
Kim and Kathryn Sikkink (2010) argue that trials do indeed promote positive societal 
outcomes, especially positive human rights outcomes, since they promote accountability 
that socially ostracize violations and the potential for a future repetition of abuses. 
Somewhat refuting the findings of Sikkink and Walling (2007) and the overall arguments 
advanced by scholars that favor trials as a form of retributive justice, James Meernik, 
Angela Nichols, and Kimi King (2010) find little evidence to suggest that trials make 
much of a positive or negative difference when examining the effect of domestic and 
international prosecutions in post-conflict countries between 1982 and 2007.  
On the other hand, other scholars contend that restorative justice mechanisms 
represent a more viable long-term option for promoting reconciliation since they can 
repair broken relationships and promote societal healing (Hayner 1994; Goldstone 1995; 
Nino 1996; Minow 1998; Kritz 1999; Tutu 1999; Rotberg and Thompson 2000; Hamber 
2001; Mamdani 2001; Amstutz 2005; Roman and Choi Yuk-ping 2005; Kerr and 
Mobekk 2007; Clark 2008; Kashyap 2009; Porter 2015). Rachel Kerr and Eirin Mobekk 
(2007, 4), for example, contend that restorative justice mechanisms ensure that past 
wrongs will never happen again by strengthening the rule of law, which delivers justice 
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and lessens a desire for vengeance. Rina Kashyap (2009, 453) contends that restorative 
justice “identifies the opportunity to tell the story of what happened, as a primary need of 
the victim,” which gives victims a sense of justice and allows them the opportunity to 
forgive. Porter (2015, 14) further notes that for harms that can reasonably be addressed 
through restorative justice, “accountability for wrongdoing is recognized, but the target of 
justice lies in achieving a right relation between the victim and perpetrator – that is, some 
degree of reconciliation.” Finally, Janine Clark (2008) finds that restorative justice 
processes in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have initiated and furthered 
reconciliation more so than retributive processes. Examining the effectiveness of 
reparations in the Czech Republic, Roman David and Susanne Choi Yuk-ping (2005) also 
find that reparations to victims of human rights violations can provide sociopolitical 
redress, whereas retributive justice mechanisms rarely deliver reconciliation. To these 
scholars, retributive justice holds the potential to destabilize fragile post-conflict societies 
by provoking hostile attitudes and new grievances.  
2.8 Is Transitional Justice Flawed?  
Coupled with this disagreement over the appropriate nature of transitional justice 
processes, other scholars question whether transitional justice mechanisms are compatible 
with peace and reconciliation to begin with. Some scholars hail the pacifying effect of 
transitional justice mechanisms and their ability to alleviate volatile emotions and 
advance healing (Goldstone 1996; Sikkink and Walling 2007; Olsen et al. 2010; 
Nettelfield 2010; Porter 2015). Richard Goldstone (1996), for example, argues that 
transitional justice mechanisms compliment peace by strengthening judicial systems and 
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the rule of law. Lara Nettelfield (2010) further finds that transitional justice mechanisms, 
notably ad hoc tribunals, have contributed to democratization and peaceful transitions in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Other scholars instead argue that transitional justice mechanisms undermine the 
peace they are intended to create and are frequently manipulated for personal and 
political gain (Kiss 2006; Minkkinen 2007; Leebaw 2008; Lundy and McGovern 2008). 
Csilla Kiss (2006, 927), for example, finds that transitional justice mechanisms employed 
in Hungary failed as a consequence of them diverting “attention from ongoing difficulties 
in the country, especially social issues deriving from inherited economic problems … as 
well as from financial and economic management committed in the course of 
privatization and social reform.” Bronwyn Leebaw (2008) argues that transitional justice 
processes are susceptible to revenge or victor’s justice, which creates the question of 
“whose” justice is being served. Panu Minkkinen (2007) also points out that transitional 
justice mechanisms fail to address resentment, which causes underlying feelings of anger, 
hate, and animosity to fester well beyond the immediate termination of violence. 
Along with this critique that transitional justice may actually undermine the peace 
it is intended to build, some scholars, applying criticisms levied against liberal 
peacebuilding, question the dominant, legalistic discourse of transitional justice. Rama 
Mani (2002) argues the legalistic nature of transitional justice and its emphasis on 
redressing direct human rights abuses often leaves structural injustices in place that 
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contributed to the conflict to begin with.
47
 Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern (2008), 
moreover, raise concerns over the top-down nature of transitional justice processes, 
which they argue are not inclusive and participatory in nature. Using the Ardoyne 
Commemoration Project (ACP) in Northern Ireland as a case study, Lundy and 
McGovern (2008, 284-291) trace how community-inspired, truth-telling strategies 
incorporated participation of various stakeholders and created a “victim-centered” 
agenda, which contributed to wider goals of nation-building, social reconciliation, and 
conflict de-escalation. Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein (2004, 29-48) also shed 
light on the shortcomings of top-down approaches by suggesting that publics within 
countries of top-down approaches often perceive that these efforts constitute an external 
solution or are externally imposed without local input, which undermines the legitimacy 
of state-level trials, truth commissions, or amnesty programs that often accompany DDR 
processes. Andrea Kupfer Schneider (2009, 298) comments that this lack of local input 
into the truth commission in El Salvador was ultimately a harbinger for its ineffectiveness 
considering that it “consisted entirely of international commissioners and staff members, 
purposely excluding Salvadoran natives because of the civil war.” Paul Gready and 
Simon Robins (2014) also build on this argument by noting that a key limitation 
associated with transitional justice processes is that they are dominated by a few 
stakeholders externally as well as internally. Externally, these processes are controlled by 
key IGOs and INGOs, such as the UN or Human Rights Watch (HRW), while internally, 
only a small number of citizens, in most cases, participate as witnesses, defendants, or 
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 Mani (2002), in particular, argues that focusing only on direct abuses committed by 
allowing victims to identify perpetrators in trials or truth commissions negates the ability 
of mechanisms to address underlying grievances, animosities, or tensions that hold the 
potential to rekindle future violence and acts of human rights abuses. 
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through the giving of testimony (Gready and Robins 2014, 343). Jack Snyder and Leslie 
Vinjamuri (2003) also critique the top-down, legalistic nature of transitional justice 
processes by noting that they often come to embody the inter-group tensions that were 
meant to remedy. In their study of the ICTY, for example, Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003, 
21) find that the ICTY reinforced ethnic cleavages, evident by the fact that “many Serbs 
complained that the tribunal unfairly targets Serbs, while many Croats have argued that 
their group has been unfairly singled out.” Further, the authors (2003, 22) use survey data 
to argue that the ICTY marginalized Bosnia’s domestic court system by imposing 
international standards that were not well understood or accepted, thus undermining 
efforts at delivering justice and reconciliation. Kieren McEvoy (2008, 17), thus, calls for 
a “thicker” understanding of transitional justice, one that acknowledges how its legalistic 
discourse causes it to be “something rooted firmly in the formal mechanisms and 
institutions of international criminal justice rather than in the communities most affected 
by the conflict.”   
A final critique of the political-legal, top-down discourse surrounding transitional 
justice comes from Erin Baines (2010) who suggests that trying to administer formal 
transitional justice through existing state institutions actually exacerbates conflict and 
injustices by ignoring processes independent of the state that are better situated to 
promote social healing and reconciliation at the micro-level. In particular, Baines (2010: 
411) argues that the “process of social reconstruction often takes place at the micro level, 
amongst the war-affected themselves and firmly outside the formal institutions [utilized 
as part of transitional justice processes today].” In her study of conflict resolution and 
reconciliation processes in Northern Uganda, Baines (2010: 417-428) finds that moral 
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and spiritual based processes in Acholi-land were better situated to promote spiritual and 
therapeutic healing as well as social reconstruction. More importantly, Baines (2010: 
412) finds that these processes provided a sense of closure to people who fell into 
ambiguous victim-perpetrator statuses that included “bystanders, collaborators, 
informants, forced perpetrators, forced combatants, victims-turned-perpetrators, and 
perpetrators-turned-victims.”  What separates Baines (2010) from Mani (2002), Lundy 
and McGovern (2008), Fletcher and Weinstein (2004), and Gready and Robins (2014) is 
her criticism of the emerging idea that the limitations of top-down approaches can be 
rectified by simply adopting bottom-up approaches in conjunction with universal 
mechanisms. Although Baines (2010, 412-414) agrees that top-down mechanisms are 
likely to create frictions in local contexts by negating or undoing processes of 
reconciliation already under way, Baines also acknowledges that “traditional,” grassroots 
approaches can be susceptible to the same pressures and limitations as well in the form of 
elite capture, spoilers, or failing to deliver a sense of justice to victims or their families.   
The common unifier across these critiques is that the legalistic and top-down 
framing of transitional justice is problematic. In some cases, these mechanisms are not 
participatory, they are viewed as being distant and externally imposed, or they are 
perceived as being a tool to simply make it appear as if a transitional government has 
made a sharp departure from a past period of violence, instability, oppression, or conflict. 
Further, as Dan Bar-On (2007), Neil Kritz (2009), and Martina Fischer (2011) suggest, 
post-conflict justice and reconciliation efforts are extremely diverse enterprises that 
require both top-down and bottom-up strategies that purposively target various actors, 
stakeholders, and, more importantly, civil society groups in a post-conflict country in 
78 
 
order to be effective. The key debate that rages between these critics, then, is how we can 
design processes and universal mechanisms that must be implemented at the national-
level while acknowledging that healing is a victim-centered enterprise that must be 
targeted at various levels of society (Lundy and McGovern 2008; Schneider 2009; Baines 
2010). More importantly, how can we utilize top-down approaches in such a way to 
prevent them from undoing efforts to repair relationships between victims and 
perpetrators at the micro-level?  
2.9 Do Truth Commissions Work? 
As a form of restorative justice that places an emphasis on strengthening the rule 
of law, while also promoting psychological and societal healing, truth commissions have 
proliferated in recent decades, evident by their increasing application in a variety of 
societies haunted by human rights abuses in Latin America, East Asia, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. This is largely a consequence of the fact that transitional societies are marked by 
criminality and widespread instability, which makes retributive forms of justice, such as 
criminal trials, hard to pursue on a massive scale. Further, South Africa’s truth 
commission marked a turning point in global awareness that uncovering the truth, 
listening, and forgiveness can address past injustices and promote reconciliation at the 
same time. As Leebaw (2008, 102) comments, “truth commissions are no longer seen as 
a second rate alternative, but rather an important complement to prosecution of 
systematic atrocity.” In most cases, truth commissions eventually blend restorative justice 
with retributive justice by combining psychological healing and the “truth” with the rule 
of law later in the transitional process.  
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In the literature, it is argued that clear-cut conditions must be met for truth 
commissions to be effective.
48
 Commissions must have strong public support, include 
representatives of various sectors of society, and operate in impartial, transparent, and 
non-political ways. Commissions must also have adequate financial and material 
resources to collect testimony, perform investigations, and conduct public hearings. On 
the other hand, commissions will be toothless and impotent if they lack legitimacy and 
transparency among ordinary citizens, have inadequate resources, and draw their 
members only from elites or specific segments of society. Above all, commissions fail if 
they are used as a form of victor’s justice or as tools to whitewash past injustices. 
Despite this agreement over the factors that are thought to condition the 
effectiveness of truth commissions, existing studies remain far from homogenous over 
whether truth commissions promote positive societal transformation. On one hand, 
proponents argue that truth commissions can become a catalyst for reconciliation by 
repairing intergroup relationships, advancing human rights protections, fostering 
transparency and accountability, and strengthening democratic processes (Scharf 1997; 
Minow 1998; Boraine 2000; Lutz and Sikkink 2001; Hamber 2001; Kim and Sikkink 
2010; Olsen et al. 2010; Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010; Porter 2015). Truth commissions are 
particularly appealing to proponents in situations marked by transitions away from 
authoritarianism, in where these bodies can become an essential component of efforts to 
uncover crimes committed by state security forces, establish the “truth” about the nature 
                                                          
48
 See Gibson (2009: 125) and Hayner (1994: 558) for a more detailed discussion on 
metrics that have been used to examine the success and effectiveness of truth 
commissions.  
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and scope of past surveillance programs, or uncover the whereabouts of those who had 
been “silenced” (Lundy and McGovern 2008, 270).  
Proponents of truth commissions advance the following three claims: (1) truth-
seeking builds justice; (2) truth-telling can become a catalyst for societal healing and 
reconciliation; and (3) truth-finding promotes a culture of respect for human rights 
(Herman 1994; Scharf 1997; Hayner 1994; Ash 1997; Minow 1998; Hayner 2001; 
Abrams and Hayner 2002). In terms of the first claim, exposing past atrocities, assigning 
blame to perpetrators, and allowing victims to come forth and share their past injustices is 
viewed as an essential ingredient in the peacebuilding process. As Richard Goldstone 
(1996, 491) has argued, “…the public and official exposure of the truth is itself a form of 
justice.” Closely related to the first claim, truth-telling is perceived as being therapeutic. 
As Judith Herman (1994: 1) notes, “…remembering and telling the truth about terrible 
events are prerequisites for both the restoration of the social order and for the healing of 
individual victims.” Michael Scharf (1997, 379) similarly writes that “…national 
reconciliation and individual rehabilitation are facilitated by acknowledging the suffering 
of victims and their families, helping to resolve uncertain cases, and allowing victims to 
tell their story, thus serving a therapeutic purpose for an entire country.” Minow (2000, 
244) also posits that “coming to know that one’s suffering is not solely a private 
experience, best forgotten, but instead an indictment of a social cataclysm, can permit 
individuals to move beyond trauma, hopelessness, numbness, and preoccupation with 
loss and injury.” Finally, truth-finding can allow post-conflict societies to develop an 
impartial, historical record of past abuses that are often kept secret. This is posited to be 
advantageous as a consequence of truth-finding educating a society about its past, 
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teaching a culture of respect for human rights protections, and preventing future human 
rights abuses. As Priscilla Hayner (1994, 607-609) comments, truth-finding “allows a 
society to learn from its past in order to prevent a repetition of such violence in the 
future.” Jeremy Sarkin (1999: 800) further argues that truth-finding can “ensure the 
avoidance of such human rights violations in the future and will also further the 
development of a human rights culture.” Of equal importance is the fact that truth 
commissions can correct “mythmaking” and the detrimental effects of revisionism in the 
future (Posen 1993; Snyder 2000; Kaufman 2001). Using complex datasets, Tricia Olsen, 
Leigh Payne, and Andrew Reiter (2010) and Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) find that truth 
commissions are not associated with improvements in human rights protections in post-
conflict countries that adopt them. Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) further finds that truth 
commissions have no effect on levels of democratization. Kim and Sikkink (2010), using 
an alternative data, instead find that truth commissions, when coupled with trials, 
strengthen human rights protections. When examining combinations of mechanisms 
further, Olsen, Payne, and Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) later concede that the effect of truth 
commissions is enhanced when they are coupled with tribunals and amnesty provisions. 
Despite these claims, a growing chorus of skeptics view truth-building as a 
potentially destabilizing force in already delicate and fragile post-conflict situations, and 
argue that truth commissions often fail more than they succeed (Huntington 1991; Popkin 
and Roht-Arriaza 1995; Brody 2001; Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003; Mendeloff 2004; 
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Gibson 2009).
49
 Refuting the first claim above, Reed Brody (2001) comments that justice 
is better served through criminal courts, which now have greater authority and legitimacy 
in prosecuting perpetrators of human rights abuses. Margaret Popkin and Naomi Roht-
Arriaza (1995, 114), moreover, argue that truth commissions in Chile, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala did not end a cycle of impunity since they were a poor substitute for 
appropriate punitive action. Arguing against the second claim, Michael Ignatieff (1996) 
questions whose “truth” is being told since there are different degrees of truth, which can 
range from “forensic truth” to “partial truth” and “hearsay.”  
Even more problematic, several scholars suggest that victims may exaggerate 
their claims to exact revenge or even use the truth-building process for personal gain. In 
Rwanda, for example, Bert Ingelaere (2009) finds that truth-building processes have 
failed to administer justice as a consequence of victims using formal processes to seize 
land from alleged perpetrators as well as its Tutsi minority using them to exact revenge of 
certain segments of its Hutu majority. Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri (2003) further 
comment that truth commissions have the potential to rekindle anger, hatred, and 
resentment between victims and perpetrators rather than becoming a catalyst for social 
reconciliation. Building on the work of Sikkink and Walling, David Mendeloff (2004: 
366) also notes that there is little evidence to suggest that truth commissions have 
deepened intergroup harmony or promoted a culture of respect for human rights in Latin 
America or South Africa. Although truth commissions have been vital components of the 
peace process in these countries, Mendeloff (2004) notes that tensions persist along the 
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 Gibson (2009, 124) embodies this view when noting that “many commissions appear to 
have had little, if any, impact on societal transformations” even when expectations are 
minimal.  
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polarizing lines of ethnicity, race, and religion. Finally, some scholars have argued that 
forgetting about the past, or promoting “collective amnesia,” is better suited for 
promoting healing and stability in transitional societies (Huntington 1991).  
Along with these critiques, other scholars criticize how truth commissions have 
been utilized as a transitional justice mechanism. Glenda Mezarobba (2010) documents 
how Brazil’s truth commission between 1995 and 2007 did little to establish an 
authoritative record of what transpired during years of oppressive, military governments. 
Instead of being an independent, investigative mechanism, this body merely became a 
forum to process claims made by victims. Other scholars posit that truth commissions are 
susceptible to political manipulation by political elites. Examining the use of truth 
commissions in Serbia and Croatia, Brian Grodsky (2009) argues that truth commissions 
in each country respectively have been greatly undermined by political, economic, and 
social elites who established them in a haphazard fashion to counter international 
pressure for criminal prosecutions. Using the failure of the Haitian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission as a case study, Joanna Quinn (2009) also comments how 
truth commissions can be plagued by a lack of political will, which can contribute to 
shortages in funding and time constraints.  
2.10 Summary 
 This chapter focuses on four key debates in the literature as it relates to the 
operation of truth commissions as a form of transitional justice in post-conflict societies. 
The first section examined the changing nature of global violence and the new wars 
thesis. Contemporary global conflicts are no longer dominated or marked by state-actors 
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using accepted weaponry on well-defined battlegrounds. Instead, contemporary conflicts 
are increasingly intermittent and protracted in nature and marked by a diffuse number of 
state and non-state actors that may, in some cases, have incentives to see violence persist 
rather than come to an end through a peace agreement or negotiated settlement.  
 The second section surveyed extant studies on the nature and goals of 
international peacebuilding. While peacebuilding operations started with clear goals and 
objectives immediately following World War II, the evolution of international 
peacebuilding from keeping the peace to peace enforcing and peace building has 
complicated international efforts to prevent post-conflict countries from relapsing back 
into armed violence and instability. Today, international peacekeeping operations are 
structured around diverse and sometimes unrealistic goals, ranging from holding 
elections and rebuilding basic state institutions to fostering reconciliation between former 
belligerents and their supporters. Some scholars, moreover, question the liberal approach 
to international peacebuilding, which places a focus on shoring up democratic institutions 
and processes, incentivizing free market exchanges, and promoting the rule of law. To 
critics, this instant liberalization is actually causing more harm than good.  
 The third section surveyed transitional justice as both a growing norm and 
literature. Scholars of transitional justice argue that post-conflict countries must address 
past human rights abuses in some form or another in order to more forward politically, 
socially, and economically. If not, these societies will forever be plagued by a legacy of 
past abuses, atrocities, and violations that have the potential to become underlying 
sources of conflict in the future. With that said, scholars of transitional justice remain 
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divided over whether it is better to punish perpetrators for past abuses, or whether it is 
better to promote strategies that are more restorative in nature in order to reintegrate 
former perpetrators back into their communities. Scholars operating from one perspective 
over another, moreover, remain divided over best practices, or the mechanisms that 
should be adopted in post-conflict countries. Some scholars who favor retributive justice 
argue that criminal tribunals represent the best way forward, whereas others place an 
emphasis on lustrations or reparations as the appropriate mechanisms to punish 
perpetrators.  
 The fourth and final section examines the main topic in this study -- do truth 
commissions actually work? Even among scholars who are proponents of restorative 
justice, these bodies are highly controversial. Some scholars point to the operations and 
proceedings of high-profile cases, such as South Africa’s TRC, to press the claim that 
truth commissions are a vital component of the peacebuilding and transitional justice 
processes. Other scholars point to the deficiencies associated with numerous examples of 
failed truth commissions, such as those in Uganda, to press the opposite claim. 
Regardless of these debates, we have benefited tremendously from alternative viewpoints 
on the effectiveness of truth commissions as a transitional justice mechanism. We have 
also benefited tremendously from those who have attempted to isolate the conditions in 
which truth commissions are more likely to exhibit a positive effect. With that said, we 
continue to lack the empirical evidence that is cross-national and time series in nature to 
judge or prove whether these bodies actually make a difference or not.  
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN 
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Methods, Models, and Procedures 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes, in detail, the mixed-method research design used to test 
and provide answers to each of the three research questions identified in Chapter One. 
The first part of this chapter discusses the merits associated with using mixed-, or multi-
method, approaches in social science research. The second section frames the quantitative 
aspect of the study, with a particular emphasis placed on discussing the data, models, and 
statistical tests utilized to test each of the five hypotheses developed in Chapter 1. To do 
so, this section describes how each of the dependent, independent, and control variables 
are measured, provides descriptive statistics for these variables, and constructs the eight 
models developed to assess the impact of truth commissions and different combinations 
of transitional justice mechanisms on levels of democratization, human rights protections, 
economic development, and the durability of peace in post-conflict countries. The 
original dataset, which contains information on transitional justice mechanisms and post-
conflict indicators between 1970 and 2010, is described in detail in this section as well. 
The third section explains the qualitative aspect of this study, with a particular emphasis 
placed on describing the rationale for picking Rwanda as a case study as the surveys and 
interviews that were developed to measure popular views and beliefs toward the gacaca 
courts. This section, in particular, discusses how the surveys were manipulated to test for 
automatic responses, which is critical when measuring attitudes in non-democratic 
countries, and reports the descriptive data for the respondents. This section also discusses 
how general principles of case study research designs are met to produce robust and 
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replicable data (Geddes 1990; Lieberson 1991; King et al. 1994; Yin 2009). A brief 
synthesis and overview of the key components of the quantitative and qualitative methods 
is offered at the end of this chapter as an easy reference for the overall research design 
adopted in this study.  
3.2 Rationale for Mixed-Method Approaches   
Multi-method and mixed-method approaches have grown in popularity and 
application in Political Science research over the past two decades. The former is usually 
characterized by a researcher adopting multiple techniques within a specific research 
frame, whether it is qualitative or quantitative in nature (Collier and Elman 2008). 
Mixed-method approaches, on the other hand, combine quantitative and qualitative 
research techniques, strategies, or analyses into a single research design and often involve 
multiple types of data collection (both numerical and qualitative) (Creswell 2003, 209). 
More importantly, this type of research design enables generalizations obtained from 
large-N studies to be complemented with thick description from small-N case studies or 
vice versa.  
This methodological strategy has become increasingly attractive in social science 
research since it offers researchers the ability to examine complex research questions 
from diverse perspectives, which creates various avenues to test competing hypotheses or 
theories. As Robert Yin (2009, 63) comments, mixed-method approaches that triangulate 
data sources “permit investigators to address more complicated research questions and 
collect a richer and stronger array of evidence that can be accomplished by any single 
method alone.” John Creswell (2003, 4) concludes that mixed-method approaches are the 
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wave of the future and to “include only quantitative and qualitative methods falls short of 
the major approaches being used today in the social and human sciences.”  
The merits of mixed-method approaches, as a methodological strategy, rest in 
their ability to allow researchers to address limitations and complications associated with 
conducting a purely quantitative or qualitative study, which helps explain why these 
approaches have proliferated (King et al. 1994; Creswell 2003; Maxwell 2005; Yin 
2009). A common critique of quantitative-driven research designs is that they force 
researchers to frame research questions around those that can be tested through the use of 
statistical or numerical data. Critics of quantitative research designs also raise concerns 
over the growing complexity and sophistication of statistical methods in social science 
research, causing some to question whether quantitative research designs are actually 
producing useful and relevant knowledge regarding political phenomena. A common 
critique of qualitative studies, on the other hand, is that they are plagued by issues related 
to reliability, validity, and replication. For example, can one researcher replicate and 
produce the same results collected by another researcher across time and across different 
geographic or cultural settings? Critics also raise concerns over the small-N nature of 
qualitative studies, which may cause researchers to make erroneous inferences about a 
larger population of cases based on a small subsample of cases. Finally, some critics 
question the external validity of qualitative research designs and, in particular, those that 
utilize case studies to test competing hypotheses or theories. Barbara Geddes (1990), for 
example, has improved our understanding of comparative case study analysis by 
highlighting how seminal studies are possibly rooted in erroneous conclusions or 
assumptions as a consequence of a researcher picking cases or observations that already 
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prove or disprove a particular value of a dependent variable (i.e., selecting on the 
dependent variable).  
The merits of mixed-method approaches, then, rest in their ability to mix different 
types of data or nest one method within another to provide additional insight into 
different research questions and hypotheses (Jick 1979; Creswell 2003). Statistical 
studies often lack “thick description,”50 while qualitative studies -- ranging from case 
study research and interview-based research to participant observation or survey-based 
research designs -- often lack generalizability or replicability. Qualitative-driven studies, 
moreover, often suffer from the lack of empirical, testable data researchers can use to 
clearly test the effects of different theories and variables. By combining quantitative and 
qualitative techniques, this allows researchers to make inferences about a large number of 
cases in a population through quantitative analyses, and then explore outliers or 
anomalies through case studies or other qualitative techniques. It is important to note, 
however, that mixed-method approaches create extensive challenges for researchers. As 
John Creswell (2003, 210) comments, combining different methodological approaches 
often involves “extensive data collection, the time-intensive nature of analyzing both text 
and numeric data, and the requirement for the researcher to be familiar with both 
quantitative and qualitative forms of research.”  
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 Geertz (1973) comments that thick description entails not just describing a research 
phenomenon in interest, but also establishing sufficient detail and background context to 
determine whether the conclusions reached in one particular case are potentially 
transferable to other cases, settings, or situations. Thick description, then, goes beyond 
just providing a superficial account of a particular phenomenon of interest with the goal 
of complex analysis of the particularities of a case.  
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 Out of the various mixed-method approaches available,
51
 this study adopts a 
concurrent transformative design strategy to gain a better understanding of what impact 
truth commissions have in post-conflict countries (see Figure 5 below). This method 
involves collecting and analyzing quantitative and qualitative data simultaneously 
(Creswell 2003, 214). The hallmark features of this approach is the development of a 
theoretical framework, or perspective, in the initial stages of a study, which then guides 
the research questions, hypotheses, and data analysis that is performed. The goal, or 
objective, of this type of inquiry is to use theory to frame a research design and then use 
both quantitative and qualitative research strategies to provide empirical answers to the 
research questions being posed through this framework. Concurrent approaches are 
different from sequential strategies in the fact that the former places on emphasis on 
collecting and analyzing data simultaneously, while the latter places an emphasis on 
collecting and analyzing one type of data first and the other second (i.e., it places an 
emphasis on one type of method over the other). 
 
 
Figure 5: Concurrent Transformative Research Design 
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 Other mixed-method research design types include: (1) sequential explanatory design 
models; (2) sequential exploratory design models; (3) sequential transformative design 
models; (4) concurrent triangulation design models; and (5) concurrent nested design 
models (Creswell 2003).  
Theory  
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By adopting a mixed-method approach, the aim of this study is to provide a more 
comprehensive examination of what conditions the effectiveness of truth commissions as 
a form of transitional justice in the past as well as to provide insight into how to improve 
their performance in 21
st
 century conflicts. The study, however, does not intend to 
establish clear cause-effect relationships between truth commissions and any of the 
dependent variables examined. Instead, the objective is to examine the societal effect of 
truth commissions from various perspectives and utilize multiple techniques to survey 
whether there is evidence to suggest that truth commissions are tied to positive societal 
outcomes or not. Further, the quantitative models used in this study incorporate various 
time intervals with the intent of mimicking difference-in-difference (DiD) models in both 
quantitative and qualitative research designs, which are increasingly becoming an 
attractive strategy for determining whether complex linkages exist when holding multiple 
variables constant. The inability to differentiate between truth commissions actually 
causing an outcome or merely being associated with an outcome remains an open source 
of debate and a critical limitation in extant studies. By combining quantitative models 
Quantitative + Qualitative Data 
Collection 
Concurrent Analysis of Data & 
Findings 
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with a case study, the goal of this study is provide additional, empirical insight into what 
conditions peace, justice, and reconciliation in war’s last phase.  
3.3 Quantitative Research Design: Statistical Data, Variables, & Model 
Specification  
Brief Summary of Research Questions & Hypotheses  
The quantitative aspect of this study uses data on transitional justice mechanisms 
and various societal indicators in post-conflict countries between 1970 and 2010 to assess 
the impact of truth commissions and their performance in relation to other transitional 
justice mechanisms. More importantly, the data were collected in such a way to provide 
empirical insight into each of the three main research questions that guide the nature of 
inquiry in this study and to test each of the five hypotheses derived from the main 
theoretical argument in Chapter 1. These research questions and the five hypotheses 
derived from them are summarized in Table 4 below.  
Table 4. Review of Research Questions & Hypotheses 
Summary of Research Questions 
RQ1 Do truth commissions produce positive societal outcomes in the form 
of democratization, economic development, human rights protections, 
and the durability of peace?   
RQ2 Must truth commissions be coupled with transitional justice 
mechanisms that are retributive in nature (e.g., criminal tribunals, 
lustrations, reparations) in order to be effective?  
RQ3 Are top-down approaches to transitional justice, such as truth 
commissions, increasingly becoming obsolete?  
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Summary of Study Hypotheses, Key Variables, & Purported Direction of 
Relationships 
 
H1 Post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions alone are less 
likely to experience advancements, or improvements, in levels of 
democratization in comparison to those that adopt truth commissions 
in combination with one or more retributive mechanisms. 
 Dependent Variable 
Democracy 
Independent Variable 
Truth commission 
Direction 
Negative 
 
H2 Post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions alone are less 
likely to experience improvements in human rights protections in 
comparison to those that adopt truth commissions in combination with 
one or more retributive mechanisms. 
 Dependent Variable 
Human Rights 
Independent Variable 
Truth commission 
Direction 
Negative 
 
H3 Post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions alone are less 
likely to experience improvements in economic development in 
comparison to those that adopt truth commissions in combination with 
one or more retributive mechanisms. 
 Dependent Variable 
Economic 
development 
Independent Variable 
Truth commission 
Direction 
Negative 
 
H4 Post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions alone are less 
likely to remain at peace in comparison to those that adopt truth 
commissions in combination with one or more retributive 
mechanisms. 
 Dependent Variable 
Durability of peace 
Independent Variable 
Truth commission 
Direction 
Negative 
 
H5 Post-conflict countries that combine top-down approaches with 
grassroots level mechanisms are more likely to experience 
improvements in levels of societal peace, democratization, economic 
development, and human rights in comparison to those that only adopt 
top-down mechanisms. 
 Dependent Variables 
Democracy, economic 
development, human 
rights protections, 
durability of peace 
 
Independent Variable 
Top-Down 
Mechanism + 
Grassroots (i.e., 
Local or Bottom-Up) 
Mechanism 
Direction 
Positive 
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Transitional Justice Dataset 
 The dataset created for this study contains information on 1,110 transitional 
justice mechanisms in 141 countries between 1970 and 2010. The unit of analysis is a 
specific transitional justice mechanism during this period.
52
 As a consequence of using 
specific transitional justice mechanisms as the unit of analysis, multiple mechanisms can 
exist in a given year for a specific country. For example, a truth commission and two 
amnesty programs are coded for Algeria in 2006. Five amnesty programs, moreover, are 
coded for Afghanistan in 1979. Start and end dates are included for each transitional 
justice mechanism included in the dataset, which allows for the creation of time-specific 
variables in the data.    
Five transitional justice mechanisms are included in the dataset: (1) truth 
commissions; (2) reparations; (3) lustration policies; (4) criminal tribunals; and (5) 
amnesties. Of the 1,100 mechanisms included, 54 are truth commissions (5%), 41 are 
reparations (4%), 41 are lustrations (4%), 262 are criminal tribunals (24%), and the 
remaining 712 are cases involving amnesties (64%). As illustrated in Figure 6 below, 
transitional justice mechanisms peak between 1990 and 1999, with 343 mechanisms in 
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 Information on specific transitional justice mechanisms was compiled from the 
Transitional Justice Data Base Project (available at: http://www.tjdbproject.com/). This 
project maintains the dataset used by Tricia Olsen, Leigh Payne, and Andrew Reiter for 
their groundbreaking work on transitional justice mechanisms. The only data that was 
copied from this dataset was information on transitional justice mechanisms between 
1970 and 2010. Data on political, economic, and social indicators for each mechanism 
were individually coded by the author.  
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operation during this time period in comparison to 255 between 1970 and 1979, 276 
between 1980 and 1989, and 237 between 2000 and 2010.  
 
In the universe of transitional justice, it is important to note that more than just 
these five mechanisms exist; however, these are the most commonly used and adopted 
transitional justice mechanisms in post-conflict societies historically, which warrants 
attention on their application and outcomes. This is not to say, though, that these are the 
only transitional justice mechanisms that post-conflict societies have an ability to choose 
from. Public memorial projects, institutional reforms, and the restructuring of educational 
systems or educational material in primary schools, for example, represent transitional 
justice mechanisms in of themselves that have drawn increased scrutiny in recent years 
0
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Figure 6: Transitional Justice Mechanisms, 1970-2010
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(Bassiouni and Rothenberg 2008). Reliable and accurate data on the usage of 
mechanisms outside of these five main mechanisms is problematic to obtain and code.  
Each observation in the dataset has country-year specific information as well as a 
unique Correlates of War (CoW) identification marker. In addition, information on the 
target of a particular mechanism and whether a mechanism itself is domestic, 
international, or hybrid (type) is included for each observation. For example, mechanisms 
that are coded “1” for target are those that were aimed at state actors, while mechanisms 
coded “2” are those that target non-state actors. Domestic mechanisms, moreover, are 
those that were directed within a country against domestic agents. International 
mechanisms are those that were created either by an IGO or transitioning government as 
part of a multi-government brokered peace agreement or those that target individuals 
from multiple countries of origin. The codebook for the dataset, which contains detailed 
information on how specific variables are coded, is available in Appendix B.
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In the dataset, coverage of transitional justice mechanisms begins with 1970 since 
this marks the beginning of the Third Wave of Democratization (Huntington 1993). This 
‘Third Wave’ was characterized by transitions to democracy in Western Europe 
beginning with Greece (1974), Portugal (1974), and Spain (1975) and those that would 
later occur in Latin American and Eastern European countries during the 1980s and early 
1990s. In all of these geographic regions, political transitions followed the collapse of 
oppressive and often brutal military, despotic, or communist regimes that forcefully 
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 The appendix contains information on mechanism coding for each of the variables 
included in the dataset. The appendix itself is structured in such a way to provide a clear, 
yet comprehensive overview of the data itself.  
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denied basic human rights and civil liberties to their citizenry over an extended period of 
time. Even though Paige Arthur (2009) traces the roots of transitional justice to political 
transitions beginning in the 1980s, this study expands this boundary to transitions that 
occurred in the 1970s.  
Variables 
Several dependent, independent, and control variables are utilized in this study. 
Most of these variables are measured in ways similar to extant studies to promote 
methodological consistency. For example, scholars assessing the impact of different 
transitional justice mechanisms on human rights protections often utilize indices available 
from either the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) dataset or the Political Terror Scale (PTS) 
produced from yearly reports compiled by Amnesty International and the US State 
Department. To further promote methodological consistency, this study measures 
democracy, economic development, human rights protections, and the durability of peace 
in almost identical terms using the same databases (e.g., World Bank Project and the 
Polity IV database) as past quantitative studies (e.g., Kim and Sikkink 2010; Olsen el al. 
2010; Meernick et al. 2010; Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010). The decision to do so was 
informed by the belief that measuring these variables in alternative ways would create 
further methodological divisions in an already nascent, messy, and convoluted literature 
marked by studies that find evidence to suggest that truth commissions (or amnesties or 
trials) promote human rights and others that argue the opposite. By using the same 
measures as those used in past studies, this provides an important baseline for 
comparison. Using similar measures also represents a path forward for future researchers 
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interested in the societal effects of truth commissions as well as other transitional justice 
mechanisms.  
Dependent Variables 
Four dependent variables are used in this study: (1) democracy; (2) human rights 
protections; (3) economic development; and (4) the durability of peace. Each of these 
variables are described, in detail, below and descriptive statistics are provided in Table 5 
(see pp. 18-19). For each dependent variable, measures are available for the year prior 
(pre), the year of (event), the year after (post), five years after (five-year), and ten years 
after (ten year) for each transitional justice mechanism. For example, democracy scores 
for Morocco, which adopted an amnesty program in 1980, are available for 1979, 1980, 
1981, 1985, and 1990. The goal of structuring the dataset in this way is to mimic DiD 
analyses that incorporate a temporal analysis of the data to not only track the immediate 
societal effects  associated with a particular mechanism, but also their societal outcomes 
on various indicators over a much longer time period. The first time interval is used as an 
additional strategy to determine whether different mechanisms matter or not in the 
countries they are adopted and to determine whether the effect of these mechanisms is 
increasing or decreasing in intensity. If the coefficient, for example, is negative the year 
prior and remains negative over the other four time periods for a particular mechanism, 
this might indicate a relationship that is tenuous at best. If the coefficient is negative and 
then becomes positive after a particular mechanism is adopted, this might suggest this 
mechanism is having some type of effect.  
Dependent Variable 1: Democracy  
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Democracy
54
 is measured through Polity IV scores available from the Polity 
Project database. Polity IV scores are country-specific and combine democracy and 
authoritarian scores on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 to +10, with -10 to -6 indicating 
a purely authoritarian or autocratic government, -5 to +5 indicating an “anocracy,”55 and 
+6 to +10 indicating an electoral democracy. To allow for additional statistical tests (e.g., 
ordered logit), additional variables that consolidated these scores into three categories 
were included in the dataset. Countries with a Polity IV score between -10 and -6, for 
example, were coded “1,” countries with a Polity IV score between -5 and +5 were coded 
“2,” and countries with a Polity IV score between +6 and +10 were coded “3” for each of 
the three new variables. Collapsing these scores into these three additional variables 
provided an avenue to test whether results varied between different statistical techniques.  
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 Democracy is a notoriously difficult concept to define, let alone measure. In this study, 
democracy is associated with the concept of “liberal democracy,” which is defined as a 
system of government that is marked by a free press, ensures free, fair, and competitive 
elections, provides mechanisms or avenues to hold political leaders accountable, and 
provides for basic political rights and civil liberties (e.g., equal access to voting, freedom 
of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion) (Dahl 1956).  
55
 The Polity IV Project defines anocracies as regimes that are somewhere between 
autocracies (political power is completely concentrated in the hands of a few) and 
democracies (political power is held by governing elites who are accountable to citizens 
through elections, interest groups, civil society, etc.). Anocracies, as a result, combine 
features of both regime types together. Following the definition of liberal democracy 
above, anocracies can be best thought of as “illiberal democracies.” According to Zakaria 
(1997, 22) illiberal democracies are marked by governments that come to power through 
elections, which may be free and fair, but once in power, ignore constitutional limits on 
executive power, deprive citizens of basic political rights and civil liberties, intimidate 
opposition, and exercise control over mass media. Levitsky and Way (2010) have 
recently used the term “competitive authoritarianism” to describe hybrid regimes that fall 
somewhere between democratic and authoritarian regimes.  
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The median value
56
 for the raw Polity IV scores at each time interval in Table 5 (-
4, -3, -3, 0, and 3 respectively) indicates that most of the observations in the dataset are 
anocracies. Further, the pre, event, and post democracy scores (-4, -3, and -3) are lower 
than the five-year and ten-year measures (0 and 3) even though all five measures had 
similar standard deviations (6.9, 6.5, 6.9, 6.9, and 6.8 respectively). This high standard 
deviation for all five time intervals indicates high variation in Polity IV scores. These 
higher polity scores also seem to highlight shifting trends in regime types and a move 
away from authoritarianism to democracy over the period covered in the dataset.  
Polity IV scores were utilized over other measures, such as those available from 
Freedom House,
57
 for two design reasons. First, Polity IV scores measure democracy 
based on six component measures in three broad areas: (1) the existence of institutional 
constraints on executive power; (2) the existence of institutional and procedural elements 
that allow citizens to express preferences and hold leaders accountable; and (3) the 
guarantee of civil liberties. Second, Polity IV scores are the most widely used measures 
of democracy in extant studies. Long time-series data exists for Polity IV scores (1800-
2015), which has caused this index to become the academic standard for measures of 
democratization, particularly in studies in International Relations.  
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 The median value is reported since the data are skewed (i.e., a large number of 
countries (~50) with a perfect democracy score of 10 are pulling the data (and the mean) 
to the right).  
57
 Freedom House ranks countries, annually, on a democracy index based on civil liberties 
and political rights. In both categories, scores range from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). 
The annual Freedom in the House Report presents these scores and offers a cumulative, 
or aggregate, score for individual countries on 25 different measures. The annual report 
also classifies countries as “free,” “partly free,” and “not free” based on these measures.   
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Polity IV scores are not perfect, however. Polity scores are missing for certain 
countries or for certain periods in the dataset. For example, there are no data for Bosnia 
and data are missing for both Afghanistan (1979-1988, 2001-2010) and Lebanon (1990-
2004) due to the presence of ongoing conflicts in each country. Polity scores also exhibit 
dramatic shifts. For example, Hungary had a combined Polity score of -7 in 1987, 
following by a score of 10 in 1990. Haiti, moreover, had a score of -7 in 1993, which was 
then followed by a score of 7 in 1995, and score of 2 in 2000. South Africa also yielded a 
perfect score of 10 even during apartheid, which indicates that Polity IV scores may not 
accurately measure commonly perceived views of liberal democracy. Regardless of these 
conceptual and measurement problems, polity scores are strongly correlated with other 
measures of democracy (e.g., Vanhanen Index of Democratization, Cheibub and 
Gandhi’s Classification Regime Index). 
Dependent Variable 2: Human Rights 
Human rights protections in the dataset are measured through the Physical 
Integrity Rights Index (PHYSINT) available from the CIRI Human Rights Dataset. This 
index measures government protection of human rights through indices that rank 
countries based on the incidence of torture, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, 
and disappearance. The PHYSINT index ranges from 0 to 8, with 0 indicating the 
absence of government respect for human rights in these four areas and 8 indicating full 
government respect for human rights. Physical Integrity scores for all five time intervals 
had similar standard deviations (2.3, 2.3, 2.3, 2.2, and 2.1 respectively) as illustrated in 
Table 5, which indicates minimal variation in human rights scores across countries 
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included in the dataset. It is important to note, however, that PHYSINT scores are 
missing for a sizeable number of observations for all five time intervals in the dataset 
(368, 322, 299, 215, and 257 respectively).  
This index is an increasingly attractive measure of human rights since it examines 
the performance of particular governments in these four areas and provides a cumulative 
score based on their collective performance in each of these four areas. Similar to Polity 
IV scores, moreover, PHYSINT scores are commonly used to measure human rights 
protections in extant studies. With that said, there are limitations associated with this 
index as well. First, Physical Integrity scores are only available after 1981, which 
accounts for the large frequency of missing values in the dataset.
58
 Second, PHYSINT 
scores are often unavailable during active periods of conflict or armed hostilities, which 
means that data are missing for active conflicts in the dataset, such as for the DRC (1995-
present), Bosnia (1995-1999), Iraq (2003-present), and Somalia (1993-present). These 
missing data are clearly problematic; however, Physical Integrity scores are utilized over 
other measures, such as PTS data available from Amnesty International, since these two 
limitations affect alternative measures as well. PTS data, for example, is only available 
after 1976.  
Dependent Variable 3: Economic Development 
Economic development is measured through annual gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita data (constant $US) available through the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators Database. GDP per capita is a measure of all economic activity 
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 All observations between 1970 and 1980 were coded as missing.  
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by an individual country’s citizens and corporations both within and outside of its borders 
divided by its total population. This per capita measure is important because it provides 
economic data on the average household in a particular country. Out of the several 
economic indicators available to economists and academics alike, data on GDP per capita 
has become the favored approach, or standard, for measuring differences or variation in 
economic development and facilitating comparisons or investigating differences between 
two or more countries’ economies over other economic indicators, such as gross national 
product data (GNP) (i.e., gross national income (GNI)). To promote comparisons, data on 
GDP per capita is measured through constant $US. Similar to the other three dependent 
variables, data on GDP per capita is available one year prior, the year of, one year after, 
five years after, and ten years after for each transitional justice mechanism included in the 
dataset.  
The GDP per capita for countries in the dataset varies between different time 
intervals. Pre, event, and post GDP per capita is much lower than ($714, $736, and $807) 
than the GDP per capita five-years and ten-years after for each observation ($955, and 
$1,044 respectively). The data also illustrate that most countries in the dataset fall into the 
low-income or lower-middle income economies (LDCs) categories
59
 utilized by the 
World Bank when classifying and evaluating the performance of economies around the 
world.  
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 The World Bank develops for economic categories: (1) low-income economies; (2) 
lower-middle income economies; (3) upper-middle-income economies; and (4) high-
income economies. Using the World Bank Atlas method (which is a conversion factor), 
LDCs are those with a GNP per capita of $1,005 or less in 2016. The World Bank LDCs 
are highly concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia.  
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Dependent Variable 4: Durability of Peace 
The last dependent variable, peace, is coded as a dummy variable indicating 
whether active conflict occurred in a country for a specific year. An observation is coded 
“1” if armed conflict or violence occurred in a given year or “0” if armed conflict or 
violence did not occur within a calendar year. The threshold adopted in this study is the 
25-annual battle-related deaths utilized by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). 
The UCDP adopts a much narrower threshold for violence in comparison to other 
databases that measure and code incidences of armed violence and hostilities worldwide. 
The UCDP provides country-year specific information on armed conflicts by using a 25 
annual battle-related deaths as a benchmark for whether armed violence exists in a 
country or not. This threshold was used over others, such as the CoW, since it is more 
likely to catch low-intensity conflicts that may slip through other conflict trackers.   
As shown in Table 5, 36 percent of cases experienced armed conflict in the year 
prior. 37 percent and 33 percent of cases experienced armed conflict in the event year and 
post year intervals respectively. For the five-year and ten-year intervals, 32 percent and 
28 percent of cases respectively experienced armed conflict.  
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Democracy, Human Rights, & 
Economic Development   
Variable  
(N) 
Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max Missing 
Polity IV Pre  
(1053) 
-1 -4 6.8 -10  10  57 
Polity IV 
Event  
(1073) 
-1 -3 6.5 -10  10  37 
Polity IV 0 -3 6.9 -10  10  36 
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Post 
(1074) 
Polity IV 5 
(1010) 
1 0 6.9 -10  10  100 
Polity IV 
Ten 
(888) 
1 3 6.8 -10  10  222 
GDP per 
capita Pre 
(997) 
2547.7 714 5473.8 70.9 41921.8 113 
GDP per 
capita Event 
(1014) 
2646.9 736.4 5729.8 72.9 44307.9 96 
GDP per 
capita Post  
(1016) 
2857.7 807 6259.4 65.5 52531 94 
GDP per 
capita 5  
(966) 
3490.2 954.8 7081.7 125.1 48401.4 144 
GDP per 
capita 10 
(835) 
3740.6 1043.6 6950.2 66 53324.4 275 
PHYSINT 
Score Pre 
(742) 
4 4 2.3 0 8 368 
PHYSINT 
Score Event  
(788) 
4 4 2.3 0 8 322 
PHYSINT 
Score Post 
(811) 
4 4 2.3 0 8 299 
PHYSINT  
Score 5 
(895) 
4 4 2.2 0 8 215 
PHYSINT 
Score 10  
(853) 
4 4 2.1 0 8 257 
Conflict Pre 
(1092) 
0.36 0 0.5 0 1 18 
 
Conflict 
Event 
(1101) 
0.37 0 0.5 0 1 9 
Conflict Post 
(1100) 
0.33 0 0.5 0 1 10 
Conflict 5 
(1055) 
0.32 0 0.5 0 1 55 
Conflict 10 
(921) 
0.28 0 0.4 0 1 189 
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Note: Raw Polity IV scores are depicted above. GDP per capita is in thousands of dollars 
(constant $US).  
 
Independent Variables 
 All five transitional justice mechanisms included in the dataset are utilized as 
independent variables. Each variable is coded as a dummy variable, with “1” indicating 
the existence of a particular transitional justice mechanism and “0” indicating the absence 
of this indicator. Observations that qualify as truth commissions are those that are marked 
by an independent, temporary body officially sanctioned by a state actor or IGO to 
investigate past human rights abuses. Observations that are coded as criminal trials or 
tribunals are those that are marked by criminal proceedings created to hold perpetrators 
of human rights abuses accountable for their actions. To qualify as a lustration policy or 
political vetting mechanism, an observation must include some type of provision that 
legally prohibits active or former government officials or those directly tied to a 
government from holding political office for some time period based on past violations of 
human rights abuses. Observations that are coded as reparations are those that include the 
transfer of monetary payments, property, or other forms of restitution to victims or their 
families for past human rights abuses.  Finally, observations coded as amnesties are those 
that involve an official, state-sanctioned policy that declares eligible individuals will not 
be prosecuted or held criminally liable for their role in orchestrating or perpetrating past 
human rights abuses as long as they meet certain conditions.   
Dummy variables are created for different combinations of mechanisms. In 
particular, a set of four variables combining truth commissions with other mechanisms 
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were created. For example, a dummy measuring whether a country adopted a truth 
commission in combination with an amnesty program was included. Another is dummy 
measuring whether a country adopted a truth commission in combination with a criminal 
tribunal was also created. Overall variables indicating the presence of a restorative 
mechanism, a retributive mechanism, and a combination of at least one restorative and 
one retributive mechanism was also included. In all of these cases, a variable is coded “1” 
if a particular combination exists and “0” if such a combination does not exist.  
Control Variables  
The four dependent variables described above are used additionally as controls in 
each of the eight models below. Conceptually, it makes sense to control for each of these 
variables to determine whether they are correlated. For example, studies on 
democratization suggest that transitional societies that are wealthy are more likely to 
become successful democracies than those that are poor (Lipset 1959; Bilson 1982; 
Bollen 1993; Olson 1993; Londregan and Poole 1994; Leblang 1996). Several studies 
have also advanced links to suggest that democracies are more likely to protect basic 
human rights over non-democracies (Poe and Tate 1994; Hofferbert and Cingranelli 
1996; Poe et al. 1999; Keith 2002; de Mesquita et al. 2003). The data also seem to 
provide evidence that such links exist, as suggested by the reported collinear figures in 
Table 6 below.
60
 Although these figures do not suggest that any of these variables are 
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 Pre measures for each variable are only reported in this table. These figures do not 
change much when taking into account different time intervals. Democracy and human 
rights scores and democracy and GDP per capita ten years after, for example, are not 
highly collinear (correlation coefficient r = 0.30 & 0.38 respectively).  
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strongly correlated with one another,
61
 there does appear to be weak and moderate 
relationships between several of the variables. For example, a moderate negative 
relationship exists between human rights and conflict, while a moderate positive 
relationship exists between democracy and per capita GDP.   
Table 6: Correlation between Democracy, Human Rights, GDP per 
capita, & Conflict Pre Measures  
Variable 1 Variable 2  Correlation 
Democracy  Human Rights   0.30 
Democracy  GDP per capita  0.42 
Democracy  Conflict  -0.01 
Human Rights  GDP per capita 0.32 
Human Rights  Conflict -0.57 
GDP per capita  Human Rights 0.32 
GDP per capita  Conflict  -0.07 
 
In addition to all four dependent variables being included as controls, several 
other additional control variables are included. Region is included since extant studies 
have highlighted regional differences in the frequency, adoption, and success of different 
transitional justice mechanisms (e.g., Sikkink and Walling 2007; Olsen et al. 2010; 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010). In the dataset, 35% and 38% of the total amnesties included 
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 A correlation coefficient between 0.30 (+/-) and 0.50 (+/-) generally indicates a weak 
linear relationship between two variables. A value between 0.50 (+/-) and 0.70 (+/-) 
indicates a moderate relationship. Any value above 0.70 suggests a strong linear 
relationship exists between two variables.  
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are concentrated in Asia and Africa respectively. Lustration policies, moreover, tend to 
be concentrated in Eastern Europe (34%), while trials are heavily concentrated in Africa 
(38%). Reparations, on the other hand, are evenly spread across the regions
62
 included in 
the dataset. The target of particular mechanisms is also included for purposes of 
determining whether the success of mechanisms vary based on whether they are directed 
against state actors or non-state actors. By including these additional controls in the 
dataset, the goal is to parse out the effect of truth commissions as well as other 
transitional justice mechanisms as much as possible.  
Model Specification  
 Eight different statistical models are tested. The first model uses a logit analysis to 
measure the impact of truth commissions as well as other transitional justice mechanisms 
on the durability of peace. The second, third, and fourth models test the impact of truth 
commissions as well as other transitional justice mechanisms on democracy, human 
rights, and economic development through ordinary-least squares (OLS) analyses that 
incorporate five different time-intervals. The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth models use 
the same dependent variables and statistical analyses as the first four models; however, 
these test different combinations of transitional justice mechanisms. In particular, four 
combinations are tested to determine whether truth commissions are more effective in 
they are paired with one mechanism over another. Similar to each of the first four 
models, the dependent variable is manipulated at different time intervals to mimic a DiD 
model in these models. 
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 Seven regions are coded: (1) Asia; (2) Africa; (3) Latin America; (4) North America; 
(5) Western Europe; (6) Eastern Europe; (7) Oceania.  
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Model One: Peace Outcomes for Specific Mechanisms 
 The first model is depicted in Figure 7. The dependent variable is the durability 
of peace, which is measured by the absence of 25 annual battle-deaths. This variable is a 
dummy variable, with “1” equaling the presence of at least 25 annual battle-deaths in a 
given country for a given conflict; “0,” on the other hand, equals the absence of armed 
hostilities measured by more than 25 annual battle-related deaths. The key independent, 
or predictor, variables are truth commissions, trials, amnesties, lustrations, and 
reparations. All five of these variables are binary, with “1” indicating the presence of a 
mechanism and “0” representing the absence of this mechanism for a country-specific 
observation. Geographic region, per capita GDP, regime type, CIRI scores, and the target 
of a mechanism (state, non-state, or both) are included as controls.  
The aim of this model is to determine whether truth commissions reduce the 
propensity of belligerents to resort back to the use of armed violence or hostilities to 
settle lingering grievances or underlying tensions. A logit model is utilized to test for the 
durability of peace at five different intervals (pre-event year, event years, post-event year, 
five-years after event year, and ten-years after event year) due to the binary nature of the 
dependent variable. To ensure the best model fitness, probit models were also run for 
each of the five models.  
Figure 7: Multivariate Model of Peace Outcomes 
                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
       
 
Peace 
(DV) 
 
Measure: > 25 Annual 
Battle-Deaths  
 
Time intervals: Year 
prior, event year, year 
after, five years, ten years 
 
Truth 
commission, trial, 
amnesty, 
lustration, 
reparations 
(IVs) 
111 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model Two: Democracy Outcomes for Specific Mechanisms 
 The second model, depicted in Figure 8, is structured in such a way to test the 
democratic outcomes associated with truth commissions, trials, amnesties, lustrations, 
and reparations. The five intervals used in Model 1 are also utilized in this model. An 
OLS model of the following form is developed:  
YiDemocracy = B0 + B1TC + B2Trials + B3Amnesty + B4Reparation + 
B5Lustration+ B6Cj + Ei t 
 The coefficient YiDemocracy is an estimate of the effect on democracy and 
represents the raw (-10-10) and recoded polity scores (1-3) for an observation included in 
the dataset. The coefficient B0 represents the constant (or intercept), B1TC represents the 
dummy truth commission variable, B2Trials represents a dummy trial variable, 
B3Amnesty represents a dummy amnesty variable, B4Reparation represents a dummy 
reparations variable, B5Lustration represents a dummy lustration variable, B6Cj 
represents the added control variables, and Ei t represents the error term for each unit at 
each time period. To ensure the best model fitness and also to evaluate whether results 
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differ based on a particular statistical test, an OLS model and an ordered logit model 
(using the recoded DV) are used to investigate whether variation exists in the results. 
Figure 8: Multivariate Model of Democracy Outcomes 
                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
       
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model Three: Human Rights Outcomes for Specific Mechanisms 
 The third model is depicted in Figure 9. This model is structured in such a way to 
evaluate the human rights outcomes of truth commissions, trials, amnesties, lustrations, 
and reparations over five time intervals.  An OLS model of the following form is tested:  
YiHumanRights = B0 + B1TC + B2Trials + B3Amnesty + B4Reparation + 
B5Lustration+ B6Cj + Ei t 
 In the model, the coefficient YiHumanRights gives an estimate of the human rights 
effect and measured through Physical Integrity scores. The coefficient B0 represents the 
constant (or intercept), B1TC represents the dummy truth commission variable, B2Trials 
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represents a dummy trial variable, B3Amnesty represents a dummy amnesty variable, 
B4Reparation represents a dummy reparations variable, B5Lustration represents a dummy 
lustration variable, B6Cj represents the added control variables, and Ei t represents the 
error term for each unit at each time period. An OLS model is utilized since the DV 
ranges from 0 to 8.  
Figure 9: Multivariate Model of Human Rights Outcomes 
                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
       
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model Four: Economic Outcomes for Specific Mechanisms 
The forth model is depicted in Figure 10. This model tests the economic 
outcomes associated with truth commissions, trials, amnesties, lustrations, and 
reparations over five time intervals. An OLS model of the following form is tested:  
YiGDP per capita= B0 + B1TC + B2Trials + B3Amnesty + B4Reparation + 
B5Lustration+ B6Cj + Ei t 
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 YiGDP represents GDP per capita (constant $US), B0 represents the constant (or 
intercept), B1TC represents the dummy truth commission variable, B2Trials represents a 
dummy trial variable, B3Amnesty represents a dummy amnesty variable, B4Reparation 
represents a dummy reparations variable, B5Lustration represents a dummy lustration 
variable, B6Cj represents the added control variables, and Ei t represents the error term for 
each unit at each time period. An OLS model is selected due to the continuous nature of 
the dependent variable.  
Figure 10: Multivariate Model of Economic Outcomes 
                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
       
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model Five: Peace Outcomes for Combinations of Transitional Justice Mechanisms 
The fifth model, in Figure 11 below, mirrors Model 1 to estimate the pacifying 
effects of transitional justice mechanisms. The only difference is that this model uses 
combinations of truth commissions with other transitional justice mechanisms as the 
predictor variables. These new predictors are binary in nature, with “1” indicating the 
presence of both mechanisms. Similar to Model One, a logit model is utilized to test the 
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impact of these different combinations over five different time intervals. Probit models 
were also run alongside these models to test for variation in the results.   
Figure 11: Multivariate Combination Model of Peace Outcomes 
                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
       
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model Six: Democracy Outcomes for Combinations of Transitional Justice Mechanisms 
The sixth model, as depicted in Figure 12, mirrors Model Two to estimate the 
democratic effects and outcomes of truth commissions in conjunction with other 
transitional justice mechanisms. Similar to Model Five, specific combinations of truth 
commissions and other mechanisms are utilized as the predictor variables. The same 
vector of control variables and time intervals are used as all of the other models. The 
same OLS model used in Model 2 to estimate the democratic outcomes of each 
transitional justice mechanism separately is used in this model to test the effects of 
different combinations of truth commission mechanisms on democratic outcomes.  
Figure 12: Multivariate Combination Model of Democracy Outcomes 
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Model Seven: Human Rights Outcomes for Combinations of Transitional Justice 
Mechanisms 
The seventh model, depicted in Figure 13 mirrors the third model; however, it is 
manipulated to estimate the human rights effects of truth commissions in conjunction 
with other mechanisms. The dependent variable remains the same as in Model Three and 
the same vector of control variables and time intervals are included. An OLS model, 
moreover, is used to estimate the human rights effects of these four combinations. This 
model is identical to the model used in Model Three; however, instead of treating each 
transitional justice as a key independent variable individually, the different combinations 
of mechanisms are included as the predictor variables in this model. 
Figure 13: Multivariate Combination Model of Human Rights 
Outcomes 
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Model Eight: Economic Outcomes for Combinations of Transitional Justice Mechanisms 
The eighth, and final, model depicted in Figure 14 estimates the economic effects 
associated with truth commissions in conjunction with other transitional justice 
mechanisms. The dependent variable is the same as Model Four. The same combinations 
of predictor variables are used as well as the same vector of control variables and time 
intervals. An OLS model, moreover, is used to estimate these economic effects. This 
model is identical to the model used in Model Four; however, instead of treating each 
transitional justice as a key independent variable individually, the different combinations 
of mechanisms are included as the predictor variables in this model.  
 
Figure 14: Multivariate Combination Model of Economic Outcomes 
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3.4 Case Study Research Design   
To explore the critical question of whether top-down approaches to transitional 
justice are becoming increasingly obsolete in the 21
st
 century, Rwanda’s gacaca courts 
are utilized as a case study to explore the intersections and obstacles to peacebuilding and 
transitional justice. These courts represent a hybrid, bottom-up approach to transitional 
justice that was utilized in conjunction with traditional, top-down approaches in the form 
of an international criminal court that was created by the UN following the events that 
unfolded during the Rwandan genocide. These courts can also be considered hybrid in 
nature since they dispensed both retributive and restorative justice by punishing those 
guilty of committed crimes during the genocide and by promoting reconciliation for those 
who came forward and confessed their crimes. The genocide, coupled with a broader 
civil war between 1990 and 1994, led to the forcible displacement of roughly half of 
Rwandan’s population and killed approximately 10 percent of Rwanda’s total population 
(Moghalu 2005, 17). Thousands of women were also subjected to sexual violence with 70 
percent of survivors being infected with HIV (Amnesty International 2004, 3).  
 
Region, Human Rights Scores, 
Active Conflict, Regime Type, 
Target of Mechanism, Level of 
Mechanism 
(CVs) 
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Although a hybrid-approach was adopted, the gacaca courts became the face of 
transitional justice in a battered and war-torn society marked by extreme violence 
perpetrated at the local level. According to Coel Kirkby (2006, 100), the goals of gacaca 
were to: (1) establish the truth about crimes that were committed during the genocide; (2) 
speed up the prosecutions of accused perpetrators who had languished in jail without 
formally being charged; and (3) end a cycle of impunity and promote reconciliation and 
unity among Rwandans. Despite their success in trying large numbers of perpetrators, 
these courts quickly became a source of contention and controversy. Jeremy Sarkin 
(2001, 161) comments that the limited jurisdiction of the courts caused them to only 
focus on crimes committed by Hutu and not those committed outside of the genocide by 
Tutsi. Bert Ingelaere (2009) comments that these courts inhibited reconciliation and 
prospects for national unity since they were used by the Rwandan government as a tool 
for political manipulation.  
Survey & Interview Design 
The gacaca courts represent a unique case study to explore the intersections 
between peace, justice, and reconciliation and, more importantly, to evaluate the impact 
and effectiveness of bottom-up approaches to transitional justice compared to top-down 
approaches and vice versa. To test public perceptions of the gacaca process and the 
overall transitional justice process in post-genocide Rwanda, this study administered a 
survey to 27 gacaca court participants between June and July 2016. Of the 27 that 
participated, 12 agreed to participate in a longer, semi-structured interview that examined 
key themes, questions, and values in a more in-depth, but informal manner. Two versions 
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of the survey were administered to manipulate wording in order to test whether 
Rwandans have been conditioned to think or perceive of gacaca in certain ways. The 
rationale for using two versions was to determine whether different wording affected 
participant responses and to also safeguard against participants mistaking the meaning or 
application of certain words in particular questions. Each semi-structured interview 
followed the same prompt and focused on three critical themes: (1) whether gacaca 
promoted justice; (2) whether gacaca contributed to reconciliation both nationally and at 
the village-level; and (3) whether alternative mechanisms, other than gacaca, were more 
capable of dispensing justice, uncovering the truth, and allowing individuals to move 
forward. The study protocol is available in Appendix D. Both versions of the survey are 
available in Appendices F and G respectively. Finally, the interview prompt is available 
in Appendix E.  
66 percent of the surveys and approximately two-thirds of the study interviews 
were conducted in Ruhengeri (18 surveys, 8 interviews); the remaining 40 percent of the 
surveys and one third of the interviews were conducted in Kigali (9 surveys, 4 
interviews). Ruhengeri was a focal point early on in the civil war between the RPF and 
the Rwandan government and RPF forces used this border area as a staging area to 
conduct attacks in Rwandan territory from Uganda. In the waning days of the genocide, 
this was also one of the main routes the Interahamwe used when fleeing to the DRC. Due 
to its status as a staging point for RPF-led incursions as well as the “exit point” for the 
Interahamwe as they fled Rwanda, unthinkable acts of violence and cruelty were 
committed against civilians. The proximity of Ruhengeri to the DRC and Ugandan 
borders also makes it susceptible to inter-ethnic tensions with Tutsi families now 
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occupying homes and land once occupied by Hutu before the civil war and genocide. 
Kigali, on the other hand, was the site of countless atrocities committed at the beginning 
of the genocide. As noted above, Interahamwe and government soldiers manned 
roadblocks and checkpoints in the capital during the early stages of the genocide, which 
effectively trapped and limited the movement of Tutsi and moderate Hutu opposed to the 
killings. Like Ruhengeri, streets throughout Kigali were the site of horrendous murders 
and other human rights violations by both Interahamwe and other militias allied with the 
Hutu Power movement as well as RPF soldiers.  
In total, a sample of 60 individuals was initially identified during the planning 
stages of the research to participate in both the survey and interview. These 60 
individuals were randomly selected among a list of 95 gacaca participants identified by 
two gacaca court judges. These judges were identified through contacts established 
during the initial research design stage through American nongovernmental organizations 
working in the country. One judge presided over cases in Ruhengeri, while the other 
judge presided over cases in Kigali. Those targeted to participate in the survey and 
interviews were Rwandans that either were involved in gacaca proceedings as plaintiffs, 
defendants, and witnesses or those who were regular attendees to weekly meetings. 
Approximately 18.5 percent of the respondents were participants in gacaca cases, another 
18.5 percent were witnesses in gacaca cases, and the remaining 63 percent were those 
that attended gacaca proceedings on a regular basis.  
Of the 60 individuals initially identified, only 27 were able to participate during 
the time frame identified above (45 percent response rate) and of these 27, only 12 agreed 
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to take part in a longer, more substantive interview (44 percent response rate). These 
response rates were negatively affected by the inability of the author to receive ethics 
approval from the Rwandan National Ethics Committee as well as a research permit from 
the Rwandan Ministry of Education, which prevented the ability to administer surveys 
and interviews to government officials and those officially tied to the gacaca proceedings 
through a direct, government link. Approximately half of those that did not participate 
were omitted for this reason. The other half were omitted since they either refused to 
participate when contacted at a later point or due to logistical reasons preventing the 
author from administering the survey or interview (if they agreed to take part in this 
aspect of the study) in person. For non-disclosure reasons, all participants are not directly 
identified and several measures have been taken to shield their identity. The interview 
methods table can be found in Appendix H.   
The survey and study interview included questions that asked respondents’ 
sociodemographic characteristics. The survey and study interview did not ask a 
respondents’ ethnicity (whether they were Tutsi or Hutu) since doing so is prohibited by 
law in Rwanda. This basic demographic information is found in Table 7 below.  The 
median age of the survey respondents was 35 years old, which is significantly higher than 
the national median age of 19 years old.
63
 Males were over-represented in the sample, 
with 16, or 59 percent of respondents being men. This is higher than the national ratio in 
where men comprise roughly 51 percent of the population. Approximately three out of 
four respondents had a primary school education, which is similar to demographic data 
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 All demographic data used for comparison was compiled from databases administered 
by the World Bank.  
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contained in existing studies (Thompson 2002; Rettig 2008; Pozen et al. 2014). Further, 
those working in the education (5) and nonprofit or nongovernmental sectors (9) were 
over-sampled, which is a consequence of the fact that one of the gacaca judges is the 
founder of a nongovernmental organization group, while the other was a principal of an 
elementary school that receives assistance from an American-based INGO in the form of 
a cow project.  
Table 7: Demographic Information of Gacaca Survey Respondents 
 
Survey Demographic Information    N  %   
 
Sex 
 Male       16  59 
 Female      11  41 
   
Age  
 18-25       1  4 
 26-33       5  18.5 
 34-41       11  41 
 42-49       4  15 
 50-57       3  11 
 58-65       2  7 
 65+       1  4 
 
Education 
 Primary       20  74 
 Secondary      3  11 
 Post-Secondary     4  15 
 
Occupation 
 Nongovernmental     9  33 
 Education      5  19 
 Tourism      5  19 
 Transportation      4  15 
 Agriculture      3  11 
 Other       1  4  
 
Residence 
 Ruhengeri      18  66 
 Kigali       9  33 
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Type 
 Gacaca Participant      5  18.5 
 (Judge, accuser, defendant) 
 Gacaca Witness     5  18.5 
 Gacaca Attendee     17  63 
Note: Numbers may not add up perfectly due to rounding.  
 
Study eligibility required participants to be at least 18 years of age and understand 
and agree to an informed consent form. The average time for a respondent to complete 
either form of the survey was approximately 10 minutes. The average length of each 
interview was approximately 45 minutes. If a participant had trouble understanding a 
particular question or a topic on the survey or during the interview, further clarification 
was provided. All of the surveys were administered in paper-form, which required the 
participant to fill out the survey by hand. The surveys were administered in this fashion to 
shield a participant’s responses64 and to ensure proper coding at a later time. All surveys 
were destroyed approximately a month after the study was conducted. For some 
interviews, a translator was used if language barriers proved too difficult to overcome. 
For some respondents, their proficiency in English was limited and they preferred, 
instead, to conduct the interview in French.  
Measures 
Attitudes and perceptions toward gacaca were measured in the survey through a 
three-point response option ranging from “agree” to “disagree,” with the additional 
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 The author perceived that written survey forms would shield individual responses to 
questions on the survey. The use of a paper-form was also a necessity considering that the 
author did not receive a government-issued research permit.  
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response of “I don’t know.” This response option was utilized rather than a traditional 
five-point response option for purposes of simplicity and efficiency. The questions were 
structured in such a way to measure a vast constellation of attitudes toward gacaca. The 
questions were also structured in such a way to measure attitudes and beliefs toward 
gacaca processes, procedures, and outcomes. For example, the question “did gacaca 
promote national unity” was utilized to measure attitudes and perceptions toward 
outcomes and processes associated with gacaca. The questions, “there was a large 
amount of false testimony or accusations,” “people told lies,” and “people felt 
threatened” were intended to measures attitudes toward procedural elements associated 
with gacaca. Finally, for purposes of comparison, questions were sometimes framed in 
the same way as past studies that have attempted to measure attitudes and beliefs toward 
gacaca (Thompson et al, 2002; Rettig 2008; Pozen et al. 2014). For example, the 
statement “people told lies” was adopted from the study of Max Rettig (2008) and Pozen, 
Neugebaurey, and Ntaganira (2014). The purpose in doing so was to add a time-series 
component when evaluating attitudes and perceptions toward gacaca. 
Some questions (e.g., gacaca allowed perpetrators to be reintegrated back into 
their community) were also similarly structured to those that are used in the Rwanda 
Reconciliation Barometer (RRB), which is administered by the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Commission of Rwanda (NURC). This government agency has been 
measuring attitudes at different stages of the gacaca process. A survey was administered 
by the NURC to approximately 5,000 Rwandans in 2006, 2010, and 2016. The purpose of 
framing these questions similar to the RRB was to determine whether Rwandans have 
been conditioned to think in certain ways. If their responses are largely similar to those 
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questions found in the NURC survey, yet differ on those questions either developed from 
past studies or those that are unique in this study, this should cause us to be careful when 
making generalizations or inferences about the effect of the gacaca courts. In past 
studies, Rwandans are commented to be notorious for telling researchers “want they 
want” (Thompson et al. 2002; Rettig 2008; Pozen et al. 2014).  
Building on these surveys, the semi-structured interview questions were 
structured in such a way to measure whether Rwandans perceive that gacaca was better 
suited to dispense justice on a mass scale in comparison to other commonly used 
transitional justice mechanisms in post-conflict countries. The study interview questions 
provided participants with a greater opportunity to elaborate on their own feelings and 
attitudes toward the gacaca process, procedures, and policies. In the end, the study 
interview built on the surveys in incalculable ways. The study interview, in particular, 
was extremely useful in collecting data on whether gacaca worked and whether gacaca 
was the best mechanism available to not only dispense justice on a mass scale, but also 
uncover the truth and contribute to ethnic reconciliation and the overall healing process in 
post-genocide Rwanda.  
3.5 Summary   
 Multi-method research designs are extremely powerful in social science research 
since they allow researchers to explore research questions from various viewpoints and 
methodological perspectives. In this study, a concurrent transformative research approach 
is utilized to explore the critical questions of whether truth commissions work, whether 
coupling truth commissions with retributive mechanisms enhances their effect and 
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outcomes, and whether top-down approaches to transitional justice, such as truth 
commissions, are becoming obsolete due to the changing nature of global violence. The 
quantitative section of this study utilizes a dataset constructed on transitional justice 
mechanisms, ranging from truth commissions to amnesty programs, between 1970 and 
2010. Eight models are developed to test whether truth commissions exhibit positive or 
negative effects on levels of democratization, economic development, human rights 
protections, and the durability of peace in post-conflict countries during this period both 
individually and in conjunction with other transitional justice mechanisms. More 
importantly, these models test the impact of truth commissions as well as other 
transitional justice mechanisms at different intervals to control for time and the effect of 
different combinations of mechanisms. The Large-N nature of this inquiry provides 
valuable insight into topic since effects of truth commissions, other transitional justice 
mechanisms, and other salient factors can be controlled and manipulated to draw 
inferences and generalizations about a large universe of cases. In addition, the different 
time intervals included in the models allow for before and after comparisons.  
The qualitative section of this study provides useful thick description for these 
Large-N analyses. More importantly, Rwanda’s gacaca courts provide a valuable avenue 
for exploring what conditions peace, justice, and reconciliation in the aftermath of 
extremely personal and localized violence, which often marks the contours of 
contemporary global conflicts. The survey questions are structured in such a way to 
provide valuable insight into popular perceptions toward different levels of transitional 
justice in post-genocide Rwanda. The interviews, moreover, provide valuable 
opportunities to explore the limited nature of the survey response questions in a more in-
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depth manner. With the course of the study now outlined, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 
implement the research design.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: STATISTICAL RESULTS & FINDINGS 
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Modeling Effects & Outcomes of Truth Commissions & Alternative 
Transitional Justice Mechanisms 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the statistical findings from the eight models described in 
Chapter 3. This chapter is divided into seven component parts. The first section presents 
the peace estimates for the first model, which use a dummy variable that captures annual 
battle-related deaths to test the impact of truth commissions, trials, amnesties, lustrations, 
and reparations on levels of communal violence. The second, third, and forth sections 
present the OLS estimates for the democracy, human rights, and economic development 
models, which use Polity IV scores, Physical Integrity indices, and per capita GDP as 
measures to evaluate the societal effects of these mechanisms. The fifth section provides 
a synthesis of the results obtained in the first four models. The sixth section presents the 
peace estimates for the models that estimate the societal effects of truth commissions in 
different combinations with other transitional justice mechanisms. The seventh, eighth, 
and ninth sections then present the OLS estimates for the democracy, human rights, and 
economic development models for these different combinations respectively. The chapter 
concludes with an overall synthesis of the findings reached in all eight models. A more 
substantive discussion on the implications associated with these models is included in 
Chapter 6, which synthesizes these findings in conjunction with the case study findings 
and overall implications of the dissertation itself.  The diagnostics for all of the models 
are available in Appendix C. The findings in this chapter provide some evidence that 
truth commissions, when paired with reparations, begin to exhibit positive societal 
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effects; however, the effects of truth commissions both individually and in combination 
with other mechanisms appears to be limited based on the eight models reported.  
4.2 Estimating Peace Outcomes for Individual Transitional Justice 
Mechanisms 
 The statistical results for Model 1, which uses five different time intervals to 
estimate the peace effects of truth commissions, trials, amnesties, reparations, and 
lustrations appear in Table 8.  The key take-away from the results is that truth 
commissions have no measurable, or statistically significant effect, on the durability of 
peace in four of the intervals included when controlling for all other variables in the 
models. On peace estimates 10 years after adoption, truth commissions do appear to 
exhibit a positive, statistically significant effect. This positive relationship, though, 
suggests that the presence of a truth commission is actually detrimental for the durability 
of peace since these bodies increase the probability of violence reigniting within a ten-
year period.  The odds ratios depicted in Table 9 suggest that the odds of conflict 
reigniting increases by 4.6 percent in countries that adopt truth commissions versus 
countries that do not within a ten-year period, when holding other variables constant. 
These results, together, seem to support Hypothesis 4, which states that truth 
commissions, by themselves, are unlikely to promote positive societal outcomes by 
increasing the durability of peace in post-conflict countries and reducing the probability 
of renewed violence or armed hostilities.  
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Table 8: Logit Estimates for Peace Outcomes 
             
Variable          Conflict1           Conflict2        Conflict3          Conflict4        Conflict5 
Truth Commission 0.82  0.41  0.10  0.42           13.04*** 
   (0.79)  (0.68)  (0.96)  (0.93)           (0.66) 
Trials   0.84  1.11*  1.26  0.71           13.37*** 
   (0.68)  (0.64)  (0.89)  (0.79)           (0.48) 
Lustrations  1.00  2.16*** 0.57  0.84           13.01*** 
   (0.78)  (0.79)  (1.09)  (0.96)           (0.72) 
Amnesties  1.19*  1.41*  1.01  0.95           13.91*** 
   (0.66)  (0.61)  (0.88)  (0.77)           (0.45) 
PHYSINT   -0.79*** -0.85*** -0.98*** -0.84***        -0.87*** 
   (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.06)            (0.07) 
Polity IV  0.05**  0.49**  0.37*  0.02           -0.002 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.21)  (0.02)            (0.01) 
GDP   -0.20*  -0.27** 0.002  -0.32***        -0.11 
   (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.11)            (0.11) 
Asia   -0.37  -0.94  -0.05  0.70             0.88* 
   (1.52)  (1.19)  (0.81)  (0.59)            (0.48) 
Africa   -0.63  -1.50  -0.32  0.22             0.86* 
   (1.52)  (1.19)  (0.82)  (0.59)            (0.50) 
Latin America  -1.13  -1.49  -0.95  0.32           -0.13 
   (1.52)  (1.20)  (0.83)  (0.57)             (0.51) 
N. America  2.93*  2.87**  2.58**  5.79***          4.81*** 
   (1.66)  (1.35)  (1.05)  (0.91)            (0.96) 
W. Europe  -0.03  -1.08  0.55  2.67            2.14*** 
   (1.64)  (1.43)  (1.02)  (0.73)            (0.61) 
E. Europe  -0.49  -1.82  -1.24  ---  --- 
   (1.55)  (1.23)  (0.91)  ---  --- 
State Target  -0.37  -0.39  0.04  0.33             0.47 
   (0.38)  (0.34)  (0.38)  (0.42)             (0.42) 
Non-State Target -0.30  -0.35  -0.17  0.12  0.21 
   (0.31)  (0.29)  (0.33)  (0.37)              (0.32) 
Constant  3.19*  4.33*** 1.86  2.70*         -11.83*** 
   (1.81)  (1.59)  (0.39)  (1.39)  (1.22) 
N   688  732  749  813   799 
Pseudo R2  0.33  0.39  0.42  0.35  0.36 
Log Likelihood  -303.14 -291.82 -272.43 -326.94            -301.39 
             
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable measuring annual battle-related deaths, 
with “1” indicating the presence of ongoing hostilities (>25 annual battle deaths) and “0” 
indicating the absence of physical hostilities (<25 annual battle deaths). The labels 1, 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 refer to the time intervals “one-year prior,” “the year of,” “one-year after,” “five-years 
after,” and “ten-years after” being adopted. Logit coefficients are reported with robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors were used due to the presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the error term. Reparations are excluded from the model above since 
they are perfectly correlated with amnesties. The results did not vary based on whether 
amnesties or reparations were included in the models. Oceania and mechanisms targeting 
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both state and non-state actor category were also omitted since they are highly collinear with 
other categories of region and mechanism target. Eastern Europe is omitted in Conflict 
Models 4 and 5 since it is highly collinear. N is the number of observations included in each 
model; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
 The results from all five time intervals in Model 1 also provide mixed findings for 
the other transitional justice mechanisms included as key predictor variables. Trials, 
amnesties, and lustrations exhibit a positive, statistically significant effect on annual 
battle-deaths in both the first year and ten year mark, meaning that these mechanisms, 
too, are associated with an uptick in violence within the first year and within ten years of 
being adopted. The odds ratios in Table 9 indicate that countries that adopted trials 
witnessed an increase in communal violence by 203 percent in the first year of being 
adopted. Countries that adopted lustrations, moreover, witnessed an increase in 
communal violence by 769 percent in the first year, while countries that adopted 
amnesties witnessed an increase in physical hostilities by 312 percent in the first year of 
being adopted. Needless to say, these models do not provide meaningful evidence to 
suggest that transitional justice mechanisms, individually, play a positive role in reducing 
violence in post-conflict societies. 
The results from Model 1 are much more benign for the variables included as 
controls. A negative, statistically significant relationship exists between human rights and 
economic development on the durability of peace. Across all five time intervals models, 
Physical Integrity scores are consistently significant at the 99 percent level, and the odds 
ratios in Table 9 suggest that a one unit increase in Physical Integrity scores is associated 
with a -54 percent, -57 percent, -63 percent, -57 percent, and -58 percent decrease in the 
incidence of armed violence for each time interval respectively. Further, the logit models 
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suggest a negative relationship exists between GDP per capita and annual battle-related 
deaths, with a $1,000 (constant $US) increase in GDP per capita being associated with a 
decrease in the incidence of armed hostilities by -24 the year of a mechanism being 
adopted and -27.5 percent five years after being adopted.  
Levels of democratization and geographic region, however, appear to have a 
contradictory effect on the durability of peace. Polity IV scores exhibit a statistically 
significant, positive effect on annual battle-related deaths in the first year and the 
following year of a mechanism being adopted, meaning that post-conflict countries that 
score higher on the Polity IV range are actually associated with an uptick of violence in 
the short-term. Across all five time-intervals, the results also indicate that mechanisms 
utilized in North America increase the likelihood of violence reigniting across all five 
time intervals.  
Table 9: Odds Ratios for Peace Models 
             
Variable    P-Value  Odds Ratios (%)   
Truth Commission 
 One-year prior   0.29   130 
 Year of    0.60   51     
 One-year after   0.92   10    
 Five-years after  0.65   52   
 10-years after   0.00   4.6e+07 
Trials  
One-year prior   0.21   132 
 Year of    0.09   203 
 One-year after   0.16   254 
 Five-years after  0.37   104 
 10-years after   0.00   6.4e+07 
Lustrations     
One-year prior   0.19   173 
 Year of    0.01   769 
 One-year after   0.59   77 
 Five-years after  0.38   132 
 10-years after   0.00   4.5e+07 
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Amnesties    
One-year prior   0.07   231 
 Year of    0.02   312 
 One-year after   0.25   174 
 Five-years after  0.22   158 
 10-years after   0.00   1.1e+08 
PHYSINT      
 One-year prior   0.00   -54 
 Year of    0.00   -57 
 One-year after   0.00   -63 
 Five-years after  0.00   -57 
 10-years after   0.00   -58 
Polity IV     
 One-year prior   0.02   5 
 Year of    0.02   5 
 One-year after   0.08   3.7 
 Five-years after  0.41   1.6 
 10-years after   0.87   -0.2 
GDP      
 One-year prior   0.07   -18 
 Year of    0.02   -24 
 One-year after   0.98   0.3 
 Five-years after  0.01   -27.5 
 10-years after   0.29   -10.8  
 
4.3 Estimating Democracy Outcomes for Individual Transitional Justice 
Mechanisms 
 The multivariate regression results
65
 for all five time-intervals for Model 2 appear 
in Table 10.  Similar to the results in each of the durability of peace models above, truth 
commissions do not exhibit much of a meaningful effect on levels of democratization 
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 The results did not change dramatically between the OLS and ordered logit models, 
which were run separately to determine whether one model was a better fit for the data 
considering the nature of the dependent variable. Reparations were excluded from the 
dataset since they were perfectly correlated with amnesties. Including reparations, instead 
of amnesties, does affect the OLS coefficients and statistical significance of some 
indicators, including truth commissions. The author, however, concludes that these 
differing results show that truth commissions do not have much of a meaningful impact 
on levels of democratization in post-conflict countries.  
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alone. Although a positive, statistically significant relationship exists between truth 
commissions and democracy at the five-year mark, no statistically significant relationship 
exists for any of the other time intervals. The results for the five-year model do suggest 
that truth commissions increase Polity IV scores by 1.86 within five-years when holding 
all other variables constant. The inability to reject the null for the other time intervals 
suggests that we should be cautious when stating that truth commissions have a positive 
effect on levels of democracy in post-conflict countries. The lack of statistically 
significant results for the ten-year mark seems to indicate that the effects of truth 
commissions are isolated to the first few years of a political transition rather than to long-
term outcomes. Similar to the results for Model 1, the results from Model 2 do not 
provide much evidence to reject Hypothesis 1, which states that truth commissions, 
alone, are unlikely to yield positive democratic developments in post-conflict countries 
that adopt them versus those that do not.  
Table 10 tells a much more complicated story for other transitional justice 
mechanisms. Trials, lustrations, and amnesties all have a negative, statistically significant 
effect on democracy and seem to impede the growth of democratic institutions or 
processes in the countries that adopt them. In countries that adopted lustration policies, 
for example, Polity IV scores decreased by 2.29 in the year of being adopted and 1.72 in 
the following year when holding all other variables constant. In countries that adopted 
amnesty provisions, Polity IV scores decreased by 1.5 in the first year and 1.41 in the 
following year when holding all other variables constant. Finally, countries that adopted 
trials or criminal tribunals to try offenders of human rights abuses witnessed a decrease in 
Polity IV scores by 1.36 in the first year, 1.51 in the following year, and 1.32 five years 
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after adopted when holding all other variables constant. These large and stable 
coefficients across these time intervals seem to indicate that these mechanisms delay or 
even postpone democratic processes and institutions in countries that adopt them versus 
countries that do not.   
Similar to the results for each of the controls in Model 1 above, Table 10 also 
spells out a positive story for several of these controls in Model 2 as well. In particular, 
the results show a positive, statistically significant relationship exists between democracy 
and per capita GDP, Physical Integrity scores, and the absence of armed violence. 
Increasing per capita GDP by $1,000 ($US constant) increases Polity IV scores by 0.91 in 
the first year, 0.88 the following year, 0.99 within five years, and 1.51 within ten years. 
Increasing Physical Integrity scores by 1 increases Polity IV scores by 0.46, 0.46, and 
0.45 in the first year, the following year, and within five years. Finally, the absence of 
armed hostilities increases Polity IV scores by 1.47 in the first year and 1.21 the 
following year.  
These results also show that regional effects and the target of a mechanism matter 
for democracy-building efforts in post-conflict countries. In particular, mechanisms that 
are targeted at non-state actors only decrease Polity IV scores by 2.29, 1.99 and 1.98 in 
the first year, the following year, and five years after being adopted. Mechanisms that are 
geographically concentrated in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe also decrease the 
development of democratic processes and institutions across all five time intervals, while 
those located in North America and Western Europe are more likely to witness short-term 
advancements in the consolidation of democratic institutions and processes. A 
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mechanism adopted in Western Europe, for example, increases Polity IV scores by 2.05 
five years after being adopted when holding all other variables constant.    
Table 10: OLS Estimates for Democracy Outcomes 
             
Variable  Polity1  Polity2  Polity3  Polity4  Polity5  
Truth Commission  0.19   1.06  0.73  1.86**  3.11 
(1.07)  (0.88)  (0.81)   (0.95)  (4.01) 
Trials   -1.42*   -1.36*  -1.51** -1.32*  0.12 
(0.81)  (0.72)  (0.64)  (0.79)  (4.23) 
Lustrations  -2.64**  -2.29*  -1.72*  -0.90  0.62 
(1.23)  (1.19)  (0.93)  (1.01)  (5.38) 
Amnesties  -1.95** 1.50**  -1.41** -0.48  0.93 
   (0.83)  (0.75)  (0.66)  (0.79)  (4.31)  
GDP    0.91*** 0.91*** 0.88*** 0.99***           1.51*** 
   (0.24)  (0.22)   (0.22)  (0.19)  (0.29) 
PHYSINT  0.44*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.45*** -0.19 
   (0.13)   (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.22) 
>25 Annual BD 1.41*** 1.47*** 1.21**  0.54  -0.09 
   (0.50)  (0.52)   (0.52)  (0.49)  (0.82) 
Asia   -4.87*** -4.31*** -4.38*** -4.13***        -6.49*** 
   (0.71)  (0.85)  (0.69)  (0.76)  (1.20) 
Africa   -6.86*** -6.14*** -6.44*** -5.29***        -6.31*** 
   (0.66)  (0.81)  (0.64)  (0.68)  (1.01) 
Latin America  -1.47** -0.64  -0.47  0.69  -1.28 
   (0.68)  (0.42)  (0.61)  (0.70)  (1.01) 
N. America  1.73*  2.10**  1.81*  2.24*  0.52 
   (0.90)  (1.02)  (0.92)  (1.15)  (1.79) 
W. Europe  1.34*  1.61*  1.22  2.05**  0.38 
   (0.75)  (0.90)  (0.75)  (0.89)  (1.28) 
E. Europe  -1.62** -0.34  -0.06  1.48**         -14.87*** 
   (0.73)  (0.82)  (0.63)  (0.73)  (4.91) 
State Target  0.93  0.26  0.21  -0.55  2.99 
   (0.69)  (0.63)  (0.62)  (0.61)  (2.27) 
Non-State Target -1.85*** -2.29*** -1.99*** -1.98*** -0.99 
   (0.59)  (0.58)  (0.56)  (0.54)  (1.67) 
Constant  -1.45  -1.60  -1.13  -2.84  -5.89 
   (2.07)  (2.11)  (0.55)  (1.82)  (5.21) 
N    688  732  749  816  801 
R2   0.44  0.44  0.45  0.46  0.15 
Root MSE  5.19  5.08          5.03      4.97  12.06 
             
Note: The dependent variable are Polity IV scores, which range from -10 to +10. The labels 
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 refer to the time intervals “one-year prior,” “the year of,” “one-year after,” 
“five-years after,” and “ten-years after” being adopted. OLS coefficients are reported with 
robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors were used due to the presence of 
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heteroscedasticity in the error term. Reparations are excluded from the model above since 
they are perfectly correlated with amnesties. The results did not vary dramatically depending 
on whether amnesties or reparations were included in the models. Oceania and mechanisms 
targeting both state and non-state actor category were also omitted since they are highly 
collinear with other categories of region and mechanism target. N is the number of 
transitional justice mechanisms examined for each model; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
4.4 Estimating Human Rights Outcomes for Individual Transitional 
Justice Mechanisms 
The multivariate regression results for all five time-intervals in Model 3 are 
depicted in Table 11. Much like the results in Model 1 and Model 2, which estimate the 
effects of truth commissions on the durability of peace and levels of democratization, the 
results in Model 3 appear to suggest that truth commissions are inconsequential when 
promoting human rights protections in post-conflict countries. In particular, truth 
commissions are statistically significant in any of the five time intervals when using 
Physical Integrity scores as the dependent variable.  These results, more so than Model 1 
and Model 2, provide a straightforward answer to Hypothesis 2, which suggests that 
truth commissions, alone, are not associated with improvements in human rights 
protections in post-conflict countries that adopt them in comparison to those that do not.  
When examining the impact of other transitional justice mechanisms, the results 
in Table 11 indicate that amnesties actually have a negative effect on human rights 
protections, with post-conflict countries that adopt amnesties witnessing a decrease in 
Physical Integrity scores by 0.54 in the first year and 0.55 in the following year when 
holding all other variables constant. Ironically, the regression results also indicate that 
trials have a negative effect on human rights protections in the short-term, with post-
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conflict countries that adopt them witnessing a decrease in Physical Integrity scores by 
0.46 in the first year when holding all other variables constant.  
Table 11 portrays a similar story for the same vector of control variables included 
in all five models. GDP per capita, the absence of armed conflict, and democracy are 
positively associated with human rights outcomes in post-conflict countries. Increasing 
GDP per capita by $1,000 ($US constant) increases Physical Integrity scores by 0.18 and 
0.17 in the first year and within five years. An increase in Polity IV scores by one is 
associated with an increase of Physical Integrity scores by 0.05 in the first year, the year 
after, and within five years. The presence of physical hostilities, moreover, reduces 
Physical Integrity scores by 2.23, 2.48, 2.59, 2.31, and 2.32 in each of the five time 
intervals included in the model when holding all other variables constant. These results 
provide clear evidence to suggest that per capita GDP, Polity IV scores, Physical 
Integrity scores, and the absence of armed violence are positively associated with one 
another. In other words, an increase in one will likely lead to an increase in another, even 
when using different time intervals or models.  
Finally, geographic variations appear again in the results, with mechanisms 
adopted in Asia and Latin America being negatively associated with human rights 
outcomes. In particular, mechanisms adopted in Asia are associated with a decrease in 
Physical Integrity scores by 1.99, 0.94, 1.27, and 1.06 in the first year, the following year, 
within five years, and within ten years. Mechanisms adopted in Latin America are 
associated with a decrease in Physical Integrity scores by 1.65, 0.77, 0.82, and 0.54 
during these same time intervals when holding all other variables constant.  
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Table 11: OLS Estimates for Human Rights Outcomes 
             
Variable  HR1  HR2  HR3  HR4  HR5  
Truth Commission 0.21  -0.42  -0.18  0.19  -0.27 
   (0.40)  (0.32)  (0.33)  (0.31)  (0.36) 
Trials   -0.13  -0.46*  -0.16  0.04  -0.17 
   (0.30)  (0.27)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.29) 
Lustrations  0.13  0.001  -0.59  -0.37  -0.37 
   (0.29)  (0.37)  (0.41)  (0.40)  (0.38) 
Amnesties  -0.15  -0.54** -0.55** -0.11  -0.09 
   (0.29)  (0.26)  (0.25)  (0.06)  (0.29) 
GDP    0.22*** 0.06  0.18*** -0.004             0.17*** 
   (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Polity IV  0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** -0.003 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.003) 
>25 Annual BD -2.23*** -2.48*** -2.59*** -2.31***        -2.32*** 
   (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13) 
Asia   -1.66*** -1.99*** -0.94*** -1.27***        -1.06*** 
   (0.58)  (0.49)  (0.27)  (0.32)  (0.14) 
Africa   -0.60  1.30*** 0.05  -0.58*  -0.29** 
   (0.59)  (0.50)  (0.29)  (0.31)  (0.13) 
Latin America  -1.53*** -1.65*** -0.77*** -0.82***        -0.54*** 
   (0.58)  (0.49)  (0.28)  (0.31)  (0.15) 
N. America  0.65  0.55  0.63*  1.74***           1.35*** 
   (0.65)  (0.57)  (0.28)  (0.47)  (0.41) 
W. Europe  -0.19  -0.36  0.53  0.98**             0.68*** 
   (0.61)  (0.56)  (0.36)  (0.42)  (0.26) 
E. Europe  -0.10  -0.65  0.49*  0.33             0.70*** 
   (0.59)  (0.49)  (0.29)  (0.33)  (0.21) 
State Target  0.41*  0.26  0.45**  0.48**  0.47** 
   (0.24)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.21) 
Non-State Target 0.25  0.25  0.49**  0.32  0.09 
   (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.17) 
Constant  3.79*** 5.83*** 3.74*** 5.02***           3.87*** 
   (0.85)  (0.73)  (0.62)  (0.58)  (0.53) 
N   688  732  749  816  801 
R2   0.48  0.49  0.53  0.47  0.44 
Root MSE  1.63  1.64  1.58  1.57  1.57 
             
Note: The dependent variable is Physical Integrity scores, which range from 0 (no human 
rights) to 8 (perfect human rights). The labels 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 refer to the time intervals “one-
year prior,” “the year of,” “one-year after,” “five-years after,” and “ten-years after” being 
adopted. OLS coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust 
standard errors were used due to the presence of heteroscedasticity in the error term. 
Reparations are excluded from the model above since they are perfectly correlated with 
amnesties. These results do not differ when including reparations over amnesties and vice 
versa. Oceania and mechanisms targeting both state and non-state actor category were also 
omitted since they are highly collinear with other categories of region and mechanism target. 
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N is the number of transitional justice mechanisms examined for each model; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
 
4.5 Estimating Economic Outcomes for Individual Transitional Justice 
Mechanisms 
Table 12 presents the OLS regression results
66
 for all five time-intervals for 
Model 4. In each time interval, a statistically significant relationship exists between truth 
commissions and per capita GDP ($US constant). The negative coefficient, however, 
suggests that truth commissions are actually associated with decreased economic 
outcomes. In particular, for countries that adopt truth commissions, we can expect their 
per capita GDP to decrease by 43 percent within the first year, 52 percent within five 
years, and 48 percent within 10 years. These results provide conflicting evidence for 
Hypothesis 3, which states that truth commissions, alone, are unlikely to produce 
economic outcomes in post-conflict countries. On one hand, the estimates suggest a 
relationship exists; on the other hand, this relationship is not positive in nature. 
Along with truth commissions, all five of the other transitional justice 
mechanisms individually exhibit a negative, statistically significant relationship on per 
capita GDP in post-conflict countries. For a country adopting a criminal tribunal, we can 
expect per capita GDP to decrease by 66 percent after the first year, 77 percent within 5 
years, and 73 percent within 10 years. For countries adopting lustration policies, we can 
                                                          
66
 Like all of the models above, reparations are excluded because they are perfectly 
collinear with amnesties. Similar to the democracy models, including reparations over 
amnesties or amnesties over reparations does contribute to changes in statistically 
significant results in the models; however, including reparations instead of amnesties in 
Model 4 actually changes the directional effect of truth commissions from negative to 
positive.  
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expect a decrease in per capita GDP by 66 percent, 77 percent, and 73 percent for these 
same periods. Finally, for countries adopting amnesty programs, we can expect per capita 
GDP to decrease by 69 percent, 81 percent, and 82 percent when using the same time 
periods as trials and lustrations when holding all other variables constant.  
In contrast to the negative, statistically significant relationship between all of the 
transitional justice mechanisms included in the dataset and per capita GDP, Physical 
Integrity scores and Polity IV scores have a positive effect, while the presence of active, 
armed hostilities has a negative effect on per capita GDP. A one unit increase in Physical 
Integrity scores increases per capita GDP by 6 percent within one year and 7 percent 
within ten years. A one unit increase in Polity IV scores, moreover, leads to a 3 percent, 4 
percent, and 1 percent increase in per capita GDP within one year, five years, and ten 
years when holding all other variables constant. The presence of armed hostilities, on the 
other hand, reduces per capita GDP by 23 percent in the first year and 29 percent after 
five years. Regional differences also exist in the model, with countries located in North 
America being associated with an increase in per capita GDP by 392 percent and 352 
percent over a five-year and ten-year period, for example, and countries located in 
Western Europe being associated with an increase in per capita GDP by 271 and 229 
percent respectively when using the same time intervals.  
Table 12: OLS Estimates for Economic Outcomes 
             
Variable  GDP1  GDP2  GDP3  GDP4  GDP5  
Truth Commission -0.44** -0.46** -0.43*  -0.52** -0.48* 
   (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.25)  (0.26) 
Trials   -0.59*** -0.62*** -0.66*** -0.77***        -0.73*** 
   (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.21)  (0.18) 
Lustrations  -0.79*** -0.75*** -0.67*** -0.85***        -0.92*** 
   (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.23)  (0.21) 
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Amnesties  -0.61*** -0.65*** -0.69*** -0.81***        -0.82*** 
   (0.19)  (0.18)  (0.19)  (0.21)  (0.17) 
PHYSINT   0.07*** 0.19  0.06*** -0.001            0.07*** 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Polity IV  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04***           0.01*** 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.002) 
>25 Annual BD -0.15  -0.23** -0.05  -0.29*** -0.08 
   (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.10) 
Asia   -0.19  -0.14  -0.13  0.84***           0.58*** 
   (0.61)  (0.66)  (0.65)  (0.15)  (0.17) 
Africa   -1.06*  -0.99  -1.00  -0.18           -0.55*** 
   (0.60)  (0.65)  (0.64)  (0.12)  (0.14) 
Latin America  0.06  0.10  0.08  0.86***           0.77*** 
   (0.60)  (0.65)  (0.64)  (0.12)  (0.14) 
N. America  2.74*** 2.98*** 2.78*** 3.92***           3.52*** 
   (0.61)  (0.66)  (0.66)  (0.21)  (0.18) 
W. Europe  1.79*** 1.94*** 1.88*** 2.71***           2.29*** 
   (0.61)  (0.66)  (0.65)  (0.16)  (0.18) 
E. Europe  0.14  0.18  0.06  1.05***           1.28*** 
   (0.61)  (0.66)  (0.65)  (0.16)  (0.18) 
State Target  0.15  0.26**  0.17  0.23*  -0.02 
   (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.14) 
Non-State Target 0.16  0.23**  0.17  0.13  -0.09 
   (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
Constant  7.54  7.66*** 7.55*** 7.17***          7.39*** 
   (0.65)  (0.71)  (0.69)  (0.27)  (0.25) 
N   688  732  749  816  801 
R2   0.55  0.55  0.53  0.54  0.52 
Root MSE  0.91  0.92  0.94  0.95  0.98 
             
Note: The dependent variable is per capita GDP, in natural log form, measured in thousands 
of $US. The labels 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 refer to the time intervals “one-year prior,” “the year of,” 
“one-year after,” “five-years after,” and “ten-years after” being adopted. OLS coefficients are 
reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors were used due to 
the presence of heteroscedasticity in the error term. Reparations are excluded from the model 
above since they are perfectly correlated with amnesties. Oceania and mechanisms targeting 
both state and non-state actor category were also omitted since they are highly collinear with 
other categories of region and mechanism target. N is the number of transitional justice 
mechanisms examined for each model; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
4.6 What Are The Implications of These Models?  
 Each of the four models estimating the effects of individual mechanisms on key 
post-conflict societal indicators do not tell a promising story about the effect of 
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transitional justice over the period of analysis. For immediate purposes in this research, 
truth commissions do not appear to exhibit a meaningful effect, if any effect at all, on 
levels of peace, democratization, and human rights protections in post-conflict countries 
that adopt them. Even more troubling, truth commissions appear to have a strong, 
negative effect on economic outcomes in post-conflict countries that adopt them in 
comparison to those that do not. All four models, as a result, seem to vindicate each of 
the four main hypotheses in this study.  
This should cause policymakers to pause when considering the application of 
these bodies in virtually every post-conflict country today, especially in those that remain 
economically underdeveloped, such as those are embroiled in repetitive violence and 
“conflict traps” in geographic regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. If 
anything, it appears peace, democracy, human rights, and economic outcomes are 
intimately tied to each other. All four models provide statistically significant results that 
suggest positive relationships between economic development and levels of 
democratization, between levels of democratization and the extent to which human rights 
protections are guaranteed, and the extent to which human rights guarantees exist and 
levels of economic development in a given post-conflict country.  
 The estimates in each model also suggest that the effect of transitional justice, as a 
whole, is a much more complicated that commonly depicted in the literature. Trials are 
not a one-size-fits-all solution to post-conflict justice. There is evidence to suggest that 
amnesties reduce democratic, economic, and human rights outcomes. The models also 
suggest that lustrations are tied to declining economic prospects and human rights 
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protections. The effects of these mechanisms, including truth commissions, in isolation 
from one another is dubious at best. This picture, however, begins to evolve when truth 
commissions are paired with different mechanisms. 
4.7 The Effect of Different Truth Commission Combinations on Post-
Conflict Peace, Democracy, Human Rights, and Economic Outcomes  
 The effect of truth commissions becomes more pronounced when these bodies are 
paired with other transitional justice mechanisms. Table 13 depicts the results for Model 
5. In this model, truth commissions are paired with trials, amnesties, lustrations, and 
reparations. These pairs are then used as the main predictor variables to determine 
whether peace outcomes vary between different sets of truth commission combinations. 
Picking up the effects in Model 1, three combinations (truth commissions with trials, 
amnesties, and lustrations) increase the probability that violence will reignite within ten 
years. Coupling a truth commission with reparations, however, actually decreases the 
probability of violence reigniting over this period. Further, pairing a truth commission 
with reparations reduces the probability of violence reigniting within the first year of 
being adopted and year 10.   
 The effects of Physical Integrity scores, Polity IV scores, and per capita GDP 
remain largely the same as those presented in Model 1. Table 13 illustrates that that an 
increase in Physical Integrity scores is associated with a reduction in physical violence 
and armed hostilities the following year, within five years, and within ten years. The 
direction of the coefficient for the first year, however, is now positive and different from 
Model 1. Like Model 1, per capita GDP is associated with a decreased probability of 
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violence reigniting within the first year and five years. Democracy scores continue to 
exhibit a positive effect or, in this case, increase the probability of violence reigniting in 
the first and following year of a mechanism being adopted.   
Table 13: Logit Estimates for Peace Outcomes by Truth Commission 
Combinations 
             
Variable  Conflict1 Conflict2 Conflict3 Conflict4      Conflict5 
Truth Commission 0.10  -0.32  0.35  0.02             4.28*** 
+ Trial   (0.36)  (0.35)  (0.44)  (0.40)  (0.34) 
Truth Commission  0.45  -0.01  0.09  0.25             4.83*** 
+ Amnesty  (0.36)  (0.33)  (0.45)  (0.39)  (0.33) 
Truth Commission  0.26  0.74*  -0.34  0.15             3.93*** 
+ Lustration  (0.44)  (0.44)  (0.57)  (0.52)  (0.48) 
Truth Commission -0.74  -1.42*** -0.92  -0.69           -9.08*** 
+ Reparations  (0.49)  (0.47)  (0.65)  (0.57)  (0.37) 
PHYSINT   -0.79*** 0.05*** -0.98*** -0.84***        -0.87*** 
   (0.07)  (0.21)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
Polity IV  0.05**  0.05**  0.04*  0.01  -0.002 
   (0.02)  (0.21)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
GDP   -0.20*  -0.27** 0.003  -0.32*** -0.11 
   (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
Asia   -0.37  -0.94  -0.05  0.70  0.88* 
   (1.52)  (1.19)  (0.81)  (0.59)  (0.48) 
Africa   -0.63  -1.50  -0.32  0.22  0.86* 
   (1.52)  (1.19)  (0.82)  (0.59)  (0.49) 
Latin America  -1.13  -1.49  -0.95  0.32  -0.13 
   (1.52)  (1.19)  (0.83)  (0.57)  (0.51) 
N. America  2.93*  2.87**  2.58**  5.79***           4.82*** 
   (1.65)  (1.35)  (1.02)  (0.92)  (0.96) 
W. Europe  -0.03  -1.08  0.55  2.67***           2.14*** 
   (1.64)  (1.43)  (1.01)  (0.92)  (0.61) 
E. Europe  -0.49  -1.83  -1.24  --  -- 
   (1.55)  (1.23)  (0.91)  --  -- 
State Target  -0.27  -0.39  0.04  0.33  0.47 
   (0.38)  (0.34)  (0.39)  (0.42)  (0.42) 
Non-State Target -0.30  -0.35  -0.16  0.18  0.21 
   (0.31)  (0.29)  (0.33)  (0.37)  (0.32) 
Constant  3.94**  5.75*** 2.78**  3.39*** -2.74** 
   (1.71)  (1.46)  (1.24)  (1.15)  (1.13) 
N   688  732  749  813  799 
Pseudo R2  0.33  0.39  0.42  0.35  0.36 
Log Likelihood  -303.14 -291.82 -272.43 -326.94 301.39 
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Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable measuring annual battle-related deaths, 
with “1” indicating the presence of ongoing hostilities (>25 annual battle-deaths) and “0” 
indicating the absence of physical hostilities (<25 annual battle-deaths). The labels 1, 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 refer to the time intervals “one-year prior,” “the year of,” “one-year after,” “five-years 
after,” and “ten-years after” being adopted. Logit coefficients are reported with robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors were used due to the presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the error term. Oceania and mechanisms targeting both state and non-
state actor category were also omitted since they are highly collinear with other categories of 
region and mechanism target. Eastern Europe is omitted in Conflict Models 4 and 5 since it is 
highly collinear. N is the number of transitional justice mechanisms examined for each 
model; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
 
Table 14 depicts the results for Model 6, which estimates the effects of these 
different truth commission combinations on Polity IV scores. Truth commissions, when 
paired with amnesties and reparations, have a positive, statistically significant effect on 
Polity IV scores. Countries that adopt a truth commission in conjunction with an amnesty 
program increase Polity IV scores by 1.04 within five-years when holding all other 
variables constant. Polity IV scores increased by 2.07, 1.79, and 1.52 when countries 
adopted both a truth commission and reparations within the first year, the following year, 
and within five years when holding all other variables constant. With that said, the pre-
year coefficient (2.07) is similar to the coefficients for the other time intervals, which 
does not demonstrate a causal effect. These coefficients also seem to suggest that 
democracies are more likely to adopt truth commissions and reparations to begin with, 
not that truth commissions, when paired with reparations, increase levels of 
democratization. The other two truth commission pairs (those including trials and 
lustrations) do not exhibit a meaningful effect on levels of democracy in post-conflict 
countries.   
Much like the democracy effects in Model 2, the outcomes associated with 
different control variables does not change much in Model 6. Physical Integrity scores, 
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per capita GDP, and the absence of armed hostilities all exhibit a positive, statistically 
significant effect on Polity IV scores.
67
 Combinations located in Asia, Africa, and Eastern 
Europe continue to have lower Polity IV scores than those located in North America and 
Western Europe. Finally, mechanisms that target non-state actors continue to exhibit a 
strong, negative effect on democracy in post-conflict countries, reducing Polity IV scores 
by 2.29, 1.99, and 1.98 in the first year, the following year, and within five years when 
holding all other variables constant.  
Table 14: OLS Estimates for Democracy Outcomes by Truth 
Commission Combinations 
             
Variable  Polity1  Polity2  Polity3  Polity4  Polity5  
Truth Commission 0.65  0.71  0.27  0.20  0.60 
+ Trial   (0.56)  (0.52)  (0.44)  (0.47)  (1.81) 
Truth Commission  0.12  0.56  0.38  1.04**  1.41 
+ Amnesty  (0.59)  (0.56)  (0.07)  (0.49)  (2.02) 
Truth Commission  -0.57  -0.22  0.07  0.62  1.09 
+ Lustration  (0.78)  (0.75)  (0.59)  (0.60)  (2.79) 
Truth Commission 2.07*** 2.07*** 1.79*** 1.52**  0.48 
+ Reparations  (0.67)  (0.59)  (0.51)  (0.59)  (3.10) 
GDP   0.91*** 0.91*** 0.88*** 0.99***           1.51*** 
   (0.24)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.19)  (0.29) 
PHYSINT   0.44*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.45*** -0.19 
   (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.22) 
>25 Annual BD 1.41*** 1.47*** 1.21**  0.54  -0.09 
   (0.50)  (0.52)  (0.52)  (0.49)  (0.82) 
Asia   -4.87*** -4.31*** -4.38*** -4.13***        -6.49*** 
   (0.71)  (0.85)  (0.69)  (0.76)  (1.20) 
Africa   -6.86*** -6.14*** -6.44*** -5.29***        -6.31*** 
   (0.66)  (0.81)  (0.64)  (0.68)  (1.01) 
Latin America  -1.47*** -0.64  -0.47  0.69  -1.28 
   (0.68)  (0.79)  (0.64)  (0.70)  (1.02) 
N. America  1.73*  2.10**  1.81**  2.24*  0.52 
   (0.90)  (1.02)  (0.92)  (1.15)  (1.79) 
W. Europe  1.34*  1.61*  1.22  2.06**  0.38 
   (0.75)  (0.90)  (0.75)  (0.89)  (1.28) 
E. Europe  -1.63** -0.34  -0.06  1.48**        -14.87*** 
                                                          
67
 The coefficients are the same for the controls in Model 6 as those reported in Model 2 
in Table 10.  
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   (0.73)  (0.82)  (0.63)  (0.73)  (4.91) 
State Target  0.93  0.26  0.21  -0.55  2.99 
   (0.69)  (0.63)  (0.62)  (0.61)  (2.27) 
Non-State Target -1.85*** -2.29*** -1.99*** -1.98*** -0.99 
   (0.59)  (0.58)  (0.56)  (0.54)  (1.67) 
Constant  -3.52*  -3.67*  -2.92  -4.36*** -6.37** 
   (1.92)  (1.97)  (1.77)  (1.61)  (3.32) 
N   688  732  749  816  801 
R2   0.44  0.44  0.45  0.46  0.15 
Root MSE  5.19  5.08   5.03  4.97  12.07 
             
Note: The dependent variable is Polity IV scores, which range from -10 to +10. The labels 1, 
2, 3, 4, and 5 refer to the time intervals “one-year prior,” “the year of,” “one-year after,” 
“five-years after,” and “ten-years after” respectively. OLS coefficients are reported with 
robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors were used due to the presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the error term. Reparations are excluded from the model above since 
they are perfectly correlated with amnesties. Oceania and mechanisms targeting both state 
and non-state actor category were also omitted since they are highly collinear with other 
categories of region and mechanism target. N is the number of transitional justice 
mechanisms examined for each model; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
 
 Table 15 presents the results for Model 7, which estimates the human rights 
effects of different truth commission combinations. Much like the results from Model 3 
in Table 11, truth commissions, even when paired with different transitional justice 
mechanisms, do not appear to have much of a meaningful effect on human rights 
protections in post-conflict countries that adopt them. Truth commissions, when paired 
with reparations, do exhibit a minor, statistically significant effect on human rights 
outcomes, with the presence of this specific combination being associated with a 0.37 
increase in Physical Integrity scores the following year. When paired with amnesties, 
however, this specific combination exhibits a minor, negative effect on human rights with 
this specific combination being associated with a 0.35 reduction in Physical Integrity 
scores in the first year.  
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The results do not change for the same vector of control variables used from 
Model 3.
68
 Polity IV scores, per capita GDP, and the absence of 25 annual battle-related 
deaths exhibit a positive, statistically significant effect on Physical Integrity scores. 
Human rights outcomes continue to vary by region as well, with combinations of 
mechanisms adopted in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have a negative, statistically 
significant effect on Physical Integrity scores.  
Table 15: OLS Estimates for Human Rights Outcomes by Truth 
Commission Combinations 
             
Variable  Polity1  Polity2  Polity3  Polity4  Polity5  
Truth Commission -0.01  -0.27  0.21  0.25  -0.05 
+ Trial   (0.19)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.17)  (0.17) 
Truth Commission  -0.03  -0.35*  -0.18  0.09  0.03 
+ Amnesty  (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.19)  (0.17)  (0.17) 
Truth Commission  0.25  0.19  -0.21  -0.18  -0.25 
+ Lustration  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.26)  (0.25)  (0.22) 
Truth Commission 0.12  0.19  0.37*  0.21  0.12 
+ Reparations  (0.24)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.22) 
GDP   0.22*** 0.06  0.18*** -0.001             0.17*** 
   (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Polity IV   0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** -0.003 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.003) 
>25 Annual BD -2.23*** -2.49*** -2.59*** -2.31***        -2.32*** 
   (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13) 
Asia   -1.66*** -1.99*** -0.94*** -1.27***        -1.06*** 
   (0.58)  (0.49)  (0.27)  (0.32)  (0.14) 
Africa   -0.60  -1.30*** 0.05  -0.58*  -0.29** 
   (0.59)  (0.50)  (0.29)  (0.31)  (0.13) 
Latin America  -1.53*** -1.65*** -0.77*** -0.82***        -0.54*** 
   (0.58)  (0.49)  (0.28)  (0.31)  (0.15) 
N. America  0.65  0.55  0.63*  1.74***           1.35*** 
   (0.65)  (0.57)  (0.53)  (0.47)  (0.41) 
W. Europe  -0.19  -0.36  0.53  0.98**             0.68*** 
   (0.61)  (0.56)  (0.36)  (0.42)  (0.26) 
E. Europe  -0.10  -0.65  0.49  0.33             0.70*** 
   (0.59)  (0.49)  (0.29)  (0.33)  (0.21) 
State Target  0.41*  0.26  0.45**  0.48**  0.47** 
                                                          
68
 The coefficients for these variables in Model 7 do not change from Model 3 in Table 
11.  
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   (0.24)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.21) 
Non-State Target 0.25  0.25  0.49**  0.32  0.09 
   (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.17) 
Constant  3.68*** 5.64*** 3.36*** 4.82***           3.75*** 
   (0.81)  (0.70)  (0.59)  (0.19)  (0.44) 
N   688  732  749  816  801 
R2   0.48  0.49  0.53  0.47  0.44 
Root MSE  1.63  1.64  1.58  1.57  1.57 
             
Note: The dependent variable is Physical Integrity scores, which range from 0 (no human 
rights) to 8 (perfect human rights). The labels 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 refer to the time intervals “one-
year prior,” “the year of,” “one-year after,” “five-years after,” and “ten-years after” 
respectively. Z-scores from each respective logit model are reported with robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors were used due to the presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the error term. Oceania and mechanisms targeting both state and non-
state actor category were also omitted since they are highly collinear with other categories of 
region and mechanism target. Eastern Europe is omitted in Conflict Models 4 and 5 since it is 
highly collinear. N is the number of transitional justice mechanisms examined for each 
model. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
 
 Model 8, representing the final model tested in this study, is depicted in Table 
16.
69
 Building on Model 4, this model tests the effects of different combinations of truth 
commissions on economic outcomes in post-conflict countries. The results in Model 8, 
unlike the other combination models and their predecessors, do vary considerably from 
Model 4. When combining a truth commission with lustration policies, this creates a 
negative, statistically significant effect on per capita GDP. Post-conflict countries that 
adopted this specific combination experienced a 23 percent, 21 percent, and 26 percent 
reduction in per capita GDP in the first year, within five years, and within ten years. 
When combining a truth commission with reparations, on the other hand, this creates a 
positive, statistically significant effect on per capita GDP. In particular, post-conflict 
countries that adopted this combination experienced a 52 percent, 53 percent, 64 percent, 
                                                          
69
 The coefficients for each of the control variables remain the same in Model 8 
compared to Model 4. 
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and 66 percent increase in per capita GDP in the first year, the following year, within five 
years, and within ten years.  
 
Table 16: OLS Estimates for Economic Outcomes by Truth 
Commission Combinations 
            
 Variable GDP1  GDP2  GDP3  GDP4  GDP5  
Truth Commission -0.08  -0.09  -0.13  -0.14  -0.06 
+ Trial   (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.11) 
Truth Commission  -0.09  -0.13  -0.16  -0.17  -0.15 
+ Amnesty  (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
Truth Commission  -0.27** -0.23*  -0.14  -0.21*  -0.26** 
+ Lustration  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13) 
Truth Commission 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.64***           0.66*** 
+ Reparations  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.14) 
PHYSINT  0.07*** 0.19  0.06*** -0.001             0.07*** 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Polity IV   0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04***           0.01*** 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.003) 
>25 Annual BD -0.15  -0.23** -0.05  -0.29*** -0.08 
   (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.10) 
Asia   -0.19  -0.14  -0.13  0.84***           0.58*** 
   (0.61)  (0.66)  (0.64)  (0.15)  (0.17) 
Africa   -1.06*  -0.99  -1.00  -0.18           -0.55*** 
   (0.60)  (0.65)  (0.64)  (0.12)  (0.14) 
Latin America  0.06  0.10  0.08  0.86***           0.77*** 
   (0.60)  (0.65)  (0.64)  (0.12)  (0.14) 
N. America  2.74*** 2.98*** 2.77*** 3.92***           3.52*** 
   (0.61)  (0.66)  (0.66)  (0.21)  (0.29) 
W. Europe  1.79*** 1.94*** 1.88*** 2.71***           2.29*** 
   (0.61)  (0.66)  (0.65)  (0.16)  (0.18) 
E. Europe  0.14  0.18  0.06  1.05***           1.28*** 
   (0.61)  (0.66)  (0.65)  (0.16)  (0.18) 
State Target  0.15  0.26**  0.17  0.23*  -0.02 
   (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.14) 
Non-State Target 0.16  0.23**  0.17  0.14  -0.09 
   (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
Constant  7.03*** 7.14*** 7.03*** 6.53***          6.72*** 
   (0.62)  (0.68)  (0.66)  (0.20)  (0.21) 
N   688  732  749  816  801 
R2   0.55  0.55  0.53  0.54  0.52 
Root MSE  0.91  0.92  0.94  0.95  0.98 
             
Note: The dependent variable is per capita GDP, measured in thousands of $US. The labels 1, 
2, 3, 4, and 5 refer to the time intervals “one-year prior,” “the year of,” “one-year after,” 
“five-years after,” and “ten-years after” respectively. Z-scores from each respective logit 
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model are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors were 
used due to the presence of heteroscedasticity in the error term. Reparations are excluded 
from the model above since they are perfectly correlated with amnesties. Oceania and 
mechanisms targeting both state and non-state actor category were also omitted since they are 
highly collinear with other categories of region and mechanism target. N is the number of 
transitional justice mechanisms examined for each model. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
 
4.8 Summary  
 The results in this chapter tell a complicated story for the effect of truth 
commissions in post-conflict countries. The first four models, which test the effect of 
these bodies in isolation from other transitional justice mechanisms, do not provide much 
evidence to suggest that democracy, human rights, economic development, or the 
durability of peace are influenced by these bodies. If anything, the direction of the 
coefficients in Model Four suggest that these bodies might adversely affect economic 
processes and development both in the short-term and in the long-term. The first four 
models, together, appear to provide partial support for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. The 
models indicate that we should not expect truth commissions, individually, to create 
positive societal outcomes and that post-conflict countries that adopt them are no more or 
less likely to experience improvements in political, economic, or social outcomes in 
comparison to those that do not adopt these bodies.   
 This complicated story is similar for other transitional justice mechanisms 
included in the models. Trials and amnesties actually exhibit a negative effect on 
democratic outcomes, whereas all of the alternative mechanisms exhibit a negative effect 
on the durability of peace. When estimating the effect on human rights, amnesties also 
exhibit a negative effect, primarily in the short-term, while all of the alternative 
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mechanisms exhibit a negative effect when estimating economic outcomes in post-
conflict countries. It seems, as a whole, that these mechanisms, in isolation from one 
another, are actually doing more harm than good.    
The four models that manipulate political, economic, and social outcomes for 
different combinations of truth commissions and alternative mechanisms provide a more 
positive outlook on the effect of transitional justice. The results from these models do 
provide some evidence to suggest that truth commissions, when combined with 
reparations, are associated with positive societal outcomes. In particular, truth 
commissions coupled with reparations reduce the probability of renewed violence, 
increase Polity IV scores, and contribute to positive economic outcomes in the form of 
increase levels of per capita GDP. This specific combination seems to provide evidence 
to support Hypothesis 5, which states that truth commissions must be coupled with 
retributive mechanisms in order to be effective. Across all of the models, truth 
commissions, when coupled with amnesties, do not exhibit much of a meaningful effect. 
Interestingly enough, however, truth commissions when coupled with trials also do not 
exhibit much of a meaningful effect. When coupled with lustrations, moreover, these 
bodies actually create negative societal outcomes in the form of declining economic 
performance. As a result, there is some evidence to suggest that any positive effect of 
truth commissions is heightened when these bodies are coupled with certain retributive 
mechanisms over others.  
Overall, none of the models demonstrate a clear, causal effect between truth 
commissions and positive societal outcomes. The event-year, post-year, five-year, and 
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ten-year categories for the democracy and economic models for different truth 
commission combinations seem to suggest that truth commissions can be associated with 
positive outcomes in these two areas. The coefficients for the pre-year category, however, 
are almost identical to the coefficients in these later time intervals, which seems to 
suggest that post-conflict countries that are already more democratic and wealthy in 
nature are predisposed to these two mechanisms to begin with. In other words, these 
models do not provide clear evidence to suggest that truth commissions, when coupled 
with reparations, are increasing levels of democratization and economic prosperity. 
Instead, the opposite could also hold true. 
 The results in this chapter are useful in several respects. First, every model 
provides clear evidence to suggest that democracy, human rights, economic, and peace 
outcomes are closely related. In every model tested, the same vector of controls exhibited 
strong, positive effects when used interchangeable as controls and dependent variables. 
Second, these results, although not initially hypothesized, suggest an interactive effect 
between truth commissions and reparations. This finding is interesting because the most 
common form of retributive justice is trials. These findings suggest that democracy, 
human rights, peace, and economic outcomes are indeed heightened by coupling a 
restorative mechanism in the form of a truth commission with a retributive mechanism; 
however, instead of this retributive mechanism being a human rights trial, the models 
instead suggest that the appropriate mechanism are reparations. Future research can shed 
more insight into these different modes and possibly explore this link between truth 
commissions and reparations further. Future research can also attempt to how sequencing 
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and timing possibly effects the outcomes associated with coupling different transitional 
justice mechanisms.  
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CHAPTER 5: RWANDA’S GACACA COURTS: A CASE 
STUDY FOR BLENDED APPROACHES TO TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE 
5.1 Introduction  
The Rwandan genocide
70
 was orchestrated over a 100 day period and 
systematically exterminated 70 percent of Rwanda’s Tutsi population and thousands of 
moderate Hutu who opposed the killings or tried to prevent them, making it the swiftest 
genocide in modern history (Des Forges 1999). The United Nations estimates that over 
six million Rwandese were forcefully displaced during and after the killings, with large 
numbers of refugees fleeing to Burundi, the DRC, and Uganda (UN 2014). This mass 
influx of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) created a widespread 
humanitarian crisis and fueled regional instability that governments and the international 
community are struggling to contain even today, particularly in the DR Congo. The 
genocide raged uncontrolled until the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a predominantly 
Tutsi rebel group based out of Uganda, seized control of the Rwandan government and 
defeated government, Interahamwe (“those who attack together”),71 and génocidaire72 
forces, which officially put an end to the killings as well as a broader, protracted civil war 
between the RPF and the then Hutu-dominated Rwandan government. 
                                                          
70
 The Rwandan government labels the genocide as the “genocide against the Tutsi.”  
71
 The Interahamwe was the primary militia group that carried out the planned genocide 
against the Tutsi in the summer of 1994. This militia, which was an extension of the 
ruling government party, would plunder cities and villages, root out designated Tutsi and 
moderate Hutu marked for “extermination,” and man checkpoints throughout 
government-controlled areas. Members of the Interahamwe also formed coalitions with 
other civilian-comprised killings squads that hunted Tutsi down in the countryside. 
72
 This term is commonly used to describe government officials, soldiers, or associated 
militia that planned or actually orchestrated crimes committed during the genocide. 
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Ordinary Rwandans remain traumatized by the genocide and still are coming to 
terms with the legacy of mass atrocities exceptional for their brutality, speed, and 
indiscriminate nature. Further complicating matters, human rights abuses, crimes against 
humanity, and acts of genocide were committed by all sides. As Coel Kirkby (2006, 97) 
notes, this violence affected all facets of society with entire “families and whole 
communities displaced, as massive waves of migration surged across the country when 
first Tutsis and targeted Hutus escaped the genocidal militias, and when Hutus fled from 
the victorious RPF.” 
To rebuild communities and prevent victims or their families from taking justice 
into their own hands, the RPF-controlled government adopted one of the largest 
transitional justice programs the world has ever seen. Key orchestrators and planners of 
the genocide were tried before the UN-backed International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) and through Rwanda’s domestic court system. As a consequence of a 
large backlog of cases, the Rwandan government later institutionalized a traditional 
dispute resolution mechanism at the grassroots level called gacaca (“grass” in 
Kinyarwanda) to dispense “mass justice for mass atrocity” (Waldorf 2006). Adopted 
through public law in 2001, the approximately 12,000 gacaca courts had a broad mandate 
to investigate crimes committed during the genocide and to establish an official, impartial 
record of what transpired. Representing a hybrid approach to transitional justice, gacaca 
administered both retributive and restorative justice by sentencing perpetrators, providing 
reparations, and encouraging forgiveness for those who admitted their guilt. These courts 
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became the face
73
 of the Rwandan government’s ambitious transitional justice and an 
instrument to show the world that Rwanda had moved past the “scourge of genocide” 
(Thompson 2011, 373). Above all, these courts were adopted to promote social 
reconciliation between Rwanda’s decimated Tutsi minority and its guilt-ridden Hutu 
majority
74
 at the village and communal-level.  
This bottom-up nature of the gacaca courts is important considering that much of 
the violence and atrocities perpetrated were extremely localized and often involved 
neighbor killing neighbor and family members turning on family members. Not only was 
the genocide widespread in its scope and reach, the violence orchestrated was extremely 
personal with the machete becoming the primary tool to dispense death and rape used as 
an instrument to destroy the very fabric of society. What we do not know, however, is 
whether this bottom-up approach to transitional justice was susceptible to false testimony, 
abuses by those seeking personal gain, or government interference with the intent of 
making gacaca a form of victor’s justice.  
This chapter uses Rwanda’s unique experiment with the gacaca courts as a case 
study for the challenges and successes associated with bottom-up and hybrid approaches 
to transitional justice. In contrast to other post-conflict countries in the 1990s, which 
utilized top-down approaches to transitional justice in the form of truth commissions 
(e.g., South Africa and El Salvador) or criminal tribunals (e.g., Cambodia), Rwanda 
                                                          
73
 At the time these courts operated, billboards throughout major cities and the 
countryside promoted the gacaca courts as the solution to the genocide. 
74
 Tutsi have traditionally comprised 15 percent of Rwanda’s population; Hutu, as the 
majority, have comprised approximately 84 percent with the Twa comprising less than 1 
percent. 
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utilized gacaca in conjunction with the ICTR and domestic courts to provide a sense of 
closure to victims and perpetrators alike. This unique approach, which combined top-
down and bottom-up approaches, provides an excellent case study for exploring the 
trajectories and effects of different levels of transitional justice to address mass violence. 
The objective of this chapter, then, is to critically explore the complex interchanges 
between these approaches and to assess popular perceptions toward these different levels 
of transitional justice in Rwandan society. Three critical questions structure the analysis 
and methodological approach that guides this chapter. First, was gacaca more effective in 
promoting transitional justice in comparison to the ICTR and Rwanda’s domestic court 
system? Second, do ordinary Rwandans hold favorable views toward gacaca? If yes, 
why? If no, why not? Third, and finally, was gacaca immune from external political 
pressure and elite capture? Or, did gacaca ultimately embody the ethnic differences it 
was trying to resolve and represent a form of victor’s justice used by the RPF to 
consolidate its power?   
This chapter is organized as follows. The first section discusses the post-
independence political history of Rwanda. The second section carefully traces the events 
that led to the genocide, how the genocide unfolded, and the immediate sociopolitical 
aftermath that existed after the genocide. The third section describes the foundations and 
operations of the ICTR and domestic court system, which the Rwandan government 
turned to initially to try serious orchestrators and perpetrators of mass atrocities and 
provide a sense of justice to victims of the genocide. Both of these mechanisms 
represented the international community’s favored approach to addressing genocide-
related crimes and atrocities, which were strongly encouraged to government officials 
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grappling with the vexing question of how to move forward while addressing the past. 
The fourth section describes the gacaca courts as a bottom-up approach to transitional 
justice. These courts, unlike the ICTR, became the main tool to promote transitional 
justice as a consequence of misgivings the Rwandan government had toward the ICTR 
and due to practical realities on the ground. The fifth section critically examines the three 
research questions above through the use of survey data collected by the author over a 
two month period in 2016. This chapter concludes with a brief synthesis and discussion 
of the findings.   
5.2 The Post-Independence Political History of Rwanda  
 The post-independence political history of Rwanda, much like any other African 
country, is one of instability, insecurity, and armed violence that is traced to a legacy of 
colonialism. In Rwanda’s case, its territorial borders were artificially shaped by European 
powers through the Conference of Berlin in the late-19
th
 century. Initially, Rwanda was a 
colonial possession of Germany and, along with modern day Burundi, Kenya, 
Mozambique, Uganda, and Tanzania, comprised a key territorial unit of “German East 
Africa.” By sheer acreage, German East Africa constituted Germany’s largest territorial 
holding in Africa. Due to its proximity to the Belgian controlled “Free Congo Basin” 
(modern day DRC) and the British controlled “British East Africa” (Uganda, Kenya, 
Sudan), Rwanda represented a key territorial foothold and flashpoint of conflict between 
the Germans, Belgians, and British due to its strategic location. Following World War I 
and Germany’s concession of its colonial territories as a consequence of the Treaty of 
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Versailles, Belgium assumed full administrative and territorial control over Rwanda and 
Burundi and combined both into a geographic entity called Ruanda-Urundi.  
Under Belgian colonial rule, Rwanda was largely governed through semi-
autonomous colonial administrations, which favored the interests of the minority Tutsi at 
the expense of the majority Hutu. Although these ethnic labels can be traced to pre-
colonial times, in where the label “Tutsi” was traditionally applied to land and cattle 
owners and the term “Hutu” was applied to farmers, artisans, and peasants, both the 
Germans and later the Belgians institutionalized these arbitrary ethnic divisions. The goal 
of the Germans and particularly the Belgians was to exacerbate ethnic tensions and infuse 
racial animosities into these labels as a strategy of colonial rule. The term Tutsi was later 
applied to those who were lighter in skin color, taller, and found to possess more 
“European” qualities, which provided a pretext for the colonists to grant Tutsi elite, 
privileged administrative positions in colonial governments (Burnet 2012, 47-48). Hutu, 
on the other hand, were perceived by the colonists as being more “African,” meaning 
they were darker in skin complexity and considered to be “brutish” by the colonists. 
Before colonization, these differences were indeed important; however, they largely 
existed in economic terms. From the 14
th
 to 19
th
 centuries, successive lines of Tutsi 
Kings, called Mwami, exercised power through feudal systems that fostered patron-client 
relationships, with Tutsi land owners giving access to land and livestock in exchange for 
labor from Hutu farmers. By infusing racial animosities into this ethnic distinction, the 
colonists were extremely successful in institutionalizing distrust and hatred. More 
importantly, the colonists were remarkably successful in instilling and perpetrating 
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artificial ethnic categories and creating racist sentiments and divisions that would become 
the basis for future communal violence (Des Forges 1995, 44). 
This ethnic caste system
75
 created by the Belgians persisted for much of the 
colonial era until Hutu groups rebelled against Dutch rule in 1959, which forcefully 
displaced 150,000 Tutsi into modern-day Burundi. After the Belgians granted formal 
independence to both Rwanda and Burundi in 1962, negative emotions and attitudes 
between Hutu and Tutsi boiled over into violence that forced thousands of Tutsi to 
refugee camps in Uganda and Burundi. In turn, the Tutsi-dominated government in 
Burundi massacred thousands of Hutu, which forced thousands of Hutu refugees into 
Rwanda, sometimes into the former homes of Tutsi who had fled during earlier periods of 
violence and instability. Under a pledge to restore order, General Juvenal Habyarimana 
seized the Rwandan government via a coup d’état in 1973 and established a one-party 
state with the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) recognized 
as the only officially state-sanctioned political party. As a consequence of this tit-for-tat 
violence, entire families and villages were uprooted and the Habyarimana government 
institutionalized disparate laws and policies that effectively discriminated against Tutsi. 
A state-sanctioned ethnic quota system, for example, was institutionalized with the intent 
of limiting Tutsi to holding only nine percent of available public sector jobs (HRW 
2017). 
Beginning in the 1980s, Tutsi exiled into Uganda formed the RPF and played a 
key role in the Ugandan Bush War fighting alongside Yoweri Museveni’s National 
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 The Belgians perpetrated this system through the creation of ethnic identity cards, 
which would later play a decisive factor in the identification of Tutsi during the genocide.  
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Resistance Movement (NRA). After NRA forces overthrew the government of Milton 
Obote and, later, Tito Okello, the RPF was incorporated into Uganda’s national army 
where they received training, arms, and outside support. More importantly, the RPF was 
given access to military encampments along the Ugandan-Rwandan border, which 
allowed it to stage guerilla attacks against Rwandan government forces beginning in 
1990. Paul Kagame, who served as head of intelligence for Museveni, assumed command 
of the RPF and devised an invasion of northern Rwanda with a force of 4,000 RPF forces, 
many of which were veterans of the Bush War. With assistance from the Ugandan 
government, the RPF and Rwandan government, which was backed by France, Belgium, 
Egypt, and South Africa, waged a protracted, insurgency intermittingly from 1990 to 
1994. During this period, the Interahamwe (“those who attack together”) was created as a 
paramilitary force by the Rwandan government to help counter RPF attacks. Armed and 
supplied by the Rwandan army and trained by the French, the Interahamwe were 
responsible for raids in villages throughout the countryside that were thought to be 
sympathetic to the RPF. In several documented instances, the Interahamwe rounded up 
and killed thousands of Tutsi civilians and RPF sympathizers between 1990 and 1994. 
Along with other anti-Tutsi paramilitary groups, including the Impuzamugamgi (“those 
with the same goal”), the Interahamwe, which numbered 6,500 men, was successful in 
rallying Hutu against Tutsi and, working in conjunction with the Rwandan government 
and military, forced thousands of Tutsi into exile (Bartrop and Jacobs 2014, 1746). 
Government officials and youth militias were extremely successful in fomenting ethnic 
violence and divisions by portraying Hutu as innocent victims and placing blame on Tutsi 
for their own misfortunes (Des Forges 1999, 72-82).  
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In 1992, the RPF and Rwandan government began official negotiations, known as 
the Arusha Accords, to formally bring an end to the violence. From the onset, the Arusha 
Negotiations were bogged down by divisions between moderates and hardliners within 
Rwanda’s government and over thorny issues of how to create an effective power-sharing 
government between Hutu and Tutsi, how to integrate RPF forces into the Rwandan 
national army, and how to demobilize soldiers who would be reintegrated back into 
society. The Arusha Accords were officially signed in August 1993 and contained several 
agreements calling for a new power-sharing government that would give key MRND and 
RPF leaders positions of power and contained provisions calling for the creation of a new 
national military comprised of government troops and RPF forces, albeit separated into 
different units (Des Forges 1999, 123-129). In October 1993, the United Nations Security 
Council passed Resolution 872, which created the United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda (UNAMIR). The objective of this international peacekeeping force was to help 
implement and ensure that Rwandan government and RPF forces abided by their 
agreements in the Arusha Accords.  
5.3 The Rwandan Genocide 
The genocide against the Tutsi started in April 1994 following the downing of 
Rwandan President Habyarimana’s plane by unknown assailants as it was approaching 
Kigali International Airport on the evening of April 6. This “genocidal spark” led to the 
immediate mass mobilization of Rwandan military forces, police, and government-
backed militia groups, including the Interahamwe and Impuzamugamgi. On the morning 
of April 7, members of the presidential guard, Forces armées rwandaises (FAR), police, 
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and the Interahamwe constructed roadblocks and manned barricades at strategic 
intersections within and around Kigali with the intended goal of identifying, impeding, 
and systematically exterminating inyenzi (cockroaches), ibyitso (accomplices), and 
“enemies” of the state (Burnet 2012: 4). Targeted killings quickly followed with pre-
identified Tutsi rounded up and executed and moderate Hutu politicians and opponents to 
the Hutu Power movement, including Rwanda’s Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, 
assassinated.  
Upon receiving news that the main force of the United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) would be pulled out Rwanda, calls to eliminate the 
inyenzi and ibyitso from Hutu Power elements in the Rwandan government were 
broadcast via radio by the extremist hate-radio Radio-télévision des mille collines 
(RTLM) with alarming speed. Orders to execute Tutsi were also relayed by local 
government officials who had commands to round-up and kill any Tutsi regardless of 
age, sex, education, social status, religion, or occupation (Mironko 2004, 52-53). These 
premediated killings were largely carried out by the Interahamwe and the Hutu Power
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wing of the MRND. The main objective of these mass killings was to finally solve the 
“Tutsi problem,” which was framed in such a way to suggest that Rwanda’s Tutsi 
minority population was responsible for and conspiring with the RPF to overthrow the 
Hutu-dominated government (Des Forges 1999).     
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 Pronounced “Pawa” in Kinyarwanda, the Hutu Power were radical elements in the 
government of Habyarimana that favored the “final solution” to the Tutsi problem. This 
radical element blamed the RPF for ongoing violence and violations of cease fires, stirred 
up exaggerated claims that the RPF had the intention of committing a Hutu genocide, and 
labeled moderate Hutu, such as Prime Minister Agatha Uwilingiyimana, as inyenzi 
(Cockroaches or “Puppets of the Tutsi”) (Des Forges 1999, 182-185).  
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In the weeks and months that followed, thousands of Tutsi fled to the countryside 
from urban centers and had their fates largely decided at the hands of ibitero (killing 
squads). These killing squads were comprised of ordinary Hutu civilians that were 
recruited at the beginning stages of the genocide to flush Tutsi out from hiding so they 
could be killed (Burnet 2012, 4). The ibitero were also charged with investigating cases 
where Hutu were accused of hiding or defending Tutsi, with those found guilty meeting 
the same fate as those they tried to protect. HRW (2014, 1) comments that these killings 
were exceptional for their brutality, speed, and thoroughness. Due to the limited supply of 
ammunition, death was dispensed at the hands of machete-wielding killing squads who 
summarily executed anyone found to be in possession of a Tutsi identification card or 
those that were simply accused of being Tutsi or a Tutsi-sympathizer. Even worse, sexual 
violence was used as a tool to sow fear and destroy family units. Although reports vary, 
the UN estimates that 250,000 women were raped at some point during the genocide (UN 
2014). Infants and small children, moreover, were deliberately targeted as a form of 
future population control to eliminate future generations of Tutsi, evident by the fact that 
mass graves uncovered at churches and other public spaces throughout the country were 
littered with bodies of infants, small children, and women. To this day, members of key 
institutions in Rwandan society either admit their culpability in the violence or accept 
responsibility for not doing enough to stop the bloodshed.  
The genocide ceased in mid-July as the RPF captured Kigali and pushed the FAR 
and Interahamwe southward into Burundi and eastward into the DR Congo. Rwandan 
society was in complete tatters in what Des Forges (1999, 1) describes as “one of the 
most efficient and terrifying episodes of targeted ethnic violence in recent international 
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history.” RPF forces, as they captured villages across the country, uncovered mass graves 
and entire villages burned to the ground. In “protected areas” or “safe zones” 
administered by the French (the Turquoise zone being the most notorious), RPF and 
international observers uncovered thousands of Tutsi hacked to death in schools, 
churches, and government buildings. The international community, which refused to 
intervene during the genocide, was quick to condemn the violence and atrocities that 
were perpetrated on such a mass-scale. These mass human rights abuses, ironically, 
would form the basis of a growing international norm of a “Responsibility to Protect” 
(R2P), which would later be called upon when reports of ethnic violence and genocide 
emerged in places such as Darfur.    
The genocide was characterized by extremely personal and localized violence that 
involved neighbors killing neighbors, friends refusing safe passage to friends, and family 
members turning on family members. Both government and RPF forces alike were 
responsible for perpetrating large-scale human rights abuses, which ranged from forced 
displacement and illegal detention to torture, sexual violence, and summary executions. 
In just one instance, the Interahamwe (“those who attack together” or “those who stand 
together” in Kinyarwanda) massacred an estimated 5,000 elderly men, women, and 
children at the Cyahinda parish church in Nyakizu (UN 2014). Alison Des Forges (1999, 
720), moreover, documents numerous cases of RPF soldiers killing unarmed Hutu 
civilians in villages they captured and, in some cases, rounding Hutu civilians up and 
shooting them upon them returning to their villages. Des Forges (1999, 726) also 
uncovered several instances of accused génocidaires being summarily executed rather 
than being tried through appropriate legal channels. In total, it is estimated that hundreds 
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of thousands of Rwandese -- ranging from soldiers, police, and militia to ordinary 
civilians -- took part in the killings and hundreds of thousands of more took part in 
wanton property destruction or theft (Straus 2004, 95).  
5.4 Response of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda & 
Domestic Courts 
The immediate response to the genocide was a concerted effort to create a human 
rights criminal tribunal fashioned after the Nuremburg Trials. A pressing concern of the 
international community was how and under what manner suspected perpetrators should 
be brought to justice. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security 
Council established the ICTR on November 8, 1994 to “prosecute persons responsible for 
genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of Rwanda and neighboring states in 1994.”77 The ICTR was provided with a 
mandate, albeit a limited mandate, to investigated crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and violations of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (1949), which stipulates 
basic protections for war victims. Seated in Arusha, Tanzania to shield itself from 
political influence and pressure from the Rwandan government to provide immediate 
justice for crimes perpetrated, the ICTR represented a collaborative effort by the United 
States and international community to institutionalize the call of “never again.” 
Intense lobbying efforts on behalf of the Rwandan government were unsuccessful 
in creating an international tribunal based in Rwanda that could compel state compliance 
and administer the death penalty to convicted génocidaires. Based on the “New Zealand” 
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http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/955(1994) 
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approach, the ICTR was adopted by the UN Security Council through Resolution 955 by 
invoking Chapter VII. As part of the resolution, the ICTR featured an appeals chamber 
and chief prosecutor shared with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). In a surprising turn of events, Rwanda, which was a rotating, non-
permanent member of the UN Security Council at the time, voted against the 
establishment of the ICTR since it viewed its mandate as limited and its legal recourse as 
inadequate to investigate and punish egregious those guilty of committing crimes. 
Further, the Rwandan government opposed the use of shared special prosecutor with the 
ICTY, criticized the location of the court, and protested against its ability to influence the 
nature of individual proceedings.  
The ICTR only formally indicted 93 senior military and defense officials as well 
as religious, military, and media elites with genocide-related crimes over 20 years
78
 of 
operation (UN 2015). Of these 93, only 73 were tried and received a verdict. 59 of these 
73 were eventually convicted, with 14 being acquitted. 88 percent of those convicted 
were charged with the crime of genocide, making the ICTR the first international body to 
explicitly try and convict genocide-related crimes. Government ministers, politicians, 
military leaders, police, and key members of the Interahamwe were among those that 
were tried and prosecuted. RPF soldiers guilty of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, however, were not tried and charged through the ICTR. Instead, many “mid-
level” organizers and perpetrators of violence were charged and tried through Rwanda’s 
domestic court system. In total, approximately 7,000 government officials, ranking 
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officers in FAR, and key leaders of the Interahamwe and the Hutu Power” movement 
were tried through this domestic court system (UN 2014).  
This relatively small workload of the ICTR and domestic courts is a consequence 
of their limited mandate and financial resources. Although the ICTR cost a staggering $1 
billion to operate, this cost was spread over a two-decade period and often left the ICTR 
without the financial resources to operate at full capacity. Rwanda’s domestic court 
system, moreover, was decimated by the events that unfolded during the genocide. 
Lawyers, judges, and judicial staff were systematically targeted and killed as a way to 
prevent future efforts at bringing suspected génocidaires to justice. As Human Rights 
Watch (2014, 1) comments, even the best-equipped judicial system would have faced a 
difficult and daunting task in delivering justice for atrocities committed on such a mass 
scale. This challenge was made even more difficult by the fact that thousands were 
rounded up and charged in the absence of solid evidence against them. By the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, this large population of suspected génocidaires imprisoned without 
charge created a human rights issue of its own, one in which the international community 
demanded that the RPF-dominated government address in some form or another. 
Although the ICTR and domestic courts were moving forward with trials and 
convictions, approximately 130,000 individuals remained imprisoned on charges related 
to crimes committed during the genocide by late 1998 (HRW 2014).   
5.5 The Gacaca Courts  
To rectify this situation, the gacaca courts became the main instrument of 
transitional justice in post-genocide Rwanda and the primary mechanism to uncover the 
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truth and dispense justice to those affected by the extremely personal and localized 
violence that marked the genocide. As defined by the government (2012, 1), the 
objectives of gacaca were to “reveal the truth about what happened,” “eradicate the 
culture of impunity,” and “reconcile Rwandans and reinforce their unity.” First, these 
courts only had a mandate to investigate purported crimes and atrocities committed 
during the genocide; they did not have a broader mandate to investigate purported crimes 
that were committed by RPF forces after they assumed political and territorial control. 
These courts, moreover, could not investigate human rights abuses or violations that were 
perpetrated during the broader civil war that raged between 1990 and 1994. Second, these 
courts were tasked with dispensing both restorative and retributive justice. Although 
penalties or fines were administered (retributive justice), the goal was to reintegrate an 
individual perpetrator back into his or her village and restore a lost balance between 
perpetrator and victim (restorative justice). In most cases, there were incentives for 
perpetrators to admit their guilty rather through receiving a reduced sentence rather than 
denying the charges levied against them. Third, and finally, these courts were charged 
with promoting national unity. To achieve this goal, gacaca proceedings were structured 
in such a way to label victims and perpetrators as Rwandans, not Tutsi or Hutu 
(Ingelaere, 521-522). These goals, as outlined by the Rwandan government, provided 
gacaca with a broad, yet specific mandate to investigate any crime as long as it was 
committed during the 100 days of the genocide (Sarkin 2001; Kirkby 2006; Burnet 2012; 
Pozen et al. 2014). 
Gacaca operated at the both the cell level and the sector level, with Category I 
and Category II offenses were tried at the sector level and Category III offenses being 
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held at the cell level. Category I and II offenses involved cases where a defendant was 
accused of planning the or physically taking part in the killings, while Category III 
offenses, which comprised a majority of gacaca cases, involved cases where a defendant 
was charged with property damage or theft. In Rwanda, a cell is the lowest administrative 
unit and largely coincides with individual villages; sectors, on the other hand, often are 
comprised of multiple villages or, in some cases, are marked by the boundaries of a large 
city. In total, 9,000 courts existed at the cell level and approximately 1,500 courts at the 
sector level (UN 2014). An additional 1,500 appeals courts operated nationwide. These 
12,000 courts, in total, heard an estimated two million cases involving approximately 1.2 
million individuals between 2001 and 2012 (UN 2014). The reach of these courts was 
sweeping with approximately half of the adult male Hutu population in Rwanda in 1994 
being called to appear before a court (Le Mon 2007: 1). 30 percent of these cases ended 
with the acquittal or exoneration of the accused, while the remaining 70 percent of cases 
ended with the defendant receiving anywhere from a life sentence to community service 
(UN 2014). 
Gacaca, as a form of grassroots justice in Rwandan society, can be traced back to 
the 15
th
 century. During colonial times, these courts were informal dispute resolution 
mechanisms utilized by local communities to mitigate and address marital, family, and 
land disputes (Burnet 2012, 196). Despite some parallels with the traditional form of 
gacaca, such as an emphasis on forgiveness, providing reduced sentences to those who 
confessed, and relying on community participation to inform proceedings, the modern 
variation of gacaca, which was institutionalized through Public Law in 2001, was a 
radically different institution from its predecessor. Instead of being informal courts that 
174 
 
dealt with minor crimes and functioned outside of the state, modern gacaca became the 
primary state organ to address the genocide. As Joanna Pozen, Richard Neugebauery, and 
Joseph Ntaganira (2014, 31) comment, gacaca was the Rwandan government’s response 
to practical realities on the ground following the genocide. In particular, these courts 
were utilized as a way to ease an overburdened criminal justice system, which was 
overflowing with thousands of individuals accused or suspected of taking part in the 
crimes. This was largely a consequence of the small workload and restricted mandate of 
the ICTR, which was limited to the prosecution of lead orchestrators of the genocide. 
Rwanda’s criminal justice system, moreover, was severely understaffed as a consequence 
of judges, lawyers, and others associated with its domestic legal system being 
systematically targeted and eliminated during the genocide itself. Due to these structural 
constraints, the gacaca courts were perceived to be the only viable solution to the 
problems at hand and the desperate need to dispense justice on a mass scale (Longman 
2009; Burnet 2012).  
As part of the modern gacaca process, defendants were tried in the villages where 
they were accused of committing genocide-related crimes before a panel of locally 
elected judges called inyangamugayo (“reliable person” or “trustworthy person” in 
Kinyarwanda). These judges, who were elected in the villages in which they served, were 
often venerable members of the community and elected based on their perceived ability 
to dispense justice both fairly and equitably. These judges, however, did not receive 
formal legal training and were free to lead investigations into crimes, question witnesses 
and defendants, and collect the facts in a case when deciding the fate of a defendant 
(Pozen et al. 2014, 34). In a typical case, the accused would receive a notice requiring 
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their attendance at an upcoming meeting. These individuals then had the opportunity to 
deny the charges levied against them or admit their culpability. In the case of the latter, 
defendants would often receive commuted sentences or fines in exchange for admitting 
their guilt. This could take the form of providing reparations (e.g., giving a cow to a 
person as a reparation) or even providing labor to victims or their families. In the case of 
the former, evidence would be presented against the accused and individual members of 
the community would be able to share eye-witness testimony and evidence. 
Inyangamugayo would then deliberate on the facts of an individual case and issue their 
decision before a meeting adjourned.  
5.6 Competing Views on Gacaca 
Proponents of the gacaca courts advance that these bodies have been an effective 
tool for peacebuilding and a catalyst for social reconciliation due to their therapeutic 
nature and their “bottom-up” approach to establishing justice for victims and their 
families (Daly 2002; Wierzynska 2004; Venter 2007; Clark 2010; Doughty 2015). 
Through interviews with gacaca participants, Phil Clark (2010: 265) finds that the gacaca 
process was rehabilitating to whole communities since it dignified victims by giving them 
a human face and by providing a forum for victims or relatives to receive comfort from 
others in their villages. Erin Daly (2002), moreover, argues that the grassroots nature of 
these courts’ deliberations and proceedings made them well-positioned to deliver a fair, 
impartial justice and to resolve community conflicts since elected judges were familiar 
with village dynamics and capable of dispensing fair, impartial verdicts and penalties. 
This “participatory justice” argument is also advanced by Christine Venter (2007), who 
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argues that the gacaca process provided an excellent forum for “truth-telling” at the 
local-level since it is virtually impossible for false information to be admitted in an 
individual case, which reduced incentives for someone to make accusations for personal 
or private gain. 
Other proponents contend that these courts have advanced a culture of respect for 
human rights by strengthening the rule of law and ending a cycle of impunity in post-
genocide Rwanda. Cori Wielenga and Geoff Harris (2011), for example, note that the 
retributive qualities of these courts provide disincentives for future violence along ethnic 
lines since would-be perpetrators know that there will be penalties exacted against them 
for doing so. To proponents then, the gacaca courts have been a widely successful tool 
for promoting political, ethnic, and social reconciliation, which makes the application of 
other forms of “bottom-up” transitional justice highly recommended in other post-conflict 
situations (Lundy and McGovern 2008).  
 Opponents suggest that these courts have been used as a tool to exact victor’s 
justice and that these courts have actually deepened underlying tensions and hostilities 
along ethnic lines (Sarkin 2001; Court and Joireman 2004; Rettig 2008; Ingelaere 2009; 
Longman 2009). Jacques Fierens (2005) draws attention to severe legal shortcomings 
associated with these courts as a consequence of them denying due process and a fair trial 
for defendants, which reduced the legitimacy of these courts in the eyes of the ordinary 
Rwandan. Jeremy Sarkin (2001) and Allison Corey and Sandra Joireman (2004) criticize 
these courts for their limited mandate, which does not allow them to investigate human 
rights abuses committed during the broader civil war between the RPF and the Hutu-
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dominated government between 1990 and 1994. Corey and Joireman (2004) argue that 
these courts increase the specter of continued ethnic divisions since gacaca decisions will 
be perceived as being impartial to crimes committed against Hutu civilians (2004: 73). 
Sarkin, moreover, argues that this timeline establishes a narrative of Hutus being 
perpetrators and Tutsis being victims and does not take into account a long history of 
both ethnic groups perpetrating crimes against the other (Sarkin 2001: 161).  
Longman (2009) concedes that the exclusion of crimes committed by the RPF and 
various interventions by the national unity government into gacaca proceedings created 
and perpetrated an impression of impartial, victor’s justice. Bert Ingelaere (2009: 521-
522) finds that RPF power-brokers at the national and local level used gacaca not as a 
means to establish the truth about past atrocities but as part of a broader program by the 
RPF to promote legitimacy for the RPF-dominated government. Max Rettig (2008) finds 
that gacaca has exacerbated interethnic conflict and ethnic disunity as a consequence of 
lies, half-truths, and silence during gacaca proceedings. Susan Thomson (2011), 
moreover, finds that the gacaca courts tend to take on the power dynamics in the 
communities that they operate in, meaning that these courts are used as a tool by elites 
and the RPF to advance their agenda. More importantly, Thomson finds that these courts 
are used to manipulate international donors and the international community into thinking 
that Rwanda is a nation rehabilitated from the scourge of genocide. Finally, Jeanie Burnet 
(2012: 195) comments that these courts did not have legitimacy in the eyes of the average 
Rwandan since political influences from the central government controlled the narrative 
advanced in the proceedings, which affected “who was heard, what information was 
reported, and what the final verdict was.” In sum, the gacaca process simply represented 
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a tool the RPF-dominated government used to promote legitimacy as a form of victor’s 
justice. Not only did it limit the scope of the proceedings and deliberations, the RPF had a 
hand in determining who was charged and what sentences they were given without these 
people being afforded basic legal protections and adequate due process.  
5.7 Survey & Interview Results  
Survey Attitudes toward the Gacaca Process, Procedures, and Outcomes 
The survey results in this study provide interesting insight into the claims that 
proponents and opponents of gacaca advance. Table 17 presents the survey results from 
Form A. A majority of respondents expressed positive attitudes toward the gacaca 
process as well as toward the outcomes reached in individual trials. 79 percent of 
respondents, for example, agreed with the statement ‘Overall, gacaca has worked well in 
your local community’ (Question 6). Similarly, 86 percent of respondents indicated that 
they were satisfied with the verdicts reached by gacaca judges (Question 7). When asked 
to indicate their attitudes toward the outcomes of gacaca, 86 percent of respondents, 
moreover, agreed gacaca promoted national unity and 72 percent agreed that gacaca 
uncovered the truth about what happened during the genocide in their local community 
when asked in Questions 8 and 9 respectively. 79 percent of respondents also agreed with 
the statement, ‘Did gacaca meet your individual needs’ (Question 12). 72 percent of 
respondents disagreed that false testimony was presented in individual cases or that 
people were threatened during gacaca proceedings as indicated in Questions 14 and 15 
respectively. These data appear to provide strong support for the process itself as a means 
to address crimes committed during the genocide, to learn more about what happened 
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during the genocide itself, and as means for individuals to move past the horrific events 
that took place.  
Attitudes begin to differ, though, when respondents are asked questions that 
pertain to some procedural elements and outcomes associated with gacaca. Half of 
respondents indicated that tensions and feelings of distrust still exist in their community 
(Question 10). Only half of the respondents agreed with the statement, ‘Gacaca did a 
good job investigating all crimes that were committed occurred’ (Question 11) and only 
43 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement ‘people lied,’ which suggests that 
people had reservations over the types of cases brought before these courts. These three 
questions seem to raise concerns over whether the limited mandate of gacaca affected 
their ability to be perceived as being an impartial, fair mechanism of transitional justice. 
Although most agree that gacaca was an instrumental process that helped individuals 
rebuild their local communities, these data appear to illustrate misgivings with some 
procedural and structural design elements. 
Table 17: Perceptions toward the Gacaca Courts (Form A) 
N=14 Agree Disagree I don’t know 
6. Did Gacaca work 
well in your local 
community? 
79% (11) 14% (2) 7% (1) 
7. Were people 
satisfied with the 
verdicts reached by 
inyangamugayo? 
86% (12) 7% (1) 7% (1) 
8. Did gacaca promote 
national unity? 
86% (12) 7% (1) 7% (1) 
9. Did gacaca uncover 
the truth about what 
happened during the 
72% (10) 14% (2) 14% (2) 
180 
 
genocide? 
10. Are there still 
underlying 
tensions/feelings of 
distrust in your 
community? 
71% (10) 14% (2) 14% (2) 
11. Did gacaca do a 
good job investigating 
crimes that occurred in 
your village? 
57% (8) 29% (4) 14% (2) 
12. Did gacaca meet 
your needs? 
79% (11) 0% (0) 21% (3) 
13. People told lies 21% (3) 43% (6) 36% (5) 
14. People felt 
threatened 
14% (2) 72% (10) 14% (2) 
15. There was false 
testimony or evidence 
presented 
14% (2) 72% (10) 14% (2) 
Note: Questions 1-6 recorded a respondents’ demographic information; the 
percentages may not add up correctly due to rounding.  
 
The results from Form B in Table 18 closely mirror, for the most part, the results 
from Form A in Table 17. 77 percent and 85 percent of respondents, for example, agreed 
with Question 6 and Question 7 respectively, which is almost identical to the response 
rates (79%; 86%) for both questions on Form A. Response rates for the last three 
questions did not fluctuate much between both versions of the survey as well. 57 percent 
of respondents disagreed that people told lies on Form B in comparison to 43 percent 
who disagreed on Form A. 77% of respondents also disagreed that people felt threatened 
and 62% disagreed that false evidence or testimony was presented.  
Table 18: Perceptions toward the Gacaca Courts (Form B) 
N=13 Agree Disagree I don’t know 
6. Did Gacaca work in 77% (10) 15% (2) 7% (1) 
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your local community? 
7. Were people 
satisfied with the 
outcomes of gacaca? 
85% (11) 15% (2) 0% (0) 
8. Did gacaca promote 
reconciliation? 
70% (9) 23% (3) 7% (1) 
9. Did gacaca uncover 
the truth about what 
happened during the 
genocide? 
85% (11) 15% (2) 0% (0) 
10. Are there still 
underlying 
tensions/feelings of 
distrust in your 
community? 
92% (12) 0% (0) 7% (1) 
11. Did gacaca do a 
good job investigating 
all crimes committed 
during the genocide? 
85% (11) 7% (1) 7% (1) 
12. Did gacaca allow 
you to move forward? 
85% (11) 7% (1) 7% (1) 
13. People told lies 23% (3) 53% (7) 23% (3) 
14. People felt 
threatened  
15% (2) 77% (10) 7% (1) 
15. There was false 
testimony or evidence 
presented 
23% (3) 62% (8) 15% (2) 
Note: Questions 1-6 recorded a respondents’ demographic information.  
Subtle differences do exist between each version. 92 percent of respondents on 
Question 10 on Form B, for example, agreed that underlying tensions and feelings of 
distrust still exist in their local communities, which is significantly higher than the 
response rate (71%) on Form A. 85 percent of respondents agreed in Question 9 on Form 
B that gacaca enabled them to learn more about crimes and atrocities that were 
committed during the genocide, which is actually 13 percentage points higher than on 
Form A. Response rates begin to vary, though, when keywords or wording in individual 
questions are manipulated. On Form B, only 70 percent of respondents on Question 8 
agreed that gacaca promoted reconciliation. This question was worded differently on 
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Form A in where the keyword ‘national unity’ was used instead of reconciliation on 
Question 8, which elicited an agree response rate of 86 percent. Further, 85 percent of 
respondents on Form B agreed that gacaca did a good job investigating all crimes 
committed during the genocide (Question 11). This differs dramatically from Question 11 
on Form A, in where only 57 percent of respondents agreed that gacaca did a good job 
investigating crimes committed in their village. Responses to Question 12 on both Form 
A and Form B differ slightly as well when changing the use of a keyword. 85 percent of 
respondents on Form B agreed that gacaca allowed them to move forward, compared to 
only 79 percent of respondents on Form A who agreed that gacaca met their needs.  
Interview Attitudes toward the Gacaca Process, Procedures, and Outcomes 
The study interview questions build upon these survey data and add more clues 
and context to the survey responses, which, by nature, are limited in their categories and, 
thus, their ability to tell a complete picture of public perceptions toward gacaca. When 
asked to respond to why gacaca worked, all 12 interviewees commented that gacaca was 
an empowering and participatory process that enabled them to actually see justice or feel 
a sense of closure. When probed on what justice actually entails, most respondents 
associated the term with closure, which is different than how the term is conceptually 
identified with procedural justice in this study. Most interviewees also commented that 
gacaca was successful since it provided a localized solution to an extremely personal and 
individualized event. In particular, a common theme advanced across all of the interviews 
was gacaca represented the only mechanism that was capable of addressing such a large 
number of crimes in a short period of time. Most respondents remained skeptical that 
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those who were guilty would ever be brought to justice if they were charged through the 
ICTR or through the domestic courts. Further, nearly all interviewees expressed their 
support of the community-based and participatory nature of these courts. Both of these 
features, according to interviewees, generally helped uncover the truth about what 
happened and enabled the community, as a whole, to begin a difficult, but necessary 
healing process.  
In an interview conducted with a gacaca judge in Ruhengeri (Interviewee 1), this 
sentiment was conveyed through the comment that gacaca was a “country solution” to a 
“country problem.” When asked to further comment on this statement, this individual 
commented that the ICTR was ill-prepared to deal the genocide because it focused on 
problems at the national level and failed to take into account how localized much of the 
violence was. This individual, throughout the interview, continuously highlighted the 
need for justice, truth, and healing at the local level, which the ICTR was incapable of 
providing. This was largely a consequence of the ICTR only investigating the main 
orchestrators of the genocide, according to the respondent, and the fact that it would take 
forever to dispense justice to everyone that was affected whether it be through a family 
member being killed or a cow stolen.  
In another case, an interviewee (Interviewee 3) who had lost his entire family 
during the genocide, commented that these courts prevented revenge killings by Tutsi. 
Revenge killings, as noted by this respondent, proliferated in the aftermath of the 
genocide itself as individuals returned to their villages and learned the fate of family 
members. To this interviewee, gacaca was a critical mechanism that prevented future 
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violence perpetrated along ethnic lines. Without gacaca, and even with the end of 
gacaca, this person worried that ethnic tensions might boil over into future violence. A 
colleague of Interview 4 (Interviewee 4), commented that the sentences given in 
individual cases allowed those who were charged to seek forgiveness for their crimes, 
which they commented was committed during a “time of passion, uncertainty, and 
lawlessness.”  
Another important theme that was advanced in all of these interviews was that 
national unity would not be possible without gacaca. One respondent (Interviewee 12) 
commented that this process allowed children of perpetrators and children of victims to 
learn in the same classroom. Probed further, this respondent indicated that this process 
allowed her to look those who killed her family in the eyes. Asked how she was able to 
accept the fact that her family’s killers received reduced sentences, she responded that 
gacaca allowed her to see them ask for forgiveness in a way that the entire village could 
accept. To this interviewee, gacaca provided a painful close to an extremely traumatic 
event. Another respondent (Interviewee 7), who regularly attended gacaca meetings since 
his father was a judge, commented that this process forged unity by allowing victims and 
families to forgive those who were willing to seek forgiveness for what they had done. 
Another respondent (Interviewee 5) commented that this process was extremely difficult; 
however, they suggested that “some justice was better than none.”  
Nearly all respondents agreed that these courts allowed people to move forward 
with their lives. In some cases, verdicts would provide a much-needed sense of closure, 
which was critically needed to pick up the pieces. One respondent (Interviewee 6), whose 
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brother was sentenced to 20 years in jail, commented that gacaca provided a sense of 
closure not only to the family of those affected by his brother’s actions but also to both 
him and his family considering that his brother had been held without charge for six 
years. To this respondent, gacaca finally ended a ten-year long ordeal and provided a 
timetable for which his own family could begin the “healing process”; however, he did 
find the sentencing process troubling considering that his brother was sentenced to a 
reduced term that did not take into account time he had already served in prison without 
formerly being charged with a crime.  
Building on concerns over the procedural and structural design elements in the 
survey responses, the mandate of gacaca was often raised when respondents were asked 
to comment on limitations associated with the process. Nearly all interviewees indicated 
that they found the limited scope of gacaca jurisdiction troubling. One respondent 
(Interviewee 11) questioned the framing of victims and perpetrators when asking how the 
theft of his land after the genocide could not be considered a crime. Even though this 
respondent had fled the violence, he found this situation to be unjust since no legal or 
government remedy existed for him to raise his grievances. In the interviews conducted 
in Ruhengeri, multiple individuals commented that a lack of justice for crimes committed 
before and after the genocide remained salient. Most also commented that a lack of 
attention to these issues was the main source of hostilities and tensions that remain in 
their community. More importantly, these underlying tensions and hostilities fuel the 
“silent” mistrust that permeates everyday life in their community.  
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Another concern was that the process became increasingly viewed as politicized 
as the gacaca courts went on. Interviewee 9 felt that the extension of the original 
timetable made herself and others in her community feel as if the process was being 
dragged out by the government to increase its visibility and popularity. When probed 
further, this respondent commented that ethnic divisions slowly eroded the justice 
reached in individual outcomes, with individual courts assuming the ethnic divisions and 
dynamics present in a particular community. What originally was a process meant to 
uncover the truth, promote healing, and reconcile and ultimately erase ethnic divisions, 
slowly began to assume these divides as proceedings went on. More importantly, 
Interviewee 9 thought that gacaca was used as a tool to shore up support for the regime. 
5.8  Implications 
These data tell a positive, yet complicated story about gacaca as an ambitious 
transitional justice project. Respondents were overwhelming positive in their assessments 
of gacaca when asked to provide their opinions on the ability of gacaca to promote 
national unity and uncover the truth about what happened during the genocide itself. 
Further, the study interview questions yielded an interesting link between justice and 
closure as well as the theme that gacaca, and only gacaca, was capable of administering 
this closure (i.e., justice) on a mass scale. These findings largely affirm those found in the 
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission’s RRB survey of views and attitudes 
toward gacaca in 2016 (see Table 19 below).  
With that said, the survey and interview data clearly indicate that Rwandans have 
misgivings about structural and procedural elements associated with this process and, in 
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particular, seem to feel that broadening the mandate and jurisdiction of these courts 
would likely have increased their legitimacy and their societal effect. To some 
respondents, there is a growing perception that these courts increasingly became 
politicized, which negated their therapeutic potential and tarnished the nature of the 
justice that was dispensed. The survey and study interview data, overall, seem to indicate 
that ordinary Rwandans are somewhere in between characterizations of the process 
advanced by either the Rwandan government or international human rights organizations, 
such as HWR or Amnesty International. The former would like to paint a largely benign 
picture of gacaca and its political and social effects in post-genocide Rwanda. The latter, 
instead, only focuses on the negatives associated with this process, which may cloud 
overall perceptions and progress achieved.  
Table 19: Select Questions on Gacaca from the Rwandan Reconciliation 
Barometer (2016) 
 
N=3,000 Agree Disagree Neither Agree 
or Disagree 
Gacaca courts 
uncovered the truth 
about the genocide 
94% 2% 3% 
Inyangamugayo 
were fair, impartial 
83% 7% 6% 
Convictions were 
fair 
89% 6% 3% 
Gacaca allowed for 
perpetrators to be 
reintegrated into 
society 
95% 3% 2% 
         Source: NURC, 2016 
Applied to extant findings, the survey and study interview data complement and 
challenge existing studies on gacaca. The data conflict with the key argument advanced 
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by Susan Thompson (2007), who argues that power dynamics and the use of these courts 
by the RPF negated their therapeutic and pacifying effect. The interview data in this 
study also picked up on this theme; however, all respondents agreed that gacaca was a 
necessary but painful process that allowed them to move forward. Further, the interviews 
seem to indicate that this effect that Thompson finds would have been more pronounced 
if all genocide-related crimes were addressed through the ICTR or the domestic court 
system. The survey data, moreover, confirm some of the findings of Max Rettig (2008). 
In particular, Rettig (2008, 37) finds that large majorities in his survey agreed or strongly 
agreed that gacaca has functioned well and has promoted national unity. In contrast to 
the survey results above, though, Rettig (2008, 41) finds that 90 percent of respondents 
either agreed or strongly agreed that people told or that false testimony was included in 
gacaca proceedings, which, in Rettig’s opinion, negated the pacifying effect of gacaca 
and its ability to promote ethnic reconciliation. Unlike the conclusions advanced by 
Rettig (2008), the survey and interview data in this study do closely mirror the 
conclusions reached by Pozen, Neugebaurey, and Ntaganira (2014) who, through a 
survey of 504 Rwandans from Ngoma Commune in 2011, find gacaca was widely 
popular for its ability to promote national unity and allow ordinary Rwandans to move 
forward with their lives. Even more importantly, the survey and interview data in this 
study also affirm the conclusions reached by Pozen, Neugebaurey, and Ntaganira (2014) 
on complaints associated with procedural and structural aspects (e.g., limited mandate 
and jurisdiction).   
Applied to extant studies that critique the discourse surrounding transitional 
justice, the results seem to confirm key arguments made by Lundy and McGovern 
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(2008), Fletcher and Weinstein (2004), Schneider (2009), and Baines (2010). In 
particular, the survey and interview data seem to support the need to have participatory, 
grassroots-based mechanisms as argued by Lundy and McGovern (2008). The semi-
structured interview responses, which raised the common theme that gacaca was a 
country solution to a country problem, also echoes the arguments made by Fletcher and 
Weinstein (2009) and Schneider (2009) who both suggest that cookie-cutter, one-size-
fits-all transitional justice processes will likely fail unless they are tailored to individual 
post-conflict situations. Finally, gacaca, as a traditional dispute-resolution mechanism, 
seems to support the argument made by Baines (2010) to incorporate traditional-based 
mechanisms in post-conflict countries today. Curiously, though, modern gacaca 
ultimately became a tool of a state-led transitional justice process rather than one that 
existed autonomously outside of state control as was the case with traditional gacaca.  
5.9 Summary 
In sum, the gacaca courts were a painful, yet necessary step in post-genocide 
Rwanda. Although one would be hard-pressed to argue that these courts alone promoted 
or caused peace, justice, national unity, and reconciliation between perpetrators and 
victims of genocide-related crimes, these courts appear to have worked as a country-
specific solution to a country-specific problem as a bottom-up approach to transitional 
justice. The survey and interview data are optimistic in nature and show that gacaca has 
allowed people to learn about what happened during the genocide. More importantly, 
these data show that gacaca seems to be associated with the healing process and national 
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unity through becoming an avenue for forgiveness and a catalyst for the long and arduous 
process of reconciliation.  
Rwanda, as a case study for a broader discussion on transitional justice, seems to 
illustrate that there is not a one-size fit all solution when addressing past violence, abuses, 
and atrocities. In Rwanda’s case, the ICTR itself would’ve been incapable of dealing with 
crimes committed on such a mass scale. Even in conjunction with other top-down 
mechanisms, it seems highly unlikely that the Rwandan government would have been 
capable of delivering justice on such a large scale. To borrow from one of the 
interviewees, gacaca was country solution to a country problem. This case seems to 
provide evidence to support claims that bottom-up approaches to transitional justice are 
increasingly becoming powerful tools for addressing past abuses in order to move 
forward. Further, this case seems to provide evidence to support a growing consensus that 
the more mechanisms that are adopted increase the overall effect of transitional justice in 
a post-conflict country. In this case, gacaca became the workhorse for transitional justice 
in Rwanda; however, its use in conjunction with top-down, internationally-backed 
mechanisms in the form of the ICTR increased the overall ability of the Rwandan 
government to dispense mass justice for mass atrocity.  
  CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion: Synthesis of Findings, Study Limitations, & Areas for Future 
Research 
6.1 Introduction 
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  Collectively, post-conflict societies are plagued by weak political-legal 
institutions, intergroup hostilities, shattered economies, a cycle of impunity, crumbling 
infrastructure, and lingering power dynamics that hold the potential to reignite tensions, 
instability, and armed violence. More importantly, contemporary post-conflict countries 
are often marked by a blemished human rights record, which makes social reconciliation 
a daunting and sometimes insurmountable task. The key question, then, is how can we 
create a durable peace that is forward-looking, yet built on a foundation of addressing a 
legacy of past abuses in such a way that can mitigate the negative emotions of hate, 
anger, and revenge? 
 This study has attempted to build upon our understanding of what conditions 
peace in war’s last phase by examining what role, if any, truth commissions, as a 
transitional justice mechanism, play individually and in combination with other 
mechanisms in societies emerging from periods of violence, insurrection, or state 
repression. Circling back to Chapter 1, transitional justice efforts in both Colombia and 
Tunisia today illustrate that uncovering the truth about past abuses is now perceived to be 
an essential ingredient in any political transition. In Colombia’s case, a truth commission 
is being utilized as part of a broader transitional justice project that includes a criminal 
tribunal and amnesties, with the intended goal of formally bringing an end to the longest 
running insurgency in the world. Tunisia, on the other hand, has adopted a truth 
commission largely is isolation from other mechanisms; however, the goal is to propel a 
successful democratic transition forward by investigating and shedding light on past 
abuses committed by state-sponsored security forces. Despite their divergent paths, 
transitional justice efforts in both countries reflect a growing international norm that 
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victims and their families have a basic right to know what transpired, the identity of 
individual perpetrators, or the fate and whereabouts of those who “disappeared.”  
This chapter serves as the concluding discussion for this study. A brief synthesis 
of the results in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 as well as concluding remarks on the 
implications of these findings are provided. The first section presents a short synthesis of 
the overall results. The second section then discusses the implications of these results in 
relation to extant studies on the topic. In particular, this section discusses how the 
findings reached in this study contribute to different segments of the literature on 
transitional justice processes. The third section identifies the limitations and weaknesses 
associated with the research design adopted and the various ways in which the models 
and case study can be improved.  The fourth section identifies future areas of research 
and general ideas for how we can improve our understanding of truth commissions and, 
more importantly, the overall effect of transitional justice in post-conflict countries. I end 
this study with overall remarks on the topic and where I hope to go with future research 
projects pertaining to transitional justice and post-conflict peacebuilding.   
 
 
6.2 Synthesis of Findings & Results 
 The results in Chapter 4 indicate that truth commissions, individually, do not 
appear to make a meaningful difference in post-conflict societies. The data in each of the 
first four models suggest that these bodies are not associated with sustained, long-term 
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improvements in democratization or human rights protections. Even more, there is some 
evidence to suggest that truth commissions are associated with an increased probability of 
violence reigniting after a decade and decreased wealth when using GDP per capita as a 
measure of economic vitality. The key theme, it seems, is that truth commissions are no 
more or less likely to be associated with improvements in democratization, human rights 
protections, and the durability of peace in countries that adopt them in comparison to 
post-conflict societies that lack these investigative bodies. This negative, statistically 
significant relationship between truth commissions and economic performance, 
moreover, should force policymakers, third party IGOs, human rights INGOs, or 
international donors to pause before promoting their application, especially in post-
conflict situations where markets are perceived to be the best instrument for fostering 
cooperation between former belligerents.  
 This somewhat negative view of truth commissions largely holds true for most of 
the transitional justice mechanisms included as part of a broader dataset used in this study 
to examine transitional justice outcomes and effects between 1970 and 2010. Trials, 
amnesties, and lustrations do not exhibit a meaningful, positive effect on most of the 
post-conflict indicators used as dependent variables in each of the four first models. 
Individually, all of the additional mechanisms are associated with an increased 
probability of violence reigniting and decreased economic outcomes. Even more, trials 
exhibit a consistently negative impact on levels of democratization, whereas lustrations 
and amnesties are associated with negative outcomes when estimating their effects on 
democracy and human rights respectively. If anything, it appears the key take away for 
truth commissions also applies to each of these mechanisms as well; policymakers, third-
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party IGOs, and independent donors should be careful when applying a single transitional 
justice mechanism in any post-conflict situation without first projecting the effects of that 
mechanism on various post-conflict indicators.  
 This complicated narrative for transitional justice processes to change when truth 
commissions are paired with different types of mechanisms. In particular, truth 
commissions, when coupled with reparations, appear to exhibit a positive, statistically 
significant effect on three of the four
79
 societal indicators used to measure the 
performance of transitional justice processes. When paired with the other mechanisms in 
the dataset, however, the effect of truth commissions remains muted and not much 
evidence exists to suggest that these bodies make a difference or not regardless of 
whether these mechanisms are retributive or restorative in nature. Truth commissions and 
amnesties do seem to exhibit a positive effect on democracy outcomes to a certain point, 
while there is some statistical evidence to suggest that truth commissions paired with 
lustrations actually decreases wealth in post-conflict situations.  
 The statistical results, as a whole, seem to lend partial support for the first four 
hypotheses advanced in Chapter 1. Table 20 provides a brief synthesis of these 
hypotheses and whether the null hypothesis is accepted or rejected based on the results 
obtained from Chapter 4. As initially hypothesized in all four cases, post-conflict 
countries that adopt truth commissions, alone, are unlikely to experience improvements 
in levels of democratization, human rights protections, economic development, or the 
durability of peace. When combining truth commissions with reparations, which are a 
                                                          
79
 This unique pair exhibits a positive, yet very weak, short-term effect on human rights 
protections.   
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form of retributive justice, truth commissions do exhibit a positive effect as initially 
hypothesized as well. With that said, truth commissions do not exhibit a similar, positive 
effect when paired with trials or lustrations. If anything, it appears that coupling truth 
commissions with trials actually is associated with negative outcomes in some contexts. 
This causes a partial rejection of the null in each of these four hypotheses. This is a 
consequence of the fact that there is not overwhelming evidence to suggest that the effect 
of truth commissions is enhanced by simply coupling them with any retributive 
mechanism. It is important to note, though, that this research is not confidant of whether 
truth commissions, even when paired with reparations, are the cause of these positive 
societal outcomes or merely associated with a larger process at play in some wealthier or 
more democratic post-conflict countries. This is a consequence of the fact that the 
coefficients for the pre-year category are largely similar to the coefficients, in both size 
and direction, in the later time categories in the democracy, economic, and durability of 
peace models.  
 
Table 20: Key Findings for Research Questions 1 & 2 
 
Results for Hypotheses 1-4 
 
H1 
 
 
 
 
H0 
 
Post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions alone are less likely to 
experience advancements, or improvements, in levels of democratization in 
comparison to those that adopt truth commissions in combination with one or 
more retributive mechanisms. 
 
There is no relationship between truth commissions and levels of democracy 
when they are coupled with retributive mechanisms in post-conflict countries. 
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 Dependent Variable 
Democracy 
Independent Variable 
Truth commission 
Null Hypothesis 
Partially Reject 
 
H2 
 
 
 
 
H0 
Post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions alone are less likely to 
experience improvements in human rights protections in comparison to those 
that adopt truth commissions in combination with one or more retributive 
mechanisms. 
 
There is no relationship between truth commissions and human rights 
protections when they are coupled with retributive mechanisms in post-conflict 
countries. 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Human Rights 
Independent Variable 
Truth commission 
Null Hypothesis 
Partially Reject 
 
H3 
 
 
 
 
H0 
Post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions alone are less likely to 
experience improvements in economic development in comparison to those 
that adopt truth commissions in combination with one or more retributive 
mechanisms. 
 
There is no relationship between truth commissions and levels of economic 
performance when they are coupled with retributive mechanisms in post-
conflict countries. 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Economic 
development 
Independent Variable 
Truth commission 
Null Hypothesis 
Partially Reject 
 
H4 
 
 
H0 
Post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions alone are less likely to 
remain at peace in comparison to those that adopt truth commissions in 
combination with one or more retributive mechanisms. 
There is no relationship between truth commissions and the durability of peace 
when they are coupled with retributive mechanisms in post-conflict countries. 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Durability of peace 
Independent Variable 
Truth commission 
Null Hypothesis 
Partially Reject 
 
 
 The implications of these findings are interesting on several fronts. First, these 
results seem to indicate that uncovering the truth about past crimes, atrocities, or human 
rights violations may not be enough in the post-conflict stage. As theorized in Chapter 1, 
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restorative mechanisms, like truth commissions, can indeed be helpful as “victim-
centered” approaches; however, these investigative bodies, in isolation from other 
mechanisms, are unlikely to promote positive societal outcomes in the form of increased 
levels of democratization, economic performance, human rights records, or the durability 
of peace. Second, the results do indicate that one combination of a restorative and 
retributive mechanism was helpful; however, the results appear to be contradictory since 
truth commissions, when paired with trials and lustrations, produce inconsequential and, 
in some cases, negative effects, which is not theorized in Chapter 1. Finally, this study 
does seem to justify a growing consensus that the effect of transitional justice is 
heightened when more than one mechanism is adopted in a post-conflict situation.   
Building on the statistical results in Chapter 4, the survey and interview results in 
Chapter 5 providing interesting insight into the use of hybrid, grassroots-level transitional 
justice processes. These data seem to provide positive support for Hypothesis 5, which 
stipulates that top-down approaches must be used in tandem with local, grassroots-level 
mechanisms that are capable of dispensing justice to the “ordinary” victim or citizen (see 
Table 21). Ironically, these data also seems to verify the statistical results in Chapter 4. 
Gacaca, at its core, was a hybrid transitional justice mechanism that dispensed restorative 
and retributive justice through uncovering the truth and punishing most perpetrators 
through reparations in the form of community service or monetary payments.   
Table 21: Key Findings for Research Question 3  
 
Results for Hypothesis 5 
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H5 
 
 
 
 
H0 
Post-conflict countries that combine top-down approaches with grassroots 
level mechanisms are more likely to experience improvements in levels of 
societal peace, democratization, economic development, and human rights in 
comparison to those that only adopt top-down mechanisms. 
 
There is no relationship between adopting top-down approaches in 
conjunction with grassroots, bottom-up approaches and positive societal 
outcomes in post-conflict countries. 
 Dependent Variables 
Democracy, 
economic 
development, human 
rights protections, 
durability of peace 
 
Independent Variable 
Top-Down 
Mechanism + 
Grassroots (i.e., Local 
or Bottom-Up) 
Mechanism 
Null Hypothesis 
Reject 
 
The implications of the case study results are important in several respects as 
well. Although imperfect, the frame surrounding gacaca as a “country solution for a 
country problem,” appears to be a widely shared public sentiment, which has garnered 
public support and legitimacy for this project over the ICTR. It is important to note that 
Rwanda is an outlier in studies on transitional justice due to the scope and severity of the 
Rwandan genocide; however, the key take away from Chapter 5 is that top-down, 
externally imposed mechanisms would likely have failed if they were adopted over 
gacaca as a traditional, dispute-resolution mechanism in Rwandan society. This is 
important considering the abundance of non-Western, non-legalistic mechanisms that 
exist in most post-conflict countries around the world. This is not to say that top-down 
approaches are obsolete; however, Chapter 5 provides evidence to suggest that these 
approaches and the overall transitional justice process can be enhanced by simply 
utilizing different mechanisms at different levels of society.  
6.3 Contribution to Literature 
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 The statistical aspect of this study builds upon extant studies in several ways. 
Similar to Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010), this study primarily focuses on the application and 
outcomes of truth commissions; however, the findings from the different statistical 
models in both studies differ on one key front. Whereas Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) finds 
that truth commissions have no effect on democracy and a negative effect on human 
rights, this study, instead, reaches the opposite conclusion: truth commissions have no 
effect on human rights and a negative effect, albeit a weak effect, on levels of 
democratization in post-conflict countries. These differences in results can possibly be 
attributed to the use of different datasets and indicators. This study relied on transitional 
justice mechanisms coded by the Transitional Justice Database Project, while 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) coded truth commissions based on country-specific 
information from the United States Institute for Peace (USIP). With that said, what unites 
both studies is a failure to provide a clear, empirical link that truth commissions matter in 
post-conflict societies that adopt them in comparison to those that do not.  
 In comparison to past studies that have examined the effects associated with 
different combinations of mechanisms, this study reaches different conclusions as well. 
Olsen et al. (2010) find that truth commissions, alone, produce negative effects on human 
rights protections, which is similar to the findings reached by Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010). 
When testing the effect of truth commissions in combination with other mechanisms, the 
authors find that coupling these bodies with amnesties produces positive effects for 
democratic and human rights outcomes. This study, on the other hand, finds that truth 
commissions coupled with reparations was the most important combination. These 
differences in conclusions and results are interesting considering that both studies use the 
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same unit of analysis, similar coding schemes for key independent and dependent 
variables, and similar time intervals.   
Finally, the gacaca case study seems to lend empirical support to critics who 
question the discourse surrounding top-down approaches and those who have 
championed the use of micro-level approaches, which are perceived to be more 
participatory and inclusive in nature (e.g., Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003; Lundy and 
McGovern 2008; McEvoy 2008; Baines 2010; Gready and Robins 2014). This study, in 
particular, finds that the gacaca courts were instrumental in promoting a sense of closure 
to victims and perpetrators alike. More importantly, these courts provided an avenue for 
“mass justice for mass atrocity,” which was a feature that was lacking in the ICTR or 
Rwanda’s domestic court system (Waldorf 2006). Although the survey and interview data 
are imperfect, they seem to provide some evidence to conclude the growing consensus 
advanced by these skeptics or champions of micro-level, country-specific approaches: 
top-down approaches that are perceived to be externally imposed or forced on a post-
conflict country face an up-hill battle when promoting transitional justice since they lack 
basic legitimacy among the people they are structured to serve.  
6.4 Study Limitations & Potential Error 
 To be sure, this research is not devoid of limitations. In terms of the statistical 
aspect of the study, several issues affect the dataset and subsequently the statistical 
models used to test each of the research questions and hypotheses. Manually inputting 
Polity IV scores, GDP per capita measures, Physical Integrity scores, and measures of 
armed violence for more than 1,100 observations from different data sources that are 
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complex and sprawling in nature will inevitably lead to coding mistakes. Further, the 
large number of missing data for certain variables (e.g., Physical Integrity scores) in the 
dataset possibly skews the results in each of the eight models tested. Reparations and 
amnesties, moreover, are highly collinear, which created complications in the first four 
models by causing reparations to be omitted. With that said, the models did not change 
dramatically when using amnesties over reparations or reparations over amnesties in the 
models. Finally, the large number of missing data for some of the observations included 
after 2000 may have potentially skewed the models as well. 
As for the survey and interview aspect of this study, the small-N nature of the 
sample size limits the generalizability of the findings. This small-N nature may also lead 
to potential erroneous inferences being made in comparison to other studies that have, on 
average, made inferences based on a sample size of 500 to 1,000 gacaca participants 
(e.g., Rettig 2008 and Pozen et al. 2014). Despite efforts to obtain a representative 
sample, moreover, the demographics of the survey respondents’ does not neatly match 
average demographic statistics for Rwandan society. By increasing the sample size in the 
future, this could mitigate both of these limitations and the potential for erroneous 
inferences. A final concern is related to the issue of replicability. The sample was 
identified through irregular means at best, which creates concerns over whether a person 
attempting to replicate the sample method in this research could achieve or even perform 
the same research. This study tries to mitigate this concern by including the interview 
methods table; however, this is obviously an issue or key methodological problem 
associated with the research design process.  
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6.5 Future Areas of Research 
 There are numerous avenues and areas in which scholars interested in transitional 
justice processes can pursue or focus on to build upon our understanding of what 
conditions an enduring and durable peace and also how to best address a legacy of past 
abuses and violations. Despite a burgeoning literature in recent decades, our 
understanding of transitional justice as a field of inquiry is complicated by its fragmented 
nature. Some scholars prefer to use more qualitative, case-study driven analyses or 
historical techniques to isolate and trace the outcomes of transitional justice processes in 
a particular country or over time. Other scholars instead have turned to increasingly 
complicated and complex statistical models and techniques to parse out the effects of 
these mechanisms and processes in countries emerging from a period of state repression, 
political violence, or armed conflict. Regardless of a scholars comfort zone or favored 
approach, multi-method research designs will remain extremely useful and 
methodologically powerful when trying to understand the outcomes associated with 
transitional justice. This is largely a consequence of the fact that statistical approaches 
remain incapable of clearly determining cause and effect relationships between 
transitional justice mechanisms and different post-conflict indicators.  
 One simple way to improve our understanding is to branch out beyond the “big 
five” mechanisms -- criminal trials, truth commissions, reparations, amnesties, and 
lustrations -- that are examined in most studies, including this one. By focusing on these 
five mechanisms alone, this allows for cross-study comparisons; however, doing so also 
limits our sample population and universe of post-conflict cases we are fixated on. By 
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expanding our analyses to different types of mechanisms, such as public memorial 
projects or constitutional changes, this might provide a thicker understanding of ways in 
which post-conflict societies can confront a legacy of past abuses.  
 A second way to improve our understanding of transitional justice is to move 
closer, rather than farther apart, on issues related to semantics. Some studies define truth 
commissions in this way based on this set of criteria, whereas others either relax or add 
specific requirements for an investigate body to be considered a truth commission. 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) and Olsen et al. (2010), for example, come to different 
conceptual definitions considering whether an investigate body constitutes a truth 
commission or not. These conceptual definitions cause the former not to label the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearances of People in Uganda in 1974, which is 
considered by Hayner (2001) to be among the first truth commissions, whereas the latter 
includes this particular case in an overall dataset on transitional justice processes from 
1970 onward. The term post-conflict itself is highly debated, which causes some studies 
to consider “case x” a post-conflict situation while other studies do not consider this very 
same case a post-conflict situation because of competing measures or operational 
definitions. These differences in semantics do matter. One of the most difficult aspects of 
this study were choices involving conceptual definitions -- or decisions to restrict or relax 
measures, definitions, or metrics in certain areas to produce cross-study analyses.  
A third crucial area in which to explore further is to empirically determine 
whether sequencing and timing matter when combining different mechanisms, including 
restorative and retributive mechanisms. This is especially important considering a 
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growing consensus in favor of “more is better” as it relates to transitional justice 
mechanisms. This means future work needs to address the outcomes of specific 
combinations across geographic groupings of countries. Further, timing remains an 
elusive component in most studies on transitional justice. Does it matter if a combination 
of mechanisms is applied directly before or after a transition? Does it matter if one 
mechanism is adopted initially and then another is adopted six months later, a year later, 
or two years later?  
This issue of timing and sequencing appears to be at play in this study. Even 
though this study finds evidence to suggest that coupling truth commissions with 
reparations is beneficial for several of the societal indicators used as dependent variables, 
might this relationship be reverse under circumstances where a truth commission is 
adopted first, then followed by reparations? Does it matter if reparations are adopted first 
and then a truth commission after ‘x’ period of time? What about the effect for other 
mechanisms paired with truth commissions? Might adopting a truth commission first, 
followed by a criminal tribunal or lustration program produce optimal results in post-
conflict countries?  The overall theory advanced in this study seems to suggest that 
adopting a restorative mechanism first, followed by a retributive mechanism second 
would yield fruitful results in post-conflict situations.  
6.6 Concluding Remarks 
 My goal, which I realize was extremely ambitious and time-consuming now, was 
to isolate the effects of truth commissions as well as other mechanisms of transitional 
justice. I believe the results obtained in this study are important; however, I also have 
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come to realization that the literature on transitional justice remains fragmented, 
decentralized, nascent, and conflicting in nature as a consequence of transitional justice 
processes themselves. Variation between and within mechanisms makes cross-cultural, 
cross-regional, and cross-study comparisons extremely difficult to conceptualize, 
implement, and formalize in research designs.  
Further, debates over semantics and the reliability and validity of measures has 
frozen progress on an extremely important and timely topic. Studies of post-conflict 
countries are important considering what is at stake in these countries -- most will remain 
weak and fragile states that lack institutional capacities and resources to deliver basic 
needs to their citizens. Further, inadequate approaches to redressing past crimes and 
abuses is potentially sowing the seeds for renewed violence and a repeat of these very 
same crimes and abuses. This means scholars of transitional justice need to do better 
considering that there is indeed a “human face” behind our work, results, and analyses.  
Studies of transitional justice processes complement our understanding of post-
conflict countries by continuing to remind policymakers, outside donors, and those 
operating in the non-profit sector that addressing past abuses and ending a cycle of 
impunity is an essential component in any equation developed for addressing the needs of 
these fragile, yet highly complex societies. Inattention will only breed future grievances, 
hostilities, and underlying feelings of distrust and anger, which will be exploited by 
trigger events. It is my sincere hope that continued work on whether transitional justice 
“works” through the use of diverse multimethod and mixed research designs will become 
a catalyst for renewed interest and engagement in perennial questions that continue to 
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bog down the field. We have benefited tremendously from those who have documented 
convincing evidence for why certain countries choose certain mechanisms (e.g., Olsen et 
al. 2010; Rothe and Maggard 2012). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
Truth Commissions & Commissions of Inquiry, 1974 - 2015 
 
Country Official Title    Time  Started by  Type* 
   
Uganda  Commission of Inquiry into   1974  Executive Official 
   the Disappearance of People 
  in Uganda since the 25
th
 of 
  January, 1971  
 
Brazil  No More    1979-1982 NGO            Unofficial 
 
Bolivia  National Commission for    1982-1984 Executive Official 
Investigation For Forced  
Disappearances  
 
Argentina National Commission on the   1983-1984 Executive  Official 
Disappeared 
(“Never Again”)     
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Zimbabwe Commission of Inquiry into the  1983-1984 Executive Official 
  Matabeleland Disturbances    
   
Uruguay  Commission for the Investigation   1985  Legislature Official 
of the Situation of the Disappeared     (Amnesty Law) 
and Related Events 
 
Uruguay Investigating Commission on the   1985  Legislature  Official  
  Kidnapping and Assassination of  
National Representatives Zelmar  
Michelini and Hector Gutierrez Ruiz  
 
Peru  Commission of Inquiry to Investigate 1986-1988 Legislature Official 
  the Massacre of Prisoners 
 
Uganda  Commission of Inquiry into   1986-1994 Executive Official 
Violations of Human Rights  
 
Philippines Presidential Committee on Human  1986-1987 Executive Official  
  Rights  
 
Chile  National Commission for Truth   1990-1991 Executive Official 
  and Reconciliation  
  (“Rettig Commission”) 
 
Nepal  Commission of Inquiry to Locate    1990-1991 Executive Official 
  The Persons Disappeared during the  
Panchayat Period 
 
Chad  Commission of Inquiry into the   1991-1992 Executive Official 
Crimes and Disappropriations  
Committed by ex-President Habre,  
his Accomplices, and/or Accessories 
 
 
South Africa Commission of Inquiry into   1992  Legislature Official 
  Complaints by Former African       
  National Congress Prisoners and      
  Detainees (“Skweyiya Commission)      
  
 
 
El Salvador Commission on the Truth    1993-1993 Peace   Official 
  for El Salvador       Agreement (UN) 
 
 
Germany Commission of Inquiry for the  1992-1994 Legislature Official 
  Assessment of History and 
  Consequences of the SED  
  Dictatorship in Germany 
 
Rwanda International Commission of  1993  NGO            Unofficial 
  Investigation on Human Rights  
  Violations in Rwanda Since 
  October 1, 1990  
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South Africa Commission of Inquiry into   1993  Legislature Official 
  Certain Allegations of Cruelty 
  And Human Rights Abuse Against 
  ANC Prisoners and Detainees by 
  ANC Members  
 
Honduras  Independent Inquiry Undertaken by the 1993-1994 Executive Official 
  National Commissioner for the  
Protection of Human Rights 
   
Ethiopia The Special Prosecution Process by  1993-2007 Executive Official 
the Office of the Special Prosecutor       
   
Haiti  National Truth and Justice Commission 1994-1996 Executive Official 
 
Germany Commission for the Overcoming of the 1995-1998 Legislature Official 
  Consequences of the SED Dictatorship 
  In the Process of German Unity 
 
South Africa Commission of Truth and Reconciliation 1995-2002 Legislature Official 
   
Sri Lanka Commission of Inquiry into Involuntary 1995-2000 Executive Official 
  Removal and Disappearances of Persons  
in Western, Southern, and 
Sabaragamuwa Provinces  
 
Ecuador Truth and Justice Commission  1996-1997 Ministerial Official 
         Accord 
 
Guatemala Commission for the Historical  1997-1999 Peace   Official 
  Clarification of Human Rights    Agreement (UN)  
   
  Violations and Act of Violence 
  which Caused Suffering to the 
  Guatemalan People 
 
Nigeria  Human Rights Violations   1999-2002 Executive Official 
  Investigation Commission  
 
Rwanda National Unity and Reconciliation  1999-present Legislature/ Official 
  Commission    (permanent Public Law 
       body in 2002) 
 
Cote d’Ivoire Mediation Committee for   2000-2001 Executive Official 
  National Reconciliation 
 
South Korea Presidential Truth Commission   2000-2004 Executive Official 
  on Suspicious Deaths  
 
Uruguay Commission for Peace   2000-2002 Executive Official 
 
Peru  Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2001-2003 Executive Official 
  Commission   
 
Panama  Panama Truth Commission   2001-2004 Executive Official 
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Serbia and Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2002-2003 Executive Official 
Montenegro for Servia and Montenegro 
 
Grenada Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2001-2006 Parliament Official  
   
Algeria  Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission in Charge  2003-2005 Executive Official 
  of the Question of Disappearances  
 
Ghana  National Reconciliation Commission 2003-2004 Executive Official 
 
Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2002-2004 Peace   Official 
Agreement 
Executive/ 
Legislature 
          
Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth, and 2002-2005 UNTAET Official 
(East Timor) Reconciliation 
 
Democratic Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2003-2007 Constitution Official 
Republic of 
Congo 
 
Chile  National Commission on   2003-2005 Executive Official 
  Political Imprisonment and Torture 
  (“Valech Commission”) 
 
Paraguay Truth and Justice Commission   2004-2008 Legislature Official 
 
Indonesia Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2004  Legislature Official 
 
Morocco  Equity and Reconciliation Commission 2004-2005 Royal Decree Official 
 
South Korea Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2005-2010 Legislature Official 
 
Liberia  Truth and Reconciliation Commission  2006-2009 Peace   Official 
  of Liberia      Agreement 
Legislature  
 
Ecuador Truth Commission to Impede Impunity 2007-2009 Ministerial  Official 
         Accord  
 
Kenya  Independent Review Commission of the 
  General Elections (“Kriegler Report”) 2008  African Union Official 
 
Kenya  Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation  2009-?  Legislature Official 
 
Mauritius  Truth and Justice Commission  2009-2011 Legislature Official 
 
Nepal  *Proposed    2009-?  ?  ? 
 
Honduras Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2010-2011 Executive Official 
 
Solomon  Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2010-2011 Legislature Official 
Islands 
 
210 
 
Columbia *Proposed    2017-?  Peace   Official 
         Agreement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
CODEBOOK 
Mechanism Type 
1 = Truth Commission 
2 = Reparations 
3 = Lustrations 
4 = Criminal Trials/tribunals  
5 = Amnesty 
 
Region 
1 = Asia 
2 = Africa 
3 = Latin America 
4 = North America 
5 = Western Europe 
6 = Eastern Europe  
7 = Oceania  
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Country 
Individual country where transitional justice mechanism was adopted.  
 
Countries included in the dataset:  
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, and Macedonia 
Brazil  
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic Chad 
Chile 
China 
Columbia 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Republic of the Congo 
Cote D’Ivoire  
Croatia 
Cuba  
Czech Republic 
Czechoslovakia 
Dominican Republic 
East Germany 
East Timor 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
France 
Gabon 
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Gambia  
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyzstan 
Laos 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania  
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar  
Namibia 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
North Korea 
North Yemen 
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Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papa New Guinea  
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russia 
Rwanda 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Serbia and Montenegro 
Sierra Leone 
Slovakia 
Somalia 
South Africa 
South Korea 
South Yemen 
Soviet Union 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Sweden 
Syria 
Taiwan 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela  
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Yugoslavia 
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Zambia 
Zimbabwe  
 
Year 
Calendar year in which a mechanism was adopted. 
 
Start-date 
Day, month, and year in which a mechanism started. 
-99 = missing 
 
End-date 
Day, month, and year in which a mechanism ended.  
-99 = missing 
 
CID 
CoW country ID number for the individual country where a transitional justice 
mechanism was adopted.  
 
Mechanism Level 
1 = Domestic 
2 = International 
3 = Hybrid  
 
Target 
1 = Government 
2 = Non-government 
3 = Both 
 
PreHR1 
CIRI’s PHYSINT score the year before a TJ mechanism was adopted.  
-99 = missing  
 
HREventYear 
CIRI’s PHYSINT score the year a TJ mechanism was adopted. 
-99 = missing 
 
HR1 
CIRI’s PHYSINT score one year after a TJ mechanism was adopted.  
-99 = missing  
 
HR5 
CIRI’s PHYSINT score five years after a TJ mechanism was adopted. 
-99 = missing 
 
HR10 
CIRI’s PHYSINT score ten years after a TJ mechanism was adopted. 
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-99 = missing  
 
EconPre 
GDP per capita one year before a TJ mechanism was adopted. 
-99 = missing 
 
EconEvent 
GDP per capita the year a TJ mechanism was adopted.  
-99 = missing 
 
EconPost 
GDP per capita one year after a TJ mechanism was adopted.  
-99 = missing 
 
Econ5 
GDP per capita five years after a TJ mechanism was adopted.  
-99 = missing 
 
Econ10 
GDP per capita ten years after a TJ mechanism was adopted.  
-99 = missing 
 
PolityPre 
PolityIV score one year before a TJ mechanism was adopted. 
-99 = missing 
 
PolityEvent 
PolityIV score the year a TJ mechanism was adopted. 
-99 = missing 
 
PolityPost 
PolityIV score one year after a TJ mechanism was adopted. 
-99 = missing 
 
Polity5 
PolityIV score five years after a TJ mechanism was adopted. 
-99 = missing 
 
Polity10 
PolityIV score ten years after a TJ mechanism was adopted. 
-99 = missing 
 
ConflictPre 
Dummy variable indicating whether conflict, measured by more than 25 annual battle-
deaths, occurred one year before a TJ mechanism. 
1 = More than 25 annual battle-related deaths 
216 
 
0 = Less than 25 annual battle-related deaths 
-99 = missing 
 
ConflictEvent 
Dummy variable indicating whether conflict, measured by more than 25 annual battle-
deaths, occurred one year before a TJ mechanism. 
1 = More than 25 annual battle-related deaths 
0 = Less than 25 annual battle-related deaths 
-99 = missing 
 
ConflictPost 
Dummy variable indicating whether conflict, measured by more than 25 annual battle-
deaths, occurred one year before a TJ mechanism. 
1 = More than 25 annual battle-related deaths 
0 = Less than 25 annual battle-related deaths 
-99 = missing 
 
Conflict5 
Dummy variable indicating whether conflict, measured by more than 25 annual battle-
deaths, occurred one year before a TJ mechanism. 
1 = More than 25 annual battle-related deaths 
0 = Less than 25 annual battle-related deaths 
-99 = missing 
 
Conflict10 
Dummy variable indicating whether conflict, measured by more than 25 annual battle-
deaths, occurred one year before a TJ mechanism. 
1 = More than 25 annual battle-related deaths 
0 = Less than 25 annual battle-related deaths 
-99 = missing 
 
Tc 
Dummy variable for whether a country adopted a truth commission or not. 1 = yes, 0 = 
no.  
 
Trial 
Dummy variable for whether a country adopt a criminal trial, or tribunal, or not. 1 = yes, 
0 = no. 
 
Amnesty 
Dummy variable for whether a country adopt an amnesty program or not. 1 = yes, 0 = no. 
 
Lustration 
Dummy variable for whether a country adopt a lustration program or not. 1 = yes, 0 = no. 
 
Reparation 
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Dummy variable for whether a country adopt reparations or not. 1 = yes, 0 = no. 
 
Tctrial 
Dummy variable for whether a country adopted a truth commission and trial. 1 = yes, 0 = 
no.  
 
Tcamnesty 
Dummy variable for whether a country adopted a truth commission and amnesty 
program. 1 = yes, 0 = no.  
 
Tcrep 
Dummy variable for whether a country adopted a truth commission and reparations. 1 = 
yes, 0 = no.  
 
Tclust 
Dummy variable for whether a country adopted a truth commission and lustration policy. 
1 = yes, 0 = no.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
 
Diagnostics for Statistical Models 
A. Peace Model Diagnostics (for Event Year Category in Model 1)  
 1. Outliers (appear to be somewhat problematic) 
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B. Democracy Model Diagnostics (for Event Year Category in Model 2) 
 1. Multicollinearity 
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2. Violation of Homoskedasticity and justification for robust standard errors  
 
 3. Model fit/functional form (appears to be appropriate) and test of outliers (do 
 not appear to be problematic) 
    Mean VIF        2.46
                                    
  mechtarget        1.24    0.805703
          7         1.06    0.947391
          6         1.55    0.643415
          5         2.28    0.439310
          4         2.90    0.345011
          3         1.51    0.662209
          2         1.73    0.578637
     nregion  
      peace1        1.55    0.645866
         hr1        1.91    0.523380
       econ1        4.29    0.233262
     amnesty        5.88    0.170065
 lustrations        1.79    0.558514
      trials        4.53    0.220656
          tc        2.18    0.458369
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
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C. Human Rights Model Diagnostics (for Event Year Category in Model 3) 
 
 1. Multicollinearity  
 
 
-20
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Inverse Normal
    Mean VIF       11.19
                                    
          2         2.52    0.396686
          1         2.60    0.384203
  mechtarget  
          6        18.43    0.054245
          5         9.11    0.109724
          4         3.96    0.252699
          3        29.90    0.033446
          2        44.56    0.022444
          1        36.99    0.027032
     nregion  
      peace2        1.15    0.870566
     polity2        1.76    0.568614
      lecon2        2.19    0.455586
     amnesty        6.02    0.166098
 lustrations        1.75    0.572466
      trials        4.61    0.216720
          tc        2.26    0.442871
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
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 2. Violation of Homoskedasticity and justification for robust standard errors 
 
 
 3. Model fit/functional form (appears to be appropriate) and test of outliers (do 
 not appear to be problematic) 
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D. Economic Model Diagnostics (for Event Year Category in Model 4) 
 
 1. Multicollinearity  
 
 
 
2. Violation of Homoskedasticity and justification for robust standard errors 
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3. Model fit/functional form (appears to be appropriate) and test of outliers (do 
  not appear to be problematic) 
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F. Combination Peace Model Diagnostics (for Event Year Category in Model 5) 
 
 1. Outliers (appear to be somewhat problematic) 
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G. Combination Democracy Model Diagnostics (for Event Year Category in Model 6) 
 
 1. Multicollinearity  
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    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
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2. Violation of Homoskedasticity and justification for robust standard errors 
 
 
3. Model fit/functional form (appears to be appropriate) and test of outliers (do 
  not appear to be problematic) 
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F. Combination Human Rights Model Diagnostics (for Event Year Category in Model 7) 
 
 1. Multicollinearity  
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2. Violation of Homoskedasticity and justification for robust standard errors 
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3. Model fit/functional form (appears to be appropriate) and test of outliers (do 
 not appear to be problematic) 
 
 
0
.05
.1
.15
.2
.25
D
e
n
s
it
y
-5 0 5
Residuals
Kernel density estimate
Normal density
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.3916
Kernel density estimate
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
N
o
rm
a
l 
F
[(
e
-m
)/
s
]
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Empirical P[i] = i/(N+1)
232 
 
 
 
G. Combination Human Rights Model Diagnostics (for Event Year Category in Model 8) 
 
 1. Multicollinearity  
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2. Violation of Homoskedasticity and justification for robust standard errors 
 
 
3. Model fit/functional form (appears to be appropriate) and test of outliers (do 
  not appear to be problematic) 
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Appendix D 
 
Study Survey & Interview Consent Form 
Dear Participant:  
 You are invited to participate in a research study that explores how the gacaca 
courts have contributed to reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. You can decide not to 
participate. The following information is provided in order to help you make a decision 
whether or not you would like to participate. If you have any questions, please do not 
hesitate to ask. 
Project: Did the Gacaca Courts Promote Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation in Post-
Genocide Rwanda?    
Purpose of the study: This study is an aspect of a dissertation focusing on what builds 
peace in the aftermath of war. In particular, this study is interested in exploring the ways 
in which the gacaca courts have contributed to social and political reconciliation in post-
genocide Rwanda. As part of a broader dissertation that examines the effectiveness and 
use of different transitional justice mechanisms worldwide (e.g., international criminal 
tribunals, truth commissions, amnesty provisions), the gacaca courts are used as a case 
study to explore whether hybrid approaches to transitional justice can work and whether 
the gacaca courts can be replicated in other post-conflict societies coming to terms with a 
legacy of human rights abusers and atrocities.   
Procedures: This interview will take approximately 15 to 20 minutes to complete. You 
will be asked a series of questions that ask your opinion and views on the gacaca courts. 
Risks and/or discomforts: Some questions may create difficult memories. If you feel as 
if you would like to stop the interview, you can do so at any time. You are more than 
welcome to end the interview at any time.   
Confidentiality: Your answers and information will be kept confidential. To ensure so, 
you are assigned a participant identification number, which will enable me to input and 
code your answers anonymously. After inputting the data, I will destroy all records I 
have.  
Benefits: The information gained from this study will help scholars, policymakers, and 
practitioners better understand what builds peace in the aftermath of war. In particular, 
your responses will help establish whether the gacaca courts can be replicated elsewhere. 
Your answers will also provide real-life data that is missing in existing studies.  
Contact information: 
 Eric Royer, PhD Candidate 
 Department of Political Science  
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 University of Missouri, St. Louis 
 Email: ebr3m4@mail.umsl.edu   
Phone: 314.803.7220  
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Appendix E 
Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
(All interviews were conducted by the author in English or through a translator) 
 
Date of Interview: 
 
Participant ID: 
 
Demographic Data 
 
Age: 
Sex: 
Profession/occupation: 
Place of residence: 
Highest level of education: 
 
Background Specific Questions  
 
1. For starters, could you please give me a brief description of your experience with the 
gacaca courts?  
 
2. Were you a participant?  
 
3. How many cases did you witness?  
 
4. What kinds of cases were held here?  
 
5. Do you think that most people were satisfied with the process? 
 
Gacaca Specific/Transitional Justice Questions  
 
1. It is my impression that the gacaca courts were an important step for Rwandans to 
move past the genocide. In your opinion, how has gacaca contributed to reconciliation? 
What else contributed to Rwanda’s post-genocide emergence?  
 
2. In what ways has gacaca built positive relations? Are there still underlying tensions? 
Was there any viable alternative to gacaca, in your opinion?  
 
3. Based on your personal experience, what are two or three strengths of the gacaca 
courts? What are two or three challenges?  
 
4. Could you please comment and/or give your opinion on the following questions: 
 What are two or three ways in which gacaca has contributed to human rights in 
Rwanda? Can you give me concrete examples? 
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 What is justice, and what does justice mean to you? What are two or three ways 
that gacaca has helped promote justice since the genocide? Can you give me 
concrete examples? 
 What are two or three ways in which gacaca has contributed to better 
relationships in Rwanda since the genocide? Can you give me concrete examples? 
 What are two or three ways in which gacaca is associated with economic 
development in Rwanda since the genocide? Can you give me concrete examples? 
 
5. Other countries in Africa, notably South Africa, have had a positive experience dealing 
with the past. Desmond Tutu said that it’s better to remember the past, rather than forget, 
in order to move forward. Can you give me two or three reasons why this is important? 
Or, can you give me two or three reasons why you think otherwise? 
 
6. Did gacaca help uncover what happened during the genocide? Has this process met 
your needs? What about victims and their families?  
 
7. Would you recommend this process to another country emerging from a period of war? 
How would a system similar to gacaca be beneficial? 
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Appendix F 
Survey Form A 
 
1. What is your age? ____________ 
 
2. What is your sex? 
1) Male 
2) Female 
 
3. What is your highest level of education? 
 
4. What is your occupation? _______________ 
 
5. What is your place of residency? _______________ 
 
6. Did gacaca work in your local community?  
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
 
7. Were people satisfied with the verdicts reached by inyangamugayo?  
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
 
8. Did gacaca promote national unity? 
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
 
9. Did gacaca establish the truth about what happened in your village during the genocide?  
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
 
10. Are there still underlying tensions/feelings of distrust in your community?  
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
 
11. Did gacaca do a good job investigating crimes committed in your village? 
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
 
12. Did gacaca meet your needs? 
1. Agree 
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2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
 
13. People told lies.  
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
 
14. People felt threatened.  
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
 
15. There was false evidence or testimony presented. 
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
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Appendix G 
Survey Form B 
 
1. What is your age? ____________ 
 
2. What is your sex? 
3) Male 
4) Female 
 
3. What is your highest level of education? 
 
4. What is your occupation? _______________ 
 
5. What is your place of residency? _______________ 
 
6. Did gacaca work in your local community?  
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
 
7. Were people satisfied with the outcomes of gacaca?  
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
 
8. Did gacaca promote reconciliation between victim and perpetrator?  
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
 
9. Did gacaca uncover what happened during the genocide?  
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
 
10. Are there still underlying tensions/feelings of distrust in your community?  
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
 
11. Did gacaca do a good job investigating crimes committed in your village? 
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
 
12. Did gacaca allow you to move forward?  
1. Agree 
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2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
 
13. People told lies.  
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
 
14. People felt threatened.  
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
 
15. There was false evidence or testimony presented. 
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
3. I don’t know 
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Appendix H 
 
Interview Methods Table 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
ID Interviewee  Status  Source/Loc* Format           Length** 
 
1 Gacaca judge  Conducted Sample  (R) Semi-structured 1hr 
    via email 
    & in person 
 
2 Gacaca judge  Conducted Sample (K) Semi-structured 1hr  
    via email 
& in person 
 
3 Gacaca participant Conducted Sample  (R) Semi-structured 45min 
    in person 
 
4 Gacaca participant Conducted Sample  (R) Semi-structured 40min 
    in person 
 
5 Gacaca attendee Conducted Sample  (R) Semi-structured 15min 
    in person 
 
6 Gacaca participant Conducted Sample  (R) Semi-structured 20min 
    in person 
 
7 Gacaca attendee Conducted Sample  (R) Semi-structured
 1hr15min 
    in person 
 
8 Gacaca attendee Conducted Sample  (K) Semi-structured 35min 
    in person 
 
9 Gacaca participant Conducted Sample  (K) Semi-structured 15min 
    in person 
 
10 Gacaca attendee Conducted Sample  (R) Semi-structured 30min 
    in person 
 
11 Gacaca attendee Conducted Sample (R) Semi-structured 45min 
    in person 
 
12 Gacaca attendee Conducted Sample (K) Semi-structured       1hr15min 
    in person 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
*Interviews conducted in Ruhengeri are marked by a (R); those conducted in Kigali are 
marked by a (K) 
**All times were rounded up to the nearest five-minute interval.  
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